

BRITISH OCCUPATION OF MANILA IN 1762: RESISTANCE AND DIFFERENT TYPE OF CAPTIVES*

OCUPACIÓN BRITÁNICA DE MANILA EN 1762: RESISTENCIA Y DIFERENTES TIPOS DE CAUTIVOS

BY

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ABSTRACT - RESUMEN

In 1762 Manila fell by surprise into British hands. From that moment on, a tenacious resistance to the invader began in a context of improvised irregular warfare that included native Filipinos and members of religious orders. Such confrontation gave rise to different behaviors regarding the various types of captives involved.

En 1762 Manila cae por sorpresa en manos británicas. A partir de ese momento comenzará una tenaz resistencia al invasor en un contexto de improvisada guerra irregular que incluyó nativos filipinos y religiosos. Tal confrontación dio pie a diferentes comportamientos respecto a los varios tipos de cautivos involucrados.

KEYWORDS - PALABRAS CLAVE

Manila; The Philippines; 1762; captives; resistance; irregular warfare; Spain-United Kingdom.

Manila; Filipinas; 1762; cautivos; resistencia; guerra irregular; España-Reino Unido.

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Despite the presence and relevance of the Military History of Spain during the Early Modern Age, the phenomenon of war-derived captivity is a field little analyzed by Spanish historiography until now, which is beginning to be echoed through recent studies. Around the 18th century, some studies have been publishing in Spanish, more or less detailed, by authors such as Manuel-Reyes García Hurtado, Agustín González Enciso, Aitor Pérez Blázquez, Tomás Pérez Delgado, Celia Parcero Torre or Evaristo Martínez-Radio. This last author is perhaps the one who has focused the most on this field in the last years¹, also coordinating recently a dossier together with Antonio José Rodríguez Hernández on the subject and the *Ancien Régime*². It is true that in the immediately preceding period there is also some study, although more of a punctual nature, with authors such as Maximiliano Barrio Gozalo or Antonio Jiménez Estrella. In the later one, there are already more references from the Napoleonic era onwards, such as María Zozaya Montes, Jean-René Aymes or Vicente Ruiz García, among others. However, there are fewer focused on such a phenomenon with respect to territories as far away as Asia and, in this case, the Philippines, which is what these lines intend to make known.

CONTEXT

Within the framework of the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), Spain came into conflict with the United Kingdom in January 1762 as a result of the so-called Third Pacte de Famille with France, signed in August of the previous year. The British seek to surprise the Hispanic Crown and launch a secret plan to attack Manila trying to undermine its ancient influence³, improve their own and

obtain commercial advantages from the hand of the East Indies Company, which will support the mission in exchange for dividing the loot and the government of the area. Moreover, a month after the taking of the city, the new invader authority will be Dawsonne Drake, an officer of the same⁴. Obviously, the official British version is different, as it alludes to its need in the face of the dangerous Bourbon pact and the consequent effort to diminish its power and prestige and that the Spanish ended up accepting an agreement with the British. In the secret instructions to this effect given to George Keppel, Earl of Albemarle—who, for his part, was to attack Cuba—it's indicated that the British Crown was forced to declare war on Spain, although had tried to avoid it:

[W]hereas we have been obliged by the haughty and imperious conduct of the Court of Spain to declare war against that Crown, notwithstanding the moderation with which we have constantly endeavoured to avoid that extremity... nothing will so essentially promote our service or so soon induce the enemy to listen to equitable and reasonable terms of accommodation⁵.

Thus, on 29 July an expedition set sail from Madras (India), anchoring the fleet commanded

to be said that, in spite of its relevance, the Philippine case in general has less echo in Spanish historiography than the American one, and more commonly to come to remember the events of the nineteenth century and does not usually involve as many studies as in that one. Even so, there were also conferences and studies about it, such as: Castañeda Delgado and García Abásolo, 1997 or the *XLV Jornadas de Historia Marítima, España en Filipinas, Ciclo de Conferencias, octubre 2012*, being published its acts in the monographic n.º 66 of the Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval, Madrid, 2012. It has to be highlighted some other authors, as it can be M^a Elisa Martínez de Vega or more recently María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso or Antoni Picazo Muntaner. But especially José Á. del Barrio Muñoz (2015), since it deals with the defensive measures in the same scenario some decades before, in the context of a great conflict as it was the War of the Spanish Succession.

⁴ He has to be distinguished, however, from the military governor, Captain William Brereton, with whom will have a tense relationship. It is noteworthy that Simón de Anda, whom we will refer to shortly, wrote to the King of Spain in October 1765 commenting that Captain Brereton had acted with honour. National Maritime Museum (Greenwich), Personal Collections, leg. BRE/1. About Brereton, see Brereton, 1919: 25; Brereton, 1779: 83-84.

⁵ National Archives (Kew) [NA], Colonial Office, Commonwealth and Foreign and Commonwealth Offices, leg. 117/1; Bush and Macomb, 1903: 439. On the causes of the attack, related to the economic benefits and interests of the East India Company, see Andrés Gallego, 2003: 204-207.

¹ Since 2012 he has been focusing on unraveling aspects such as the very definition of what a POW was and what it involved in the *Ancien Régime*, on humanity regarding prisoners, their worth and use of the same to obtain an advantage for the captor, such as being a source of information, or if they were a burden due to the duty to keep them together with the possible rejection or source of social conflict, the reasons for deserving a dignified treatment and what regulations could exist in this regard, the importance of capitulations or exchanges, their maintenance, etc. See Martínez-Radio Garrido, 2012; 2013; 2014; 2016; 2020; 2021; 2022.

² In the *Revista Universitaria de Historia Militar* (RUHM), vol. 9, no. 18, 2020.

³ Regarding to its origins, see Mollá Ayuso, 2019. It has

by Admiral Samuel Cornish in Cavite, port of Manila, on 22 September and that, with superior forces and quality of troops⁶, will end up taking the city on 6 October 1762. Simón de Anda, the leader of the resistance, says there were 13 warships, which is the figure that indicates Emilio Bernáldez too who, in addition, further specifies that the invader was a force of 6,830 attackers, who will launch up to 25,000 projectiles in the attack. The city was defended only by 1,000 men. It will be occupied until April 1764⁷, in a conflict that was not favourable to the Bourbon powers⁸ and it could have been worse if the British had achieved their goals in the Philippines.

Due to space concerns, it is not possible to detail the military operations. Therefore, this work focuses directly on an overview of lesser-known aspects related to prisoners and captives in those days. To begin with, referring to the interim governor himself, archbishop Manuel Antonio Rojo del Río y Vieyra⁹, although with a certain political power granted by the invaders, as will be seen.

THE FACTS

Focusing, then, on the different figures of those apprehended those days, according to the actions and facts, from the first moment the confrontation begins and with it the captives appear. Some significant, such as that of a nephew of the archbishop on the 24th, who will die as a result of the wounds inflicted by some Indians who didn't respect a parliamentary truce when approaching with an English officer with dispatches for the Spanish¹⁰.

Despite the adversity, the defenders didn't give in and on 5 October the storm was prepared with 40 Frenchmen who had previously taken prisoners in Pondicheri. They had to level the moat with the ruins of the bastion, register if there were any cuts that impeded the attackers' passage and report everything. They did it easily because they certainly did not meet resistance, with which then the final action began¹¹. Given the impossibility of defence, on the 6th the archbishop must capitulate on the word of honour that he would be respected, presenting himself to the English generals, although, in principle and at least for this fact, he didn't consider himself as a prisoner, which is a nuance to take into account¹². The archbishop handed over the capitulations to the winner, yielding in the payment of four million pesos in exchange for stopping the subsequent looting, respecting the religious and public buildings and the city itself and the use of their religion, among other freedoms¹³. In case of not paying, the agreement would not be respected and they would be shipped to India as prisoners. Regarding the four million pesos, one half was agreed to pay as soon as possible there and the other half insured with the Rojo del Río's signature against the ship called *Filipino*. She had to arrive from Acapulco with the annual consignment that the Viceroy of New Spain sent to Manila to cover the official expenses of the archipelago, together with the money earned by the merchants of the city by selling the goods from China in Acapulco. In case it did not cover the entire amount, it was owed against the Spanish Crown¹⁴. It wasn't the only thing. Along with the money, the invaders demanded that the islands be handed over to them under threat of

⁶ In this sense, Mercedes Meade notes that Manila was attacked by 15 warships under the command of Admiral Cornish, who landed with 3,000 men under Brigadier Draper. Meade de Angulo, 1992: 161; Bernáldez, 1857: 125; Archivo General de Indias (Seville) [AGI], Filipinas, leg. 388, doc. 51.

⁷ The occupation is collected in Porter Chandler, 1987: 160-161. This episode is detailed in Mas y Sanz, 1843: 122 and ff. On the plans of the area used by the British, necessary to collect information on the city and the information they handled, more or less truthful, see Mancini, 2018: 90-94.

⁸ The American version presents the British as absolute dominators everywhere. Literally, "the British were successful everywhere". *Annual Reports of the War...*: 439, although Spain was not as damaged as one might expect. In this regard, see Riera Palmero, 2015: 644; Andrés Gallego, 2003: 205-206.

⁹ On the archbishop and these facts, see Fernández Duro, 1895-1903: 83 and ff.; Buzeta and Bravo, 1851: 264.

¹⁰ These facts are nuanced with the information handled by the US government, still based on the Marquis of Ayerbe: "The English captured that day [24 September] a sampan (Chi-

nese boat) of Sangleyes (Chinese traders) [...] A nephew of the archbishop (the acting governor-general), with Captain D. José Cerezo, a sublieutenant, and his boatswain were taken prisoners [...] and when captured was conveying to Manila the nephew of the archbishop with dispatches for that official". Bush and Macomb, 1903: 448-449.

¹¹ Mas y Sanz, 1843: 131; Bush and Macomb, 1903: 440.

¹² "[C]on la condición y palabra de honor [to deal personally with the capitulations] de la indemnidad de su persona; de que no iba Su Señoría Ilustrísima prisionera ni se tenía por tal". Testimony of the notary (*escribano*) Ramón de Orendain, on 8 October 1762. AGI, Estado, leg. 44, n.º 66.

¹³ Mas y Sanz, 1843: 122-133. Carlos Vila refers to this fact as that he surrendered before an agreement had been reached in the ongoing talks on capitulation. Vila Miranda, 2007: 181.

¹⁴ Mas y Sanz, 1843: 176-177 and 205-206; Mas y Sanz, 1843: 133; Andrés Gallego, 2003: 208.




Figure 1. British plan on the attack on Manila in 1762. Source: *Plan of Manila, capital of the Philippine Islands, taken by Storm the 6. October 1762, by the English Army Commanded by Brigadier General Draper with the united Efforts of His Majestys Squadron commanded by Rear Admiral Cornish*. Royal Library (Windsor), Royal Collection Trust, Other 18th/19th-century conflicts, RCIN 733068.

putting all the Spaniards to the sword, with which the archbishop acceded, intimidated, requesting obedience to the British, something he couldn't legally if he was captive (regardless of how he considered himself, he wasn't free either). It has to be said that he ordered the silver that had been withdrawn to be brought to the province of Laguna de Hay, but the Franciscans Friars refused. The archbishop's attitude during the occupation, temporizing with the enemy (regardless of the pressure he might have) led to a strong confrontation with Simón Anda, who even calls him a traitor¹⁵. In any case, neither the occupants will get

such a sum nor the city was spared looting, as was the custom of the time. In the words of the bailiff Fray Julián de Arriaga to the Marquis de Grimaldi, Minister of State, on 12 December 1763, "that common [population of Manila] also suffered the violence that, without regard to capitulations, offered the greed of the enemy and the confusion of his disorderly dominion"¹⁶. In fact, in 1765, Cornish himself will allude to the fact that the Spanish had promised him the money from the *Filipino*, obtaining evasive replies to deliver it and even using hostages to it: "...they had even sent hostages on our ships to convince us that we

¹⁵ It is said that his actions, despite coming from force, caused him such sadness that it led to his death on 30 January 1764. The invaders respected him and gave him magnificent funerals. As a curiosity, after his death, his heart was taken to Mexico. AGI, Filipinas, leg. 388, n.º 51. Mas y Sanz, 1843: 172-174; Mercedes Meade de Angulo, 1992: 161-162; Buzeta

and Bravo, 1851: 278; Vila Miranda, 2007:181-183; Andrés Gallego, 2003:207-208; Ruiz Gutiérrez, 2013: 339-340.

¹⁶ Translated from Spanish [from now onwards, TfS]. AGI, Estado, leg. 44, n.º 66. Although such writing does not explicitly refer to looting and could refer to a more general situation.

would receive it”¹⁷. At the beginning of the year 1764, the East India Company was already aware that those responsible for the Royal Treasury in the Spanish Court were refusing the payment against the King by the governor and archbishop. That is why, when the English withdrew from the city in April, they did so without having collected the intended two million. The event gave rise to a fluid correspondence between the Marquis of Grimaldi and the Spanish ambassador in London, the prince Masserano, regarding the British claims to receive the money to avoid the sacking of the capital and the Spanish inconveniences to provide it. The first alludes to the fact that it was singular that the English wanted to receive the amount granted (more than possible) from “prisoners or vanquished”, something that is not worthy of “cultured nations”. According to him, the archbishop had made such an “extravagant order of payment” (*libranza*) out of fear, “trembling that otherwise, not only would the Spanish possessions suffer cruel havoc, but also religion, which was what most distressed him”¹⁸. Presumably, an image of England as a nation with a taste for prey was thus strengthened among the Spanish. Regarding the conditions of the occupiers in terms of defeated combatants, they are not new. It was provided that the officers would be considered prisoners of war on parole, being able to carry their swords. At the same time, the troops would be disarmed and everyone would be treated humanely (like the Spanish will say for their part). No longer as prisoners, other captives, as they are hostages, are also referred to as guarantors of compliance with the demands for payment of the four million pesos in the two mentioned payments¹⁹.

Notwithstanding, although the assailants took the capital, they did not control the situation and a tenacious resistance began, with the clerics playing a special role. This did not escape Colonel William Draper, commanding the Army, more that played by the Franciscans, and tried to win them over unsuccessfully with respect and the media-

tion of the archbishop. Among the rebels, the *P. exprovincial* Fr. Remigio Hernández stood out²⁰, who did not recognize the British authority and was active in the struggle to the extent of seeing a price placed on his head. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that the resistance had a strong defence of Catholicism against Protestants and Muslims.

We have to bear in mind here that the defence of Catholicism united with the Spanish Crown is key. It is very evident in a response from Simón de Anda to the archbishop on 20 October, when he alludes to that he achieved that “all its inhabitants are willing to admit no other religion than the one they profess, or any other domain than that of our Catholic monarch (may God preserve)” (translated from Spanish). The resistance becomes more tenacious when, before knowing the Peace of Paris, the offensive and defensive alliance requested by the English with the kinglet of Jolo is published, prisoner (with which it would not be valid either, as we will see). It is true that the archbishop had written a letter to the British government protesting this, but he was answered that the invaders had the right to request such an alliance with the Joloans in the absence of compliance on the Spanish side (not having paid)²¹.

On the other hand, Draper ordered the Spanish authorities to be brought together so that they would cede their sovereignty to His Britannic Majesty, what he got only under physical threat on those people, and that it was not accepted in any way by the rebellion embodied in a 62-year-old man from Alava called Simón de Anda y Salazar; by the taking of Manila and Cavite not all the Philippine islands had to capitulate:

I am well aware that your Honour, my Real Audiencia, and the authorities of the city and the Crown in Manila, as prisoners of war, or in the concept that they estimate, capitulate by imperative of the circumstances, and respect what is signed, if it were in accordance with reason and law of war; but I understand this, and it must be understood as to that capital, Cavite and its inhabitants... By no means regarding the rest of the provinces, which as governor, although unworthy, I will defend until the last drop of my blood is shed²².

¹⁷ TfS: “[I]ncluso habían enviado rehenes en nuestros barcos para convencernos de que lo recibiríamos”.

¹⁸ TfS. 2 January 1764. AGI, Estado, leg. 44, n.º 28; Vila Miranda, 2007: 204-212.

¹⁹ No longer as prisoners, other captives, as they are hostages, are also referred to as guarantors of compliance with the demands for payment of the four million pesos in the two mentioned payments. Signed by Cornish and Draper on 6 October. Vila Miranda, 2007: 209-210; Bush and Macomb, 1903: 453.

²⁰ Native of Piedrahita (Ávila), they put a price for his capture just like Simon de Anda. Pérez, 1901: 243-244.

²¹ Mas y Sanz, 1843: 175-176; Andrés Gallego, 2003: 212.

²² TfS: “[E]ntiendo muy bien que V.S.I., mi Real Audiencia, ciudad y cuerpo de reales oficiales, como prisioneros de guerra, o en el concepto que los estimen, capitulen por preci-

For his part and with honor in this sense, the Frenchman Monsieur Fallar behaved. He served in the capital and had fought the invaders (therefore, he was also a captive), and did not accept the Zamboanga government that they offered him if he seized it by force²³. But returning to the subject we are concerned and Simón de Anda, it must be said here how he could address the enemy in that tone of authority. Well, on the eve of the fall of the city and its imminent surrender, the title of lieutenant governor was given to the most modern *oidor* (judge), that was him, who came out of it such a day. Once verified, assumed all the functions and positions of governor, captain general and president of the Royal Court in Manila (Real Audiencia) to maintain the sovereignty of the King of Spain, since the rest of the authorities were captive, thus being the only one with full legitimacy until they were released. He stated it by edict published already on 5 October²⁴, by specifying that the institutional representatives were “deprived and prevented from the use, exercise and authority of their posts”, according to the Laws 180°, 57° and 58° of the title XV, Book II of the *Laws of the Indies*, being him, therefore, the only legal authority. This is how Anda will expose it repeatedly, as in his correspondence and edicts of 11 April and 9 July 1763 or 8 April 1764, by stating clearly that, as the Spanish authorities were prisoners of war, “they could not govern”²⁵.

sión, y observen lo que se llegue a firmar, si fuese conforme a razón y derecho de guerra; pero esto lo entiendo, y debe entenderse cuanto a esa capital, Cavite y sus habitantes... De ningún modo en cuanto al resto de las provincias, que como gobernador, aunque indigno, defenderé hasta derramar la última gota de mi sangre”. Mas y Sanz, 1843: 138-147.

²³ *Ibid.*: 137. The question is why. The details are not known, if by conviction or honour or having material interests more linked to the Bourbon dynasty, whatever these were.

²⁴ Edict published by José de Villegas Flores, royal and public notary of the deceased's property, also performed the functions of Escribano de Cámara y Gobernación until the former notaries returned, according to postliminium law and reflected in a letter from Simón de Anda on 6 June 1764. AGI, Filipinas, 609, n.º 2.

²⁵ TFS. AGI, Filipinas, leg. 388, ns 51 and 57; leg. 609, n.º 2; Vila Miranda, 2007: 187-188; Díaz Arenas, 1830: chapters “División territorial eclesiástica” and “Tribunal de la Real Audiencia”. On the lack of authority of the captive authorities at the time see Martínez-Radio Garrido, 2014: 136; Bielfeld, 1771: 307-309. It reminds the subsequent Peninsular War as Anda acts as the boards created without a king but in his name and in exile. In one of those edicts of 19 May, the heading is “We, the president and *oidores* of the Real Audiencia, Governor of the Philippine Islands by His Catholic Majesty, &c.”

So, without wasting a moment he began in this way to organize the resistance from Bacolor de la Pampanga, almost without means, but with the help of the men of religious orders who went through the villages preaching, praying and helping within their capabilities. Faced with such an attitude, Draper let Roja y Ríos continue in the civilian government, claiming that he dealt only with the military, always for the British benefit, obviously. This included urging Simón de Anda to depose his attitude, although without success, as has been said.

This fact is paradoxically parallel to the case of Sultan Mahamad Alimudin (called Fernando I by the Spanish), kinglet of Jolo, in principle ally of the Spaniards, taking up arms against the invaders and who had embraced Catholicism. He was captured by the British and then made a pact with them. Later General Draper obtained the island of Balambangan for the East Indies Company, north of Borneo²⁶. The complaint of the Spanish governor of Manila for a possible British commercial expansion in the area, reaching 1769, led to a reply from Alexander Dalrymple²⁷ (apparently consulted as an expert) to Lord Weymouth²⁸ in which, in a part of his analysis, he contradicts the own behaviour of the occupants with the archbishop. The Spanish point out that the British could not agree with Alimudin as they already had an agreement with him. However, Dalrymple alleges that it is not valid because, when it was done, he was in Manila and did not enjoy full freedom or royal dignity (thus contradicting British conduct regarding the Rojas y Ríos case). In other words, Dalrymple says that Alimudin was not re-

(TFS), which remembers those of the mentioned boards of the Peninsular War. Mas y Sanz, 1843: 184-185.

²⁶ In this sense, Simón Anda on 9 July 1763 refers to him, commenting that the English had allied with Alimudin and his son, Prince Israel. García de Arboleya, 1851: 28; British Library [BL], India Office Records [IOR] H/102: 359-360. AGI, Filipinas, leg. 388, n.º 51.

²⁷ He had been acting governor in Manila in March 1764, with which it is without a doubt for that reason that he should have been consulted in the litigation. At that time, he appropriated a Spanish documentary collection of great worth, that led to England and served for other advances and events later and unfairly considered British discoveries. See Jáuregui-Lobera, 2018: 547-548. On Brereton, Dalryple, the campaign and the lack of English resolution in the Philipinnes, see Fry, 2020: 145.

²⁸ Thomas Thynne, I Earl of Bath and III Viscount of Weymouth (1734-1796), who was appointed Secretary of State for the Northern Department in January 1768.

ally free, since he was under Spanish custody and protection. And, according to him, less because the kinglet had embraced Christianity, with which he would be unable to carry out such an agreement while Sulu was a Muslim state. That is, he could not rule in Sulu because he was not free or because he professed the faith of his subjects²⁹. By the way, it must be said that, even though he was a prisoner of the invaders, he corresponded with Anda and asked him to continue being maintained by the Spanish, as he was up to that moment.

Meanwhile, Simón de Anda, with few means and improvising, continued to organize the resistance against the English at the same time that he put down the uprising in Pangasinan, encouraged directly and indirectly by the British presence. It was extended from November 1762 to March 1765³⁰. He also had help from religious orders here, coming to offer complete forgiveness to the insurgents if they returned to order and even offering his only son hostage as a sign of good faith. However, the island was not taken in its entirety, harassing the invader with loyal indigenous people, also under the command of some clerics. The fact of the active participation of these men of God in their rebellion weighed on their captive brothers within the walls. At the beginning, those from the Manila convent were allowed to go out for a walk sometimes within the city, but suddenly they were deprived of such a concession, treating them as traitors while they favoured Anda's fight. Thus, the British shipped twelve of them to Europe.

Meanwhile, he, assisted by the Asturian Pedro José de Bustos, instructed the civilian population in the handling of weapons regardless of social class or sex, that also helped with what they could with the clerics mentioned. A highlight in a coordinated task between them was to seek desertion in the invading ranks and to form a considerable force of opposition to them. In such labour

and among his compatriots taken in Pondicheri, a French sergeant stood out, who is named as *Bretaña* (Brittany). In fact, he himself had defected and been made captain by Anda. That is, from those who had come prisoners and facilitated the storm³¹. The change of side of the French who had facilitated the assault is also significant, which indicates that there were no strict control measures, either due to British incapacity or other reasons. In the same way, one can think of the prisoner's attractiveness in collaborating with one or the other, apart from being more or less forced by the British in the initial fight. It is possible to suspect then that perhaps there, with the passage of time and resistance, they considered that the winning side would not finally be the British, as well as that they would have more connection with the Spanish as they came from the same dynasty, cause and creed.

By that time a way out of the war was already being sought, signing the preliminaries for peace at Fontainebleau on 3 November 1762, that later gave rise to the definitive Treaty of Paris signed on 10 February 1763³².

Even so, on the ground, the fight continued and at the beginning of March Don Francisco Leandro de Viana, the public prosecutor in the Audiencia—who had fled the city and had just joined Simón de Anda—, said that “the English don't even own what the Manila cannon has in range”³³. This statement matches with the words of Simón de Anda himself of 9 July 1763, referring to his own attitude of struggle:

... despite the hateful and null capitulations [which, therefore, he does not recognize] with which the islands were ceded to him, [the enemy] could only dominate what was reached by the cannon shot from the two strongpoints [Manila and Cavite] and [I] reduced him to such an ignominious narrowness that he had no freedom exceeding that area, in such a way that the enemy, being the victor, suffered misery, famines and oppressions in the plans of his triumph, seeing himself compelled to maintain a continuous vigil for not having security even within his walls³⁴.

²⁹ Response to Lord Weymouth on 1 May 1769. BL, IOR/H/100: 177-178 and 181-188; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 609, n.º 7.

³⁰ The insurrection was not general: “the other provinces of the islands were calm and remained in the obedience of the King of Spain, under the orders of Mr. Anda”. Furthermore, those of Bulacan and Pampanga “not only kept faithful, but they were the only resource of the Spanish” (TfS). Mas y Sanz, 1843: 147-149, 160 and 192-193; Buzeta and Bravo, 1851:187. While the Spanish also had to face this uprising, a war against Portugal took place. For their part, the English were immersed in war with the Indians of North America.

³¹ Mas y Sanz, 1843: 166. Regarding his nickname, it could be because of his origin, but this is a hypothesis.

³² Gómez Ranera, 1845: 164-165. *Tratado definitivo...*, 1763.

³³ “[L]os ingleses no son dueños ni aún de lo que alcanza el cañón de Manila”. Andrés Gallego, 2003: 213.

³⁴ TfS. AGI, Filipinas, leg. 388, n.º 57.

Another point is that Anda was not incommunicado with the Manila captives. He corresponded with authorities and messages were sent through religious and secular. Thus he had news about the prosecutor Viana and the *oidor* Villacorta. The latter enjoyed a certain freedom in his captivity and, precisely, when the British authorities realized that he was sending correspondence and even money to another person, they sentenced him to hang, although he will finally save his life thanks to the intercession of the archbishop³⁵. Therefore, the city was almost under siege immersed in a war of irregular color.

In the end, the British were unable to settle in the Philippines or exercise effective control of an area that interested them³⁶. From July to September, the cessation of hostilities is sought in the area and, what it comes to captives, the British gave more freedom to those they had in the city³⁷. However, there were other clashes, which did not cease until the death of the archbishop at the end of January 1764. After the funerals, negotiations began on the delivery of the city, which the king's first lieutenant, Don Francisco de la Torre, took by the hand of Anda on 17 March³⁸. When the invaders left, de la Torre employed English prisoners in the troops (so these had stayed after the signing of the peace)³⁹. It should be also noted that, despite the taking of the city, the British did not get control of the area, being the correspondence between rebels and captives a good proof of this. Proof of that lack of control was the correspondence between the resistance and the cap-

tives to give strength to the fight and undermine the invader forces. In the case of Alimudín, even receiving help in full rebellion. In fact, such correspondence took place leading to British suspicion, taking more restrictive measures and then softened when seeing the end of hostilities.

Regarding the prisoners of war themselves, the common thing at the time was that the expenses of the captives were paid by their State of origin. This is our case, in a procedure that was maintained throughout the century. In Fontainebleau's preliminary articles the 24 stands out, by which they would be reciprocally restored, paying their respective nations for the debts they have contracted as well as the expenses of their maintenance. In the definitive Treaty of Paris, the issue is qualified in article 3, since it includes in such terms the figure of the hostage along with prisoners⁴⁰. In relation to the Manila captives, the problem was how to keep them, as they were also civilians and Crown employees⁴¹. The archbishop was concerned about it and had to take care of, first, regulate and then pay their salaries as best he could. He left it in written on 22 December 1762. In a delicate situation, he stated that he had received 8,864 Spanish pesos for this purpose, with which he had to deliver that sum to another person who, obviously, had to be commissioned by the British authorities in the new situation⁴². What is interesting here is that, despite the looting, such a sum was advanced by way of loan from the British authorities "to pay the salaries of the employees in his Royal service [of Spain] that were taken prisoners in that capital". Obviously, to be reimbursed by the Spanish Crown⁴³. He will be remembered on 1 March 1763, when he wrote to Julián de Arriaga, Secretary of State for the King and the Office of Navy and Indies, in terms that such money was essential for the maintenance of the captives. According to his words, it took time to release the amount advanced by the British up to that date, taking place on the eve of the English

³⁵ Mas y Sanz, 1843: 161-170.

³⁶ Article 23 of the Treaty of Paris provides that all territories conquered by one power or another not included in it, would be restored, which included Manila—even being exchanged for an area of Florida—as it alludes to on 21 April 1763 Charles Wyndham, II Earl of Egremont, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, to Richard Neville Aldworth-Neville, secretary to the embassy at Paris and British plenipotentiary there (until the arrival of the Earl Hertford in May). NA, State Paper Office, 78/256/118; *Tratado definitivo...*, 1763: 199.

³⁷ Mas y Sanz, 1843: 187-188. Meanwhile, in September of that year the frigate of the Company of the Indies *Albion* arrived in England with some Spanish prisoners taken in that city and on the *Santísima Trinidad* galleon. *Gaceta de Madrid*, n.º 43, 25 October 1763: 347-348.

³⁸ Letter from Simón de Anda y Salazar on the recovery of Manila, 8 April 1764. Buzeta and Bravo, 1851:264-265; AGI, Filipinas, leg. 388, n.º 57; Mas y Sanz, 1843: 190-191.

³⁹ Royal Charter of 7 June 1767, that responds to a letter from the King's Lieutenant, Francisco Javier de la Torre, of 21 May 1765. AGI, Filipinas, 335, L.17, F.415R-418R.

⁴⁰ *The London Chronicle or Universal Evening Post*, n.º 972, vol. XIII, from Thursday 17 to Saturday 19 March 1763: 268. *Tratado definitivo...*, 1763: 49, 51, 153 and 155.

⁴¹ When falling into the enemy's hand, jobs, allowances, businesses and salaries dependent on the Spanish Crown are lost.

⁴² Copy in the Admiral Cornish documents, included in BL, IOR, H/77: 127 and ff.

⁴³ TFS. See in this regard Martínez-Radio Garrido, 2016: 30. On the specification of the type of captive and, specifically, by war at that time, *ibid.*: 30-32 and 52.

fleet leaving Manila. However, the archbishop recorded it in triplicate, thus avoiding that there would be no problem in having such a fact recognized and, presumably, avoiding putting himself in compromise with the interested parties in front of the British Crown. It is not strange either, since, as we have just seen, the costs and payments of salaries generally had to be paid by the captives' own nations of origin, and the governments of the captors could advance them. It is interesting to give a humanitarian treatment for the enemy to do the same and, on the other hand, an offense to the prisoners, as representatives of their King, would be an offense to the King himself.

CONCLUSIONS

The taking of Manila by the British in 1762, was a blow that surprised the Spanish Crown. During the period of the occupation there are aspects that recall the future Peninsular War (1808-1814), as there is a power vacuum supplied with an improvised government out of the capital, in the name of legality, leading an irregular liberation struggle, with a popular tinge and in defence of Catholicism. In this context, we look at the variety of captives that originated the occupation and their different role, with which both attackers and defenders/resistance had to act⁴⁴. To begin with, and among them, the figure of the governor himself, archbishop Manuel Antonio Rojo del Río y Vieyra, who despite this, could exercise political functions, thus being not recognized and despised by the resisters but appreciated by the invaders. In his case, Draper let him continue with these functions. Presumably it was not a meaningless measure of grace, but rather that it would be a Spaniard and above all an authority of faith, thus taking more weight before the resistant Catholic population. That is, he would be obeyed better than if he were an invader, also a Protestant, and that he could also favour the spread of Islam in the area that the British presence could make easier. His character more submissive to the British authorities, who saw in him an ally or, at least, an instrument to defend their interests of control over the area, led him to open confrontation with Simón de Anda, who embodied the rebellious spirit for and

before the Spanish Crown. It is true that Rojo del Río was able to act protecting the private interests of the Spanish captives, as demonstrated by his concern for the accounts of their maintenance. Notwithstanding, it is true that the rebelliousness that would be expected of him was not revealed and he would not be authorized to order any measure according to the custom of the time. Perhaps because of his character as a religious man or because of the pressure of the enemy and for not making the situation worse. In front of him, Anda acts firmly, reaffirming himself in his position and discrediting the one who, although at the time he alluded to signing the surrender without considering himself a prisoner (which would then give him greater power), was not free or had no choice. Neither did the rest of the captive authorities, who, on the eve of the fall of the city and in anticipation of it, had given full authority to Simón de Anda. He was very clear in his edicts by clearly stating that, as the Spanish authorities were prisoners of war, "they could not govern", they didn't have authority until they were released. In a similar sense and for their part, the clerics, present at all times, did not escape captivity and also came to be considered prisoners of war due to the nature of the struggle in defence of Catholicism of the resistance or being collaborators with it.

As has been said, the context of the resistance had an irregular character. This fact in itself gives two types of captives, for being military or irregular forces, before or after the capitulation. With this and at a general level, among the figures that we detect as captives, we must differentiate between combatants and civilians. The first, on both sides (something evident), among which there were even those who changed ranks. Among the latter, apart from collaborators with the struggle, those who depended on the grace measures of their captors and the archbishop for their maintenance. One should also refer to the figure of the hostage, who was used as a guarantor of agreements, measures of good faith, pressure on the enemy or even as a messenger.

It should be also noted that, despite the taking of the city, the British did not get control of the area, being the correspondence between rebels and captives a good proof of this.

It is also significant that the clerics within the walls could be considered traitors due to the attitude of the rebels. It is understood, therefore, that a captive, having accepted his condition, should maintain order and not help the resistance, be-

⁴⁴ It is true that the sources seem to show a lack of information on the captive natives.

cause then he is a traitor. And no matter whether he is a man of God or not in such a consideration. The question is to whom, since it would be to continue with the resistance. Therefore, it would be to the King of England for breaking his word and, equally, to his own monarch as guarantor of his honour.

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