THEBAN VICTORY AT HALIARTOS (395 B.C.)

BY

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RESUMEN - ABSTRACT

Este trabajo examina la batalla de Haliarto (395 B.C.) analizando la estrategia de los contendientes, los contingentes que concurrieron en ambos bandos y las rutas que siguieron los diferentes ejércitos hasta el campo de batalla, especialmente Lisandro, que empleó una ruta por el interior de Beocia, la ruta de Koutoumoulia y Evangelistria, y acampó en torno a la actual Mazi, aproximadamente a un kilómetro al sur de Haliarto, y presenta la batalla en gran medida como una emboscada tebana.

This paper reviews the battle of Haliartos (395 B.C.) analyzing the strategy of the contenders, both sides contingents and the routes followed by the armies in their way to the battlefield, especially Lysander, who used an inland boiotian route, the route of Koutoumoulia and Evangelistria, and camped in the surroundings of modern Mazi about one kilometre to the south of Haliartos, and drew up in battle to a great extent as a Theban ambush.

PALABRAS CLAVE - KEYWORDS

Grecia antigua, Historia militar, Beocia, Esparta.

Ancient Greece, Military History, Boiotia, Sparta.

1. THE SPARTAN INVASION

In 395, less than a decade after the Peloponnesian War had ended, the (First) Boiotian War1 broke out, prelude and part of another widespread conflict, which would last for nine years before the King’s Peace was signed in the spring of 386, commonly called the Korinthian War, in which Sparta and her allies fought against a coalition of states that included, amongst others2, Athens, the Boiotian Confederacy, Argos and Korinth, supported by Persia. To use the language of Thoukydides (1.23.6), the main cause, ἀληθεστάτη

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2 In addition to those mentioned, the alliance included, from 394 onwards, Larissa, the whole of Euboia, Leukas, Akarnania, Amprakia, the Chalkidians of Thrake, both Lokrians, Athamanians, Malians and Ainians (Diod.14.82.1-10; X.HG.4.2.17; Tod GHI.2, n°s 101, 102 and 103).
πρόφαστες, lay in the fear of Spartan imperialism, which the mainland Greek states perceived to be such a serious threat that they were prepared to face a war if it would check Spartan ambition (Hornblower, 1990: 123).

The Boiotian War is the name given specifically to the first year of the Korinthian War and began with a confrontation between Phokians and Lokrians, probably the Eastern Lokrians, followed by an incursion by Lokrians and Boiotians into Phokis (Hell.Ox.21.5), Sparta’s main ally in central Greece. After these initial skirmishes, which served as immediate causes that ignited the conflagration, late in the summer of 395, the Lakedaimonians planned a two-pronged invasion of Boiotia by the northwest and the southwest, which would culminate in the battle of Haliartos. Apart from some criticism of the sources, this battle has in general, received little attention from scholars.

The Spartan plan was that Lysander, with a small Peloponnesian contingent, would land in Phokis and, after mustering Sparta’s allies in central Greece, would invade Boiotia from the northwest. Meanwhile, King Pausanias, with the bulk of the Lakedaimonian and Peloponnesian army, would attack it from the southwest through the Kithairon, the mountain chain separating Attica and Megara from Boiotia. The two armies would converge in the Boiotian city of Haliartos on a pre-arranged date and attack the Boiotians and the Athenians, who would come to the aid of the Boiotians. Haliartos occupied a strategic position between the east and west of Boiotia (Buck, 1994: 38) and Spartan control would practically deny the Thebans access to the western half of Boiotia. Moreover Haliartos was less than a day’s march from Thebes, the most populous and important city of Boiotia, and from there the Spartans would be able to plunder Theban territory with relative ease.

The Spartans probably hoped to win a swift (Buckler, 2003: 79) and decisive victory in a pitched battle. The Spartans also set themselves other fundamental objectives: they would have been aware of the resentment brewing in some Boiotian cities, particularly Orchomenos, at Theban hegemony so the double Spartan invasion aspired to promote the defection of the Boiotian cities, which would lead to the break up of the Confederacy. Lakedaimonian strategy also recognised the need to reassert a Spartan presence amongst her allies in central Greece, since, as we said, Phokis had just been invaded by the Lokrians and Boiotians, and Sparta needed to prove she would not abandon her allies or allow them to be attacked with impunity.

In themselves, the proposed attack on Boiotia from the northwest and the idea of a two-pronged invasion to provoke dissent within the Confederacy were nothing new and both had been part of Athenian strategy during the Archidamian War. In 426, the Athenian

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3 Hell.Ox. 19.1, 21.1-5, 14; Paus.3.9.7-11 and X.HG.3.5.3-4, whose accounts differ considerably, particularly concerning whether Opuntian or Eastern Lokris (Xenophon) or the Hesperian or Western Lokris (Hellenika Oxyrhynchia and Pausanias) was involved. However, whichever Lokris was the combatant, it was a recognised friend and ally of the Thebans (X H.G.3.5.4: φίληται τε καὶ σύμμαχον εἶναι) or had always been a friend (Hell.Ox.13.3: εἰ πότε πέμπει φιλίας), which is truer of Eastern Lokris.

4 We have essentially followed the chronology of Beloch. GG 3.1.67-70. This dates the Boiotian and Lokrian invasion of Phokis to the end of May 395 and the battle of Haliartos to August. On the chronology of the Korinthian War in general, see: Funke, 1980: 76-101.

5 X.HG.3.5.17; Diod.14.84.1; Plut.Lys.28.2; Paus.3.5.3-4; Seager, 1994: 99.

6 Westlake, 1985: 119-133, which is still the fundamental work, especially with regard to the sources. He also attempts to reconcile the sources in order to obtain a coherent account of the battle. See also Cook, 1981: 280-300 and Buckler, 2003: 79-82 (undoubtedly one of the best).

7 Nepos (Lis.3.4) claims that Lysander was sent to help the Orchomenians, suggesting that the city defected before the Spartan invasion. This assertion lacks any basis since Orchomenos broke away from the Boiotian Confederacy when Lysander reached the gates of the city and not before (X.HG.3.5.6; Plut.Lys.28.1-2; Cook 1981: 257, n. 41). Orchomenos, with an area (198 km²) rather less than average for a Boiotian federal district (225-250 km²) had to bear the charges of a complete district and probably two thirds of another (cf. Hell.Ox.19.3; Pascual, 1996, 138-140).
strategos Demosthenes, who had invaded Leukas, allowed the Messenians of Naupaktos to convince him to wage a campaign against the Aitolians (Th.3.95-98). However, Demosthenes’ plan went much further than a simple incursion into Aitolia. Once he had defeated the Aitolians, he planned to attack Boiotia with the forces available to him: a few hundred epibatai that had come with the ships⁸, together with the Aitolians, Hesperian Lokrians, Messenians, Zakynthians and Kephallenians, without the need for any additional troops from Athens. In this way, starting from Aitolia, he planned to cross Western Lokrian territory to Kyтинion in Doris, and from there he would cross Phokis and invade Boiotia.⁹

In 429 an Athenian fleet of sixty ships, commanded by the strategos Nikias, had set sail from Oropos with two thousand hoplites, and must have landed in Tanagraian territory. At the same time an expeditionary force marching overland from Athens would join forces with them to plunder Tanagraian lands. The rendezvous took place, the Tanagraians and other Boiotians came out to do battle with them but they were defeated (Th.3.91). In 424, in the campaign that ended in Athenian defeat at the battle of Delion, the Athenians also planned a two-stage attack on Boiotia. In a first phase the Boiotian democrats would try to stir up a revolt in Chaironeia, a polis situated in the west of Boiotia and subject at that time to Orchomenos, and Siphai, a polis which was a port on the Gulf of Korinth also dominated by Thespiai. The democratic revolts would be supported by the Athenians, who would have to take Siphai by sea, and Delion, on the Euboian Channel, by land on the same day. Siphai would be occupied by the forces stationed in Naupaktos, with an additional forty ships, plus the Akarnanians and the other Athenian allies in the area, while Delion would be taken by an army from Athens.¹⁰ The ultimate objective of Athenian strategy was to incite certain Boiotian cities (Chaironeia, Thespiai and Tanagra) to defect, and this would lead to the break up of the Boiotian Confederacy controlled by Thebes.

In 395 Lakedaimonian strategy was very similar to the Athenian in terms of design and objectives and there can be little doubt that the Spartan plan took these precedents into account (Buck, 1993: 96). The main difference was that this time they would have the advantage of previous experience and would use it in a single attack. Thus, as with Demosthenes, the idea was to attack from the west with a small expeditionary force, mobilise Spartan allies in central Greece and, without using any other Lakedaimonian troops, attack Boiotia through Phokis. At the same time, as in the Athenian campaign of 424, King Pausanias would advance by land from the Peloponnese and enter Boiotia from the southwest. This coordinated attack was, like the Athenian offensive of 429, concentric in character, since the two contingents would have to join forces in Haliartos. The main objective of the double invasion was to break up the Boiotian Confederacy. Defections from the Boiotian Confederacy would force the Thebans and Boiotians to sue for peace.

Moreover, Spartan strategy had the advantage of guaranteeing the successful invasion of Boiotia: if the Boiotians tried to prevent Lysander invading by defending the Chaironeia pass, in the west of Boiotia, they would have to leave the city of Thebes and the whole of southern Boiotia exposed to King Pausanias’ army and he would be able to attack them from the rear.

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⁸ Th.3.95.2. The epibatai were hoplites on board ship, usually a group of ten on each ship (cf. Amit, 1962: 158; 1965: 29-30; Eddy, 1964: 142.)
⁹ Demosthenes tried to leave Hesperian Lokris by the so-called Isthmian Corridor through Amphissa, which is today the route taken by the Galaxidi-Amphissa-Gravia-Bralos road (Hdt.8.31-2; Kase, Szmeler, 1982: 353-366). From Kyтинion in Doris (IG.VII.3055; Th.3.95.1; Aischin.2.116; Philokoros.FGrH.328 F56b), identifies as the ancient site in Palaiochori, on the southern slopes of the Kallidromon, Demosthenes would have to entered Phokis through the Kopious valley.
¹⁰ Th.4.76-77, 90-101; Diod.12.69-70; Paus.9.6.3; Kromayer, Veith, Kaupert, 1931: 177-98; Pritchett, 1969: 24-36.
If, on the contrary, they took up a position on the Kithairon, to prevent Pausanias' attack, the whole of western Boiotia would be at Lysander’s mercy, and he would also be able to advance on the Boiotian army stationed in the south from the rear.

Finally, this plan would further Lysander’s personal ambitions. He was the main instigator of the war, he convinced the ephors to decree mobilisation and was responsible for devising Spartan strategy. Excluded from the Spartan campaigns in Asia and on bad terms with King Agesilaos, Lysander wanted to shift the centre of gravity of Spartan politics towards Europe so he could play a leading role. The best way of reinforcing his political position was to obtain a military command, but if Sparta sent a single army, that of the Peloponnesian League, the ephors would, in all probability, have given the command to his rival, King Pausanias. Thus, a double invasion guaranteed Lysander a command and gave him the opportunity to revive his fame and influence in Sparta. We do not know his specific title, but Lysander was very possibly sent as harmost with authority in the whole of central Greece. Plutarch (Lys.28.1) states that he was sent with command (hegemonia) of the army to garrison, i.e., occupy, Boiotia (φρουράν ἔποιευσε αὐτοῦ), duties usually carried out by a Spartan harmost, whether over a wide area or in a single place.

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11 On the importance of the Kithairon pass for preventing an invasion of Boiotia from the south see X.HG.5.4.36: Agesilaos, in 378, recognised that, unless Kithairon was taken first, it would not be easy to attack Thebes; X.HG.5.4.47: In 377, Agesilaos ordered the Spartan polemarch at Thespiai to take control of the Kithairon so they could invade Boiotia, and X.HG.5.4.59: in the spring of 376, Kleombrotos could not reach Boiotia because the Thebans had previously occupied the Kithairon.


Fig. 1. The Boiotian Confederacy in 395 B.C. (Oropos probably not included)
However, the Spartan invasion plan had at least two serious drawbacks. At the operational level, Lysander and Pausanias shared command and control, and they were virtually unable to communicate with each other, so the first problem was the extraordinary difficulty of joining forces in Haliartos on the day fixed. In view of the distance that both armies had to cover, the troops that had to rendezvous and the lack of communication between the two, it was much easier for one of the two expeditionary forces to go on ahead. On the other hand, in terms of strategy, the Boiotians, who would be joined by the Athenians, might defeat one of the two armies before the rendezvous took place, and this would leave the other in a difficult situation and at a disadvantage in terms of numbers.

Once both Lakedaimonian armies began to advance, the Boiotians realised what the Spartans were planning (X.HG.3.5.7). At about the same time the Boiotians sent an embassy to Athens (X.HG.3.5.7-16), probably around the beginning of August. The diplomatic mission arrived at a singularly opportune moment. In Asia, a Spartan army under King Agesilaos had won a resounding victory in Sardis over Pharnabazos, which increased Athenian fears of the creation of a Spartan empire in Asia and the Aegean. There had probably already been a democratic revolt in Rhodes, and the Persian fleet, commanded by the Athenian Konon, had occupied the island, and this also encouraged Athens to oppose Sparta. Moreover, if Athens allowed the Lakedaimonians to subjugate Boiotia, the Spartan threat would be even more serious, on land and sea, and the Lakedaimonians would easily be able to reach Athenian territory from Boiotia. However, an alliance with Boiotia could dispel the spectre of an invasion of Attica and would also further the personal ambitions of Thrasyboulos, at that time the most influential Athenian statesman, to the detriment of his rival, now Persian admiral Konon, since Thrasyboulos would lead the Athenian expeditionary force in Boiotia. As an incentive, the Boiotian emissaries offered the Athenians the possibility of recovering their old empire (X.HG.3.5.10) and leading of the alliance (X.HG.3.5.14). This mixture of threats, promises and factional infighting explains how the Boiotians succeeded in obtaining Athenian support in the form of a defensive alliance, or epimachia, which, although it obliged the Athenians to come to the aid of the Boiotians if the Spartans invaded Boiotia, did not mean declaring war on Sparta. Thus the Athenians avoided directly challenging the Spartans and being accused of breaking their undertaking to

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15 Preparations must have been made with considerable secrecy (Westlake, 1985: 125) but the Boiotians knew there would be some kind of attack (Buck, 1993: 96) and must have understood the Spartan strategy when Lysander and Pausanias started moving, if not before.

16 Diodoros (14.81.1-4) dates the battle of Haliartos when Phormion was archon at Athens (396/5) and the alliance between Boiotians and Athenians when Diophantos was archon (395/4); he therefore thinks the Athenians did not take part because they were not yet allies. However, we can be certain that the Athenians did send an expeditionary force to Boiotia and the alliance must therefore have existed before the battle. Diodoros, who was better acquainted with the Athenian sources, probably dated the battle wrongly, but not the treaty of alliance, which must have been signed at the beginning of the year in which Diophantos became archon, which began on 25 July 395.


18 Hell.Ox.18.1-3; Diod.14.79.6; Paus.6.7.6; Bruce, 1961: 166 and ff.


20 The ambassadors also claimed they were fighting in self defence, since the Spartans were planning to attack Boiotia (And.3.20 and ff.). They were supported by Thrasyboulos and the vote in favour of the alliance was unanimous (X.HG.3.5.16, Ar.Ecl.195 and ff.; Seager, 1967: 96; 1994: 100; Hamilton, 1979: 206; Cartledge 1987: 292); however, the alliance was defensive (Tod GHI, 2 n° 101; Lys.16.13; Alonso Troncoso, 1997: 30-35). Contra Accame (1951, 51), for whom the alliance was a deliberate and definitive act, declaring war on Sparta.
Sparta at the end of the Peloponnesian War (X.HG.2.2.20), while at the same time laying the groundwork for armed opposition to the Lakedaimonians.

Turning to Boiotian strategy, as we have said, the Spartan double invasion plan meant that the Boiotians could not station troops on the borders of Boiotia, or in Chaironeia, to the west, or on the Kithairon, in the south. At the same time, since they did not know the route the two armies would take or the place and date of their planned rendezvous, they could not anticipate it and challenge either army separately. Neither could they muster the Boiotian army, which would have meant withdrawing troops that were protecting the cities; in fact, the Haliartians appear to have remained inside their city throughout the campaign. Lysander could not take Chaironeia, Lebadeia or Koroneia because these cities would have been garrisoned by their respective citizens and, above all, if some thousand Orchomenians had concentrated with the Boiotian army in Thebes, it would have been difficult for the city to defect. The decision must have been that all or some of each city’s troops should defend its own walls (Buck, 1994: 38) and only the Theban army would remain in Thebes where it would await the Athenian expeditionary force. They obviously had to prevent the Lakedaimonians laying siege to or occupying the most important city in Boiotia and the capital of the Boiotian Confederacy. Boiotia could hold out if any other city fell, but the conquest of Thebes would lead directly to defeat. The city must also have been the ultimate goal of the Lakedaimonian expedition. At the same time Thebes was the hub of Boiotian communications and the army could move swiftly in any direction from Thebes and reach the place under threat. If the Boiotians succeeded in discovering where their enemies planned to rendezvous before they joined forces, they could march rapidly and attack the enemy, especially the weaker army, the one led by Lysander. If they defeated Lysander, the Boiotians and the Athenians could join forces again and destroy Pausanias. If, on the contrary, they did not succeed in finding out where their enemies would meet, Boiotians and Athenians would wait in Thebes for Lysander and Pausanias and would probably fight them in Theban territory without confining themselves behind the city walls.21 It is also possible that the Boiotians were taken by surprise by the speed of Spartan preparations, perhaps undertaken in great secrecy, and by the strategy of a double invasion itself.

2. ACCOUNTS OF THE BATTLE OF HALIARTOS

The sources for the battle of Haliartos are Xenophon (HG. 3.5.6-7, 9, 17-24) and Plutarch (Lys. 27-9, cf. Mor. 408 A-B, 578 A-B) and, to a lesser extent, Diodoros (14.81.1-3) and Pausanias (3.5.3-6). Additional information can be found in Nepos (Lis. 3.4), Lysias (16.13-14) and Demosthenes (4.17 18.96).

According to Xenophon, Lysander, with an army that included Phokians, Orchomenians and the peoples of central Greece, reached Haliartos before Pausanias. Once in Haliartos, as the day went on and Pausanias failed to arrive, he did not wait for him, and rather than holding back, he marched towards the city walls, calling on the Haliartians to defect from the Confederacy and become independent (X.HG.3.5.18: ἐπείθεν αὐτοῖς ἀφίστασθαι καὶ αὐτόνομος γίγνεσθαι). However, there were also some Thebans within the city, and they opposed this, so Lysander assaulted the walls (ἐπεί δὲ τῶν Ἐπιβαίων τινὲς ἔχει ἐν τῷ τείχῃ διεκόλυν, προσέβαλε πρὸς τὸ τείχος - X.HG.3.5.18). He goes on to say (HG.3.5.19) that, when the Thebans realised what was

21 As they did in 378 and 377, see Munn, 1987: 106-138.
happening, they hastened to defend the city with hoplites and cavalry (ἀκούσαντες δὲ ταῦτα οἱ Θηβαῖοι, δρόμω ἐρωθῆσον οἱ τε ὀπλίται καὶ οἱ ἱππεῖς).

From then on Xenophon (\textit{HG}.3.5.19) is unsure about exactly what happened, whether the Thebans took Lysander by surprise before he realised what was happening or whether Lysander saw them coming, but thought he could withstand the attack and defeat them (ὅποτερα μὲν οὖν, ἐ̂κτε λαβόντες τὸν Λύσανδρον ἐπέπεσον αὐτῷ ἐκτε καὶ αἰσθόμενος προσιόντας ὡς κρατήσουν ὑπέμενεν). In either case, the author says, the battle was fought beside the walls and Lysander and many others died. After Lysander’s death, the others fled into the mountains (πρὸς τὸ ὄρος) and the Thebans pursued them but were slowed down by steep and rugged terrain (δυσζωρία τε καὶ στενοπορία), at which point Lysander’s hoplites turned and hurled javelins and stones at them. The Thebans turned back halfway up the hill, but more than two hundred of them were killed (\textit{X.HG}.3.5.20).

During the night, the Phokians and the others, i.e., the Orchomenians and the levies from central Greece, withdrew and the next day Pausanias arrived with his army from the Peloponnesian (\textit{X.HG}.3.5.21). The following day, the second after the battle, the Athenians arrived and adopted battle formation with the Thebans. Pausanias assessed the situation and, seeing that the Corinthians had refused to take part in the expedition, the Phokians had gone home, the other allies were serving reluctantly, the enemy’s cavalry outnumbered his own, and the bodies of the dead lay close to the wall, decided to negotiate a truce and withdraw without fighting, against the advice of some Spartan commanders (\textit{X.HG}.3.5.22-25).

According to Plutarch (\textit{Lys}.28.1-2), Lysander mustered the army in Phokis, invaded Boiotia and advanced against Orchomenus. When they saw him approach, the Orchomenians opened the gates and their army joined forces with Lysander’s troops and together they invaded and plundered Lebadeian territory. While in Lebadeia, he sent Pausanias a message, urging him to meet him the following day in Haliartos, which he said he would reach by dawn. However, the letter was intercepted by the Boiotians, so they now knew where and when the enemy armies would rendezvous. The Thebans left the Athenians protecting Thebes and when night fell they set off at a forced march, reaching Haliartos before Lysander, and sent part of the army into the city (Plut.\textit{Lys}.28.3: ἔθασαν ὅλιγῳ τὸν Λύσανδρον ἐν Ἀλλάρτῳ γενόμενοι καὶ μέρει τινὶ παρῆραθον εἰς τὴν πόλιν). Meanwhile Lysander advanced until he was within sight of the walls of Haliartos and posted his army on a hill close to the city, called Orchalides or Alopeke (the Fox-hill), a part of the Helikon (Plut.\textit{Lys}.29.7), intending to wait for Pausanias. But, as the day wore on and as he began to get restless, he marched his army along the road that led directly to the walls of Haliartos. Just as they reached the river Hoplites they were attacked from the rear, beside the Kissousa spring at the tomb of Alea-Rhadamanthos\footnote{Cf. also Plut.\textit{Mor}.408 A-B: The Orchalides hill, also called the Alopeke (Fox-hill), and the river Hoplites, next to which Lysander was killed by Neokoros of Haliartos and \textit{Mor}.578 A-B: the tomb of Alea. On the location of the Kissousa spring, Frazer (5.165) considers it to be at the northern foot of Haliartos and Buckler (2003: 80 n.7) to be a spring, today channelled, which flows at the foot of the Helikon, just opposite Haliartos.} by the Thebans who had remained outside the city and had its walls on their left (Plut.\textit{Lys}.28.4: τὸν δὲ Θηβαίων οἱ μὲν ἔξω μεμεντικότες ἐν ἀριστερά τὴν πόλιν λαβόντες). At the same time, the Haliartians and Thebans within the city suddenly opened the city gates and attacked the enemy forces from the front, killing Lysander and some of the others. The Spartan army broke ranks and the Thebans pursued them, killing several thousand in all, but some three hundred Thebans were caught in rugged and difficult terrain and also perished in the pursuit (Plut.\textit{Lys}.28.6: πρὸς τὰ προξέα καὶ κατέρρη).
King Pausanias received the news of Lysander’s defeat on the road between Plataiai and Thespiai before reaching Haliartos. Against the advice of the Spartiates who were with him, he negotiated to retrieve the bodies. In the course of the retreat, Pausanias buried Lysander’s body in the Panopeans’ territory, beside the Sacred Way from Chaironeia to Delphi (Plut. Lys. 29.1-3).

In Pausanias’ account (3.5.3-6), Lysander reached Phokis and, after mustering the Phokian army, invaded Boiotia and launched an assault on the walls of Haliartos because the city refused to desert Thebes. Some Thebans and Athenians entered the city unseen (κρυφότα), took up a position before the walls and slayed Lysander. King Pausanias arrived too late for the battle and, when he heard of Lysander’s defeat, led his army against Thebes with the intention of attacking it, but when he learnt that Thrasyboulos was approaching with the Athenians and planned to attack them from the rear when they were in the midst of fighting the Thebans, he negotiated a truce with the Thebans, which is praised by this author.

Diodoros (14.81.1-3) adds that Lysander reached Phokis with a few soldiers and that Pausanias was sent with six thousand men. The Boiotians entered battle alone, without the Athenians, when they found Haliartos besieged by Lysander and the Phokians.23

Xenophon used also Athenian sources (Buck, 1993: 97), which can be clearly seen in his account of the Boiotian embassy to Athens and the Thebans’ discourse to the Athenian assembly, and his account is remarkable for its blatant antipathy to Thebes (Westlake 1985: 123) and pro-Spartan bias, also evident in the rest of his works. According to him, the Lakedaimonians were going to invade the Theban chora (HG. 3.5.7) and not Boiotia, it was the Thebans and not the Boiotians who were preparing to defend themselves (HG. 3.5.17), and the Thebans and not the Boiotian Confederacy that sent an embassy to Athens (HG. 3.5.7). In short, far from accepting the existence of the Boiotian Confederacy, Xenophon always refers to the Thebans and asserts that all Boiotia was subject to Thebes. In fact, he says, the Haliartians wanted to break away and were only prevented from doing so by the Thebans within the city, who had entered it with the specific intention of preventing them (X.HG. 3.5.18). In this last respect Xenophon’s account is not only tendentious but obviously inaccurate. Lebadeia had refused to leave the Confederacy without any Theban garrison within its walls, and as a result Lysander had plundered its territory. We can assume the same to be true of Chaironeia and Koroneia, whose territories Lysander crossed, at least the Koroneian. They too remained in the Confederacy, without Thebes having to station soldiers in either of these two cities. Just as Xenophon knew that Orchomenos had defected, he also knew that the other cities resisted, but did not say so to avoid giving the impression that some cities wanted to remain under what this author considered to be the tyrannical rule of Thebes.

Xenophon describes what happened in Haliartos from the Lakedaimonian point of view. Since he was in Asia at the time with the army of the Spartan king Agesilaos and did not witness the events24, his informant must have been a Lakedaimonian. Within this pro-Spartan version of what happened, one aspect of his account is particularly striking, in our opinion, and this is the differences we can see between various parts of his narrative. Thus he describes Lysander’s march towards Haliartos very briefly, and gives a confused account of the battle itself (HG. 3.5.17-19). This contrasts with his detailed description of how Lysander’s army was pursued over rough terrain and the vivid account of Pausanias’ arrival, the disagreement

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23 Seager (1994: 100) thinks that the city was effectively under siege and Larsen (1968: 159) seems to think it had been taken.

24 Xenophon had joined Cyros’ expedition in 402 (X. Anab. 3.1.4) and then the Spartan Thibron’s army in Asia in 400/399 (X. Anab. 7.8.22). He returned to Asia with Agesilaos’ army in 394, a year after the battle (X. Anab. 4.2.18). Cf. Delebecque, 1957: 130-165.
between the Spartan commanders and the Lakedaimonians’ retreat, harried by the Boiotians who attacked anyone who left the path and set foot in the fields (HG.3.5.20-24). This contradiction would be explained by assuming that Xenophon’s Lakedaimonian informant had served in Pausanias’ army so had not witnessed the battle, and was perhaps even one of the Spartan leaders opposed to signing the truce.25 If this were so, Xenophon would only have had a vague idea of Lysander’s action, apart from the pursuit over rugged ground, which was where Pausanias’ army took up a position the following day. With no Theban sources on the crucial matter of the battle, the sudden appearance of the Theban army, Xenophon was unable to obtain reliable information about what happened, and was thus uncertain about the details (HG.3.5.19).

Compared with Xenophon’s account, Plutarch’s narrative is much fuller, more precise, richer in details, particularly topographic, and contains virtually no inconsistencies.26 Although Plutarch used Xenophon’s text, it seems clear that it was not his main source. Firstly, he was acquainted with local legends (Lys.29.5-12; Mor.408 A-B), at least some of which he was probably told orally by natives of Haliartos; we can also assume that he visited the battlefield, which could be reached in a day from where he lived in Chaironeia, and that he consulted Boiotian or pro-Boiotian sources.27 In contrast to Xenophon, Plutarch gives the Theban view of the events at Haliartos. In fact, his description provides the basis for explaining the battle and its main contributions, in addition to the various topographical details, are the episode of the letter, the arrival of the Theban contingent before Lysander and the positions of the two armies before and during the battle.

The most striking feature of Pausanias’ account is the emphasis it puts on Athenian intervention, which is probably because he used an Athenian source, perhaps Androtion who must also have used Lakedaimonian or other pro-Spartan sources. His narrative also relieves King Pausanias of any blame: he arrived too late for the battle because he was assembling his army, even so he advanced towards Thebes and the truce he negotiated and subsequent withdrawal saved the army. He mistakenly says there were Athenians in Haliartos and that Pausanias marched against the city of Thebes, confusing the Pausanias’ routes of approach and retreat, and thinks that the Boiotian and Athenian armies did not join forces before the truce. His best contributions concern the Thebans’ secrecy in getting a contingent into Haliartos, the movements of Thrasyboulos and Pausanias’ decision to negotiate a truce.

Diodoros’ account is brief and not very enlightening and probably derives, via Ephoros, from the Hellenika Oxyrhynchia which would have given a detailed account of the battle. Diodoros correctly gives the number of Boiotian casualties suffered while pursuing Lysander’s army and the number of soldiers in Pausanias’ army, some six thousand. He also says that the Boiotians fought alone without Athenian help, which is only partly true, since it seems to suggest that the Athenians were not in Boiotia; however, they had come to their defence and were protecting Thebes.

Thus there remain a number of doubtful or contradictory points that need to be resolved in order to reconstruct the battle successfully. These discrepancies and uncertainties relate mainly to the number of troops present, the battle itself and, in particular, the routes taken by the two sides to reach Haliartos. It is precisely a knowledge of the routes taken by the two armies to reach Haliartos that will help us, in my opinion decisively, to explain this battle.

25 For a similar situation during the Battle of Leuktra, cf. X.HG.6.4.3-5, 8, 12; Buckler, 1996: 128.
26 The only uncertainty that arises in Plutarch’s account is that he does not explain why Lysander decided not to wait any longer encamped outside Haliartos.
3. The two armies' troops.

We only know the number of soldiers – six thousand – in Pausanias’ army, and have no other details. In the case of Lysander’s army, Diodoros (14.84.1) says that he reached Phokis with a few soldiers (μετὰ στρατιωτῶν ὀλίγων). The following year, in the summer of 394, at the Battle of Koroneia, Agesilaos had half a Spartan mora from the Orchomenos garrison in his army (X.HG.4.3.15).29 The other half may have remained in the city to protect it. Although the mora could have been left in Orchomenos by Pausanias as he retreated after the Battle of Haliartos, it seems more likely that it had been stationed there by Lysander. It was Lysander that had entered Orchomenos whereas Pausanias had to retreat along a predetermined route from which he was not allowed to depart in any way. This was the Sacred Way, which started in Chaironeia and went to Panopeos, Daulis and Delphi, and it was some way from Orchomenos. This Spartan garrison must already have been in Orchomenos in the summer of 395, before Agesilaos arrived, and this would explain, together with Spartan control of Phokis, why the Boiotians did not attack it immediately after Haliartos30 or in the course of the expedition the following spring that took the Boiotians to Pharsalos.31 We can thus assume that the army Lysander brought from the Peloponnese would have included, at least, one Lakedaimonian mora, some six hundred hoplites32 and perhaps a small levy of allied troops. This contingent could have amounted to a thousand soldiers.

Xenophon (HG.3.5.6) explicitly says that Lysander’s army included Phokians, Oitaians, Herakleots, Malians and Ainians and later (X.HG.3.5.17) that Lysander appeared in Haliartos with an army from Phokis, Orchomenos and the surrounding area. Pausanias (3.5.3) states that the Phokians came in large numbers and Diodoros (14.84.1) and Plutarch (Lys.28) say that all the Phokians took part. It seems clear that the Phokians were the main contingent of the army. However, the various figures we have for Phokian contingents that might help us determine their number in Lysander’s army are very small. A thousand Phokians guarded the Anopaia Path at the Battle of Thermopylai (Hdt.9.17).2 This contingent of a thousand hoplites was just part of the Phokians’ army. In fact, Herodotos says the thousand hoplites in Plataiai did not account for all the Phokians (Hdt.9.31.5) and in the first year of the Sacred War (356/5) Philomelos, the federal strategos, mustered a force of a thousand chosen Phokians (Diod.16.24.2). In the expedition of 394 undertaken by the Argives and Boiotians in central Greece the Phokians, under the command of the Spartan Alkisthenes, fought an army of six thousand men in Naryka, in Epiknemidian Lokris. The Phokians were defeated and lost a thousand men (Diod.14.82.7-9). According to Pausanias (10.20.3), in the Galatian invasion of 279, the Phokians sent three thousand hoplites and five

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29 Agesilaos’ troops were not actually Lakedaimonians; he had gone to Asia with two thousand emancipated helots and six thousand allies (X.HG.3.4.2) and Thibron had previously taken a thousand emancipated helots and four thousand Peloponnnesians (X.HG.3.1.3). As well as the half mora from the Orchomenos garrison, Agesilaos had another complete mora that had come by sea from Korinth (X.HG.4.3.15).

30 See a similar situation in Plut.Pel.16-17: in the spring of 375 the Thebans tried to take Orchomenos by surprise, taking advantage of the fact that the Lakedaimonian mora garrisoning the city had embarked on an expedition against Eastern Lokris.

31 The Lakedaimonian garrison was maintained throughout the whole of the war (cf. X.HG.5.1.29) and we have no evidence of Orchomenos being attacked at any time during the conflict.

32 In 395 a Spartan mora consisted of five hundred and seventy-six hoplites under the command of a polemarch. It was divided into four lochoi, eight pentekostyes and sixteen enomotiai, each of which had thirty-six men. In addition to these there were a hundred horsemen (cf. X.Lak.Pol.11.4; HG.6.4.12; Sekunda, 1998: 15).

According to Plutarch (Pel.17.2), Ephoros stated that a mora consisted of five hundred men, Kallisthenes six hundred and Polybios nine hundred (the latter author was referring to the Hellenistic mora).
hundred horsemen to defend Thermopylae, a figure that must be closer to Phokis’ possibilities. Moreover, in 395 the Phokians had been invaded by the Lokrians and the Boiotians not long before, so it would be logical for them to turn out in force. A figure of at least three thousand hoplites, close to the maximum we know the Phokians could have supplied, does not seem excessive.

Later, after Lysander had invaded Boiotia and Orchomenos had left the Confederacy (cf.: Plut.Lys.28.2), the Orchomenians joined him. In the Boiotian Confederacy of 395 Orchomenos was, together with Hysiai, on of the two combined districts that had to contribute two thousand hoplites and two hundred horsemen to the Boiotian federal army (each district had to provide a thousand hoplites and a hundred horsemen cf. Hell.Ox.19.3). Since the territory of Hysiai was a quarter of the size of Orchomenos, we can assume that the Orchomenians had to supply the number required for one district and part of another, perhaps two thirds, and that they were able to muster between a thousand and one thousand five hundred hoplites and more than a hundred horsemen (Pascual, 1995: 169-176). A figure of a thousand Orchomenian hoplites and a hundred horsemen would probably be the minimum Orchomenian contingent, particularly since a Lakedaimonian mora was garrisoning Orchomenos and the city was not left undefended.

In addition to the Phokians and the Orchomenians, the army that Lysander led to Haliartos certainly included Oitaians, Herakleots, Ainians and Malians, and very probably Dorians and Athamanians too. In the spring of 394, in the course of the expedition into central Greece, two thousand Boiotians and Argives, under the command of the boiotarch Hismenias, took Heraklea Trachinia, forced the Oitaians that had previously been expelled by the Spartans to return, and persuaded the Ainians and Athamanians to rebel against the Lakedaimonians (Diod.14.82.7). Hismenias left the Argives garrisoning Heraklea and mustered six thousand men for an attack against Phokis. These included the thousand Boiotians that Hismenias had taken with him and also, according to Diodoros, the Ainians, Athamanians and other allies (Diod.14.82.7), possibly Herakleots, Malians and troops from both parts of Lokris, bringing their number to some five thousand all together. Apart for the Hesperian Lokrians, who were too far away, and the Eastern Lokrians, at that time allies of the Boiotians, a figure of some two thousand hoplites for the regions of Central Greece in Lysander’s army is possible, so it would have had some five or six thousand hoplites. In any case, this expeditionary force must have been similar in size to that of the Thebans and Haliartians that fought the battle, since, according to Xenophon (HG.3.5.19), Lysander thought he could resist the hoplites and Theban horsemen that attacked him. To this contingent of hoplites would have to be added an unknown number of light infantry and cavalry.

We know that Pausanias set out overland in the direction of Kithairon, Plataiai and Thespiai with a Peloponnese army consisting of six thousand men, with the intention of invading Boiotia from the south, directly threatening Thebes. Possibly Diodoros only includes hoplites and horsemen in this figure, so light infantry would also have to be added.

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33 Spartan hegemony in the region was the outcome of the intervention of the Lakedaimonian Herippidas in 399 (Diod.14.38.4-5; Bequignon, 1937: 354). We have no knowledge of any other Spartan allies from central Greece taking part, such as the Achaians of Phiotis, Lycophron of Pherai, Pharsalos, the Hesperian Lokrians, Aitolians, Athamanians and Dorians. The Achaians, Aitolians, Western Lokrians and Thessaliens were possibly too far away to join Lysander’s army quickly, but the Athamanians and Metropolitan Dorians may have been involved.
The number of soldiers in the Theban army is rather easier to establish. According to the
Hellenika Oxyrhynchia (19.3), in 395, the Thebans had four federal districts, so they would
have been able to muster some four thousand hoplites and four hundred horsemen. Obviously
this was not the entire force that Thebes succeeded in recruiting, but it may well have been
close to the maximum number of men between the ages of 20 and 49.34 If the Thebans left
the Athenians protecting their city, it can be assumed that they sent the whole of their federal
contingent plus a similar number of light infantry (psiloi and hamippoi pezoi).35 Haliartos had
a third of a federal district so it must have provided three hundred hoplites and about thirty
horsemen, that is, a company or lochos of heavy infantry and a squadron (hila) of cavalry, as
well as the corresponding light infantry. This was the minimum contingent that the
Haliartians could muster, but as the battle took place below its walls, the Haliartians fought
in large numbers, perhaps no less than five hundred counting both hoplites and horsemen. In
short, the Thebans and Haliartians would have had some five thousand hoplites and
horsemen, in addition to their light infantry.

We know the Athenians sent hoplites and horsemen (Lys.16.13) and perhaps also light
troops. In 378 the Athenians first sent five thousand hoplites and five hundred horsemen to
the aid of Thebes (Diod.15.25.1) and later, in the same year, another five thousand hoplites
and two hundred horsemen (Diod.15.32.2) to fight various Lakedaimonian expeditions. There
were six thousand Athenian hoplites and six hundred horsemen at Nemea in 394
(X.HG.4.2.17) and some four hundred horsemen were sent to the aid of Arcadia in 364
(X.HG.7.4.29). What is more, in 395 the Athenian expeditionary force was large enough for
the Thebans to entrust their city to it and resist a possible attack by Pausanias’ six thousand
men, and their cavalry, together with that of the Thebans and Haliartians, amply exceeded that
of Pausanias (X.HG.3.5.23). Thus we can assume that some five or six thousand Athenians,
counting solely hoplites and horsemen, were dispatched.

To sum up, both armies would have had some eleven or twelve thousand soldiers,
counting hoplites and horsemen, to which would have to be added the respective contingents
of light infantry, which may have almost doubled their number. Approximately half of the two
armies’ forces would have fought in the battle.

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34 The Thebans alone could have mustered a maximum of five or six thousand hoplites and horsemen: seven
thousand hoplites and two thousand horseman from Thebes and many other Boiotian cities defended Theban
territory in 378 (Diod.15.26.2); the Thebans accounted for less than a twelfth of an allied army of seventy thousand
(less than six thousand, cf. Plut.Pel.24) which invaded Lakonia in 370/69, and six thousand Thebans died in the
destruction of Thebes by Alexander in 335, the immense majority probably between the ages of 18 and 59, and
more than thirty thousand women, children and old people were captured (Diod.17.14.1.)

35 In addition to the hoplites and horsemen, the Boiotians had their own non-mercenary light infantry corps
known as psiloi, of which there were seven thousand at Delion (Th.4.93.3). In the Spartan expedition against
Argos, in the summer of 418, the Boiotians sent five thousand hoplites and five thousand psiloi (Th.5.57.52). We
can assume that this number was similar to the number of hoplites the federal army could muster, that is, about
eleven thousand. In the same expedition there were also five hundred horsemen and five hundred hamippoi pezoi.
As we can see, the latter forces are equal in number to the cavalry. The hamippoi appear again in Xenophon
(HG.7.5.24) at the Battle of Mantinea in the summer of 362, so this corps certainly existed between the two dates
(418 to 362). The hamippoi were a kind of light infantry that fought on the flank of the horseman and their
numbers must have equalled those of the federal cavalry, about a thousand one hundred. Thus the total Boiotian
federal army would have consisted of 24,200 men: eleven thousand hoplites, eleven thousand psiloi, one thousand
one hundred horsemen and one thousand one hundred hamippoi pezoi. On the psiloi and hamippoi in general, cf.
4. THE ROAD TO HALIARTOS

We do not know which port in the Peloponnese Lysander sailed from. Korinth refused to take part in the expedition, had shown signs of hostility towards the Lakedaimonians, and the anti-Spartan faction was in power. It is true the Korinthians allowed Pausanias to pass, but they must have been forced to do so by circumstances in view of the impossibility of confronting the Spartans alone or obtaining outside help. In fact, immediately after Haliartos, they joined the anti-Spartan coalition. In view of this hostility, it is difficult to imagine that the Korinthians would have provided port facilities and allowed their ships to be used. Although the Spartans could have used an Achaian port, in view of Korinth’s attitude and the fact that in 395 Sikyon was a faithful ally of Sparta, had a good port and from 394 onwards became the main base of Lakedaimonian land and sea operations in the Gulf against Korinth (Pascal, 1995: 699-700), it seems more plausible that Lysander would sail from Sikyon. His destination could have been the Gulf of Kirrha or Antikyra. The latter is the better choice, since it is the starting point for the fastest route into the centre of Phokis, via Ambryssos.

According to Xenophon (HG.3.5.6) the ephors ordered Lysander to go to Haliartos with the Phokians, Oitaians, Herakleots, Malians and Ainians. Plutarch (Lys.28) says that he marched through Phokis with a large force under his command and Diodoros (14.81.1) that he entered Phokis and recruited the army (ἐσπελθοῦν ἔς τὴν Φωκίδα συνήγαγεν δῦναμιν). Pausanias (3.5.3) also says Lysander took large numbers of Phokians with him and invaded Boiotia without delay (ἐπὶ ἐπισκέψεως ἡξιοῦν ἔς τε Βοιωτίαν ἐλημ. ὑθεῖ). All this evidence would suggest that Lysander remained in Phokis and the whole army, not just the Phokians, massed in Phokis. In fact, if Lysander had been obliged to go to Herakleia, for example, to recruit contingents from the towns of the Spercheios, his march would have been considerably delayed and he would have had to have come back along the same route through the Gravia Pass or through Eastern Lokris along the Boagrios Valley, which was hostile to the Lakedaimonians. The best place to assemble the army would have been Elateia, the chief city of Phokis and the federal capital, which was situated at a major crossroads within easy reach of the troops from the Spercheios, although Lysander could also have congregated the army in Daulis or Panopeos, at the start of the Sacred Way to Delphi, the route Pausanias used for his retreat.

To invade Boiotia from Phokis from the northwest, Lysander could have taken two possible routes. The first goes through Elateia to Hyampolis and Abai. In Abai this road joins the southbound route from Opous, crosses into Boiotia and goes on to Orchomenos. From Orchomenos, it follows the shore of Lake Kopaia to Lebadeia (Paus.9.28,7-9, 10.35.1). The second route starts from Daulis, goes through Panopeos and Parapotamoi, enters Boiotia between the flanks of Mts. Akontion to the north and Turion to the south, and continues on to Chaironeia.

36 Immediately after the Peloponnesian War, the Korinthians challenged the way Sparta divided the spoils (X.HG.3.5.12) and sheltered the Athenian democrats that were fleeing from the rule of the Thirty (Aisch.2.147). They must have felt threatened by Spartan intervention in the Gulf (Diod.14.34.2-3; Paus.4.26.3, 10.38.3) and refused to send contingents to the Spartan expeditions against the democrats of the Piraios in 403 (X.HG.3.5.5) against Elis in 401 (X.HG.3.2.25) and with Agesilaos to Asia in 396. On the anti-Lakedaimonian faction led by Timolaos and Polyantes, cf. Hell.Ox.10.3; X.HG.3.5.1.

37 The city of Antikyra had a good port. In 196 the consul Flamininus led auxiliary troops from Antikyra by this route to their winter camp in Elateia (Livy 32.18) and, conversely, Antonius concentrated provisions from all over central Greece in Antikyra shortly before the battle of Aktio (Plut.Antonio.28); cf. also Paus.10.35.4 and McInerney, 1999: 62.
There is no clear-cut way of deciding between these two possibilities, but perhaps the first route, through Abai to Orchomenos, is the most probable. The sources do not say that Lysander passed through Chaironeia, and Plutarch, our main source, was a native of that city. If Lysander had entered through Chaironeia, by marching first to Orchomenos and then Lebadeia, he would have had to make a detour and then retrace his own steps. Possible, but improbable, and hard to understand since Lysander could not risk losing time or he might arrive late at Haliartos, where he was to rendezvous with Pausanias’ army. Moreover, by following the shore of Lake Kopais from Orchomenos, if we assume that Chaironeian territory did not extent to the Lake (Fossey 1988: 384) it was possible to reach Lebadeia without crossing Chaironeian territory, which would explain why this city is not mentioned in Plutarch’s account. Pausanias (10.35.1) calls this road λεωφόρος; it is a main artery connecting central Greece with the south (McInerney, 1999: 58-59) and starts from Elateia, where Lysander mustered the armies of Phokis and the regions of central Greece.

King Pausanias, meanwhile, left with the Lakedaimonian army, met the Arcadians in Tegea (Paus.3.5.4) and marched towards the Isthmus. He mobilised contingents from the
other allies along the way, except for the Korinthians, who refused to take part in the expedition, although they allowed Pausanias to cross their territory. From the Isthmus, he entered Megaris and set off for the Kithairon and Plataiai, and may have camped in Megara. In the north of Megarian territory, Pausanias must have taken the route to Plataiai (route Hammond) via the pass through Mt. Kithairon line of peaks. Just on the Boiotian frontier, the route divides in two, the right-hand fork going to Hysiai and Thebes and the left down to Plataiai. It is unlikely that Pausanias took the road from Pagas to Aigosthenai, which is very arduous and tortuous. The Athenians, with much of their army in Thebes, would have found it difficult to garrison Eleuteras and halt Pausanias’ advance. Moreover, since they had signed an epimachia treaty they had no reason, in principle, to fear that Pausanias would attack Attica. From Plataiai a road crossed the plain directly to Thespiai so there was no need to go through Thebes. When Pausanias reached Plataiai, Lysander was already in Lebadeia and they were both little more than twenty kilometres from Haliartos and, therefore, approximately a day’s march away.

According to Plutarch (Lys.28.2), from Lebadeia, Lysander sent a letter to Pausanias, telling him to meet him in Haliartos. The letter was intercepted by some scouts and then deciphered by the Thebans. The episode of the letter, not mentioned by Xenophon, who was not acquainted with the Boiotian sources and whose informant was in Pausanias’ army, is intrinsically probable. Given the difficulty of communication between Lysander and Pausanias, the missive was probably necessary to confirm the exact date of the rendezvous. Furthermore, Lysander’s messenger would have to have travelled from Lebadeia to Plataiai without attracting the attention of the Boiotian army, which was stationed in Thebes, but the Boiotians would have been patrolling all the routes to monitor the movements of the enemy armies and could certainly have intercepted the letter. But, more than anything else, the interception of the letter helps to explain the way subsequent events unfolded: for example, the Thebans marching at night can be interpreted as a response to an unexpected situation that their plans had not allowed for. After sending the message, Lysander immediately set out for Haliartos, where he expected to arrive at dawn on the following day.

At the same time the Thebans, who now knew where the two armies were meeting and that Pausanias would arrive late, marched out from their city. The route they took to cover the twenty kilometres between Thebes and Haliartos can be reconstructed fairly easily. The great road connecting central Greece and the Peloponnese with the north of Greece and which was the main artery between the east and west of Boiotia, crossed the Teneric plain from Thebes to the Steni Pass at the site of the sanctuary of Poseidon in Onchestos, headquarters of a Boiotian Amphiktiony. The sanctuary was situated in Kazarma Steni some four kilometres

38 In the early seventies, the Spartan expeditions against Thebes passed through Megaris. In 377, for example, Agesilaos suffered thromboflebitis in Megara while retreating after his attack on Thebes (X.HG.5.4.58.)
39 X.HG.5.4.14; Hammond, 1954: 103-22. Buckler, 2003: 81 thinks Pausanias took the route from Pagas to Agosthenai and from there to Plataiai; it would be a difficult route but one which, in his opinion, avoided the road guarded by the Athenians in Eleuteras.
40 Cf. a similar situation in X.HG.5.4.33: although the Athenians had sent contingents to the aid of Thebes against the Lakedaimonians in 378, Spodrias, the Spartan harmost of Thespiai, subsequently invaded Attica while Sparta and Athens were officially at peace (McDonald, 1972: 38-44.)
41 The account of the message has been rejected by Accame, 1951: 39, but without good reason (cf. Buck, 1994: 38; 140 n. 62; Buckler, 2003: 80.)
from Haliartos and had a settlement beside it. Onchestos may actually have been within Haliartian territory. From Onchestos the road continued parallel to the shore of Lake Kopais, following virtually the same route as that of the modern road. Approximately one kilometre from Haliartos it crossed a river, today the Kephalari, probably the ancient Lophis, and reached the city a little further on. The Thebans arrived first and sent part of their army into Haliartos, while the larger contingent remained outside and were probably posted to the west,

around modern Mt. Likophios.

The route taken by Lysander and the positions of the two armies just before they engaged are the three decisive elements for understanding the Battle of Haliartos, so they need to be considered in detail.

To reach Haliartos from Lebadeia and Koroneia, there were two possible routes. The first follows the southern shore of Lake Kopais. Thus, from Lebadeia it first goes through Koroneia, on the hill today known as Loutros (242 m), and from there continues to the small town of Ayia Paraskevi (formerly Agoriani), to the south of which rises the rounded hill of Dhekedhes. Although it is a mainly Mycenaean site, traces of the Late Geometric and Classical Period have been found here. The road then went through Solinari some 2.5-3 kilometres northeast of Koroneia. There are two ancient sites in this village: a small peak just at the foot of the hills to the south of Solinari in the chapel of Kostantinos and Eleni, where Classical and Hellenistic pottery has been found, and, secondly, the church of Ayios Yannis Theologos where Spyropoulos uncovered a sanctuary of Classical-Hellenistic date just to the north of the church. The site to the south of Solinari (Kostantinos and Eleni) and the temple to the north of the Ayios Yannis Theologos church have been identified respectively as the ancient χορήγος of Alalkomenai and the temple of Athena Alalkomenia. From Alalkomenai/Solinari the route went through the narrow pass of Vigla, a few metres wide, between the moutainside of Mt. Vigla or Petra (287 m) and the southern shore of Lake Kopais. A tower guarded the Pass. Behind Vigla is Mt. Palaiothiva or Paliophiva. The two peaks, Vigla and Palaiothiva, marked the border between the territories of Koroneia and Haliartos and together most probably formed ancient Tilphosaion, where the Tilphousa spring rose beside the temple of Apollo Tilphosaion. Somewhere in the vicinity there was also the sanctuary of the Praxidika and, close to it, the temple of Poseidon Hippios (Paus.9.33.1-3; Strabo.9.2.27). Once in Haliartian territory the route goes through the modern town of Vrastamitas and comes to Haliartos some twelve kilometres from Koroneia. The road then continued eastwards to Thebes, skirting the south of the ancient city. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Leake (2.205) took this route and reached Haliartos from Lebadeia in approximately six hours.

Another route goes inland via Koutoumoulia, modern day Koronia. Thus from ancient Koroneia, the path goes up the valley of the river Kephalovryso to Koutoumoulia; the route then passes this settlement and skirts the southern side of Mt. Mitikas, although perhaps in Antiquity the route went between Mitikas and Palaiottothia, which commands the Pass, and comes out in the Zagara valley, which runs W-E and is flanked by the slopes of Mt. Helikon (or Zagara, 1525 m) to the south, and Mt. Ayios Vassilios (962 m) and Koupohipitari (859 m)48 to the north. Close by the convent of Evangelistria, to the northeast of the modern village of the same name and some five kilometres from Haliartos, there must have been a small settlement, to judge by the tower and the few surviving buildings of polygonal rubble. The river Xirorrema or Zagara, perhaps the ancient Lamos (Aravantinos, 1996: 187), flows

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44 Th. Spyropoulos (1973) AD. Khron, 272; Leake.2.135-6; Buck 1979: 7; Fossey, 1988: 335-336.
45 Th. Spyropoulos (1973), AAA.6.381-5; (1973) Teiresias.3.1; (1973) AD. Khron.271.
46 Strabo.9.2.36; Paus.9.33.5; Plut.Mor.301 D; Pappakhantzis 5.200-2; Buck 1979: 6; Wallace 1979: 143; Knauss, 1987: 4; Fossey 1988: 332-335.
47 Paus.9.33.1-3; Strabo.9.2.27,36; Fontenrose, 1969: 119-31; Fossey, 1972: 1-16.
48 Mt. Koupohipitari can be identified as the ancient Mt. Libetron (Paus.9.34.4; Leake.2.205; Wallace, 1974: 21.)
through this valley, circling Mt. Goulas (665 m) to the south and flowing northwards through an area called Paliomazi. It then joins the river Kephalari, which goes down the narrow valley of the same name, passing the village of Mazi, until it flows into Lake Kopais. The ancient road must have approximately followed the course of the Xirorrema/Zagara.

We have various indications of the importance and use of this route. Firstly there is the tower built on the Palaiothiva peak which kept watch over the route. On Apollo’s mythical journey from Euboia to Delphi, after passing Onchestos, he went inland towards the Telphousa spring, to the west of Haliartos, leaving the shore of Lake Kopais in this area. In the campaign of 371, which ended in the Battle of Leuktra, the Spartan king Kleombrotos reached Koroneia but, finding that the Boiotians held the gorges (Diod.15.53.1: τὰς παρόδους), had to take another route along the southern coast. The use of the plural probably means the Boiotians had occupied both Passes, Palaiothiva and Vigla. The information on ancient Okalea, usually found in Evangelistria, could also point to the existence of this route. According to Stephanos of Byzantion (s.v. Okalea) there was a route from Thespiai to Okalea that did not go through Haliartos, and Dionysios Kalliphontos (96-101) also appears to situate Okalea on a line between Orchomenos /Lebadeia and Thespiai/Plataiai without mentioning Haliartos either. Moreover, the northern side of Mt. Vigla must have been so close to the shore of Lake Kopais that it left little space for the road to pass, and it must have been completely impassable during the winter when the level of the Lake rose. Consequently, here, as in other parts of Boiotia, there were low, summer roads and higher winter roads that avoided the higher level of the lake (Fontenrose, 1969: 120, 127).

The Koutoumoulia/Evangelistria path would have been one of these inland or winter routes. There are also indications that this route could have been used just the day before and day after the battle. As we have said, the day before the battle Lysander sent a messenger with a letter for Pausanias. This emissary, no doubt on horseback, since he had to cover the forty kilometres from Lebadeia to Plataiai, could have taken the route through the Vigla Pass, along the walls of Haliartos and turned inland along the Kephalari valley or through the Steni Pass in Onchestos and then crossed Theban territory to Thespiai. Both alternatives would have been very exposed for a message of such importance. It was much simpler and there was greater chance of the message reaching its destination using the Koutoumoulia route. After the battle, in the middle of the night, the Phokians and the rest of Lysander’s army withdrew without the Thebans noticing until the following morning. The Thebans evidently camped on the plain to the south of the city, so the Phokians could not have gone through them to reach the Vigla Pass; in fact, the only way they could go back without being seen was by taking the Koutoumoulia route, possibly the same way they had come.

Gell (1827: 122) mentions this route at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It goes to Lebadeia through the town of Zagora (Zagara), to Kutumula (Koutoumoulia) and from there to Kalamachi, close to Lebadeia. Gell took two hours to go from Zagora to Koutoumoulia and another two to get from there to Kalamachi. To this must be added the distance between Kalamachi and Lebadeia and the six kilometres between Zagora and Mazi, in the Kephalari valley, where Lysander may have camped, and taking into account that Gell travelled on horseback at some six or seven kilometres an hour, the journey between Lebadeia

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50 Fossey (1972: 177) associates Phase II of the tower in rectangular ashlar with the fortification of the gorges in 371; he also has a full bibliography. Buckler, 1981: 55 also mentions the narrow passes in Koroneia and McKesson Camp II, 1991: 195.

51 Hym. Apol.3.262-6; Fontenrose, 1969: 119, 123.

52 X.HG.6.4.3; Paus.9.13.3; Diod.14.52.1-53-3; Fossey, 1972: 169-170.

53 Fossey, 1988: 316-318. The information in Strabo that Okalea is on the shore of Lake Kopais, between Haliartos and Alalkomenai, is probably an intrusive gloss in the manuscript (cf. Fossey LCM, 4.6, 1979, 113-6).
and *Mazi* could have been done in 395 in a single day in less than ten hours’ march. Frazer (1905: 148, 150-151) also describes this road, which crosses a wooded valley where the *Zagara* and *Ayios Nikolaos* monasteries are to be found.

Plutarch (*Lys*.28.3) also says that the Thebans reached Haliartos before Lysander. However, when Lysander sent the letter to Pausanias from Lebadeia, he was the same distance from Haliartos, some twenty kilometres, as the Thebans. The Theban scouts first had to intercept the letter and then go to Thebes, where the bulk of the army was massed, and only then could the Thebans start off. Lysander probably sent the letter and started marching towards Haliartos. It is difficult to claim that the Thebans were travelling faster while Lysander was unaware that the letter had been intercepted, since Lysander had to arrive at the meeting point at the time agreed and was also marching at night. If the Thebans left later and arrived before him, Lysander’s delay would be easier to explain if he had taken the *Koutoumoulia* road, which was some thirty-five kilometres from Haliartos and was steeper than the *Vigla* route.

Again, according to Plutarch (*Lys*.29.7), Lysander camped on a hill near Haliartos, called *Orchalides* or *Alopeke*, which was part of Mt. Helikon, waiting for Pausanias to arrive the same day. From his camp he marched on Haliartos, and as his army crossed the river Hoplites it was attached from the rear by the Thebans who had remained outside the city and had its walls on their left (Plut.*Lys*.28.3-5). The only way of interpreting Plutarch’s account is to assume that Lysander’s position was on the final spurs of the Helikon overlooking Haliartos from the south and southeast (Bommelaer, 1981: 194) and that, as he was advancing from the southeast towards Haliartos, he was intercepted by the Thebans coming from the northwest. That is, the two armies passed each other as they marched towards Haliartos. Thus the Thebans, who had started in the east from Thebes, had reached the west of the city of Haliartos and Lysander, who was coming from the west, from Koroneia, was to the southeast of the Thebans and the city of Haliartos. Taking into account that the Thebans reached Haliartos before Lysander, he had somehow managed to pass the Thebans’ position without coming up.

against them. If Lysander had come by the Vigla route, he would have gone right through the Theban position without the Thebans attacking him even when he exposed his right flank to them, which does not make sense. Once again, Lysander’s position to the southeast and the Thebans to the northwest can be better understood if Lysander took the Koutoumoulia route.

Finally, Lysander’s intention was primarily to rendezvous with Pausanias, who would be coming to Haliartos from Thespiai, a road that joined the Koutoumoulia route, to the south of Haliartos, on the outskirts of the modern village of Mazi. This is probably the other reason why Lysander would have chosen the Koutoumoulia route, so that not only did he avoid crossing the compromised Vigla Pass, but he could also keep watch on the route by which Pausanias would be coming.

In short, Lysander, coming from Lebadeia, passed Koroneia, advanced by the Koutoumoulia route and, being unaware of the movements of the Theban army, was overtaken by it. Lysander’s manoeuvre was designed to ensure the rendezvous of the two armies and, had he known about the Thebans’ movements, he would have cut them off from the Athenians and, after joining forces with Pausanias, crushed them.

Meanwhile, the morning after the battle Pausanias, who knew nothing about the intercepted letter, took the route northwest from Plataiai to Thespiai. He must have crossed the Asopos and Oeroe rivers and reached the site of ancient Eutresis on the Arkopodhi hill, some nine kilometres from Plataiai. After that, 4.5 kilometres to the northwest, is Thespiai. From Thespiai, travelling northwest, a path turns into the valley of the river Kephalarí and comes out in Haliartos. This is the shortest route between Thespiai and Haliartos and today a modern road (Thespies-Haliartos) follows approximately the same route as the ancient path for some eleven kilometres. Pausanias (9.32.5) mentions this route, and so does Gell (1827: 121-123), who rode from Eremokastro (Thespiai) to Haliartos in just over three hours.

5. THE BATTLEFIELD AND THE POSITION OF THE TWO ARMIES.

Ancient Haliartos is situated on the hill now known as Kastri Maziou, to the west of the modern village of Haliartos. In Antiquity it was right on the edge of Lake Kopais, so in winter the north of the city was surrounded by the waters of the Lake. The steepest parts of the hill are to the north and west. On the summit, to the northwest, was the acropolis, with an area of about 250 by 150 m., and the city below spread over the gentle slopes to the south and west of the acropolis, between it and the modern road. The highest part of the acropolis reaches 164 metres and the city below is at a height of between 120 and 160 metres. In addition to the wall encircling the acropolis, which preserves traces of polygonal, trapezoidal and cyclopean walls, in 395 the city below was also surrounded by a wall, which had several towers along it. The route from Thebes to Lebadeia passed beside the city’s southern wall; the necropoleis were situated respectively to the east, southeast and west of the city and flanked the route. Haliartos is the only certain point of the battle. The Haliartians massed behind its walls, supported by a small Theban contingent that joined them in the city.

54 Strabo.9.2.28; see H. Goldman (1931), Excavations at Eutresis in Boiotia. Cam. Mass.
As we saw, Plutarch (Lys.28.3, 29.7) says that Lysander camped on a hill that was part of Mt. Helikon, Orchalides or Alopeke, where he waited for Pausanias. He then advanced along the path that led directly to Haliartos and was attacked after crossing the river Hoplites, beside the Kissousa spring where marshy plants such as the Cretan storax grew (Plut.Lys.28.3-4, 6, 29.4-5). The camp must have been near the gorge mentioned by Xenophon or the rugged terrain Diodoros (14.81.2) talks about, where the Theban pursuit ended some hours later, since Plutarch (Lys.28.6) says that Lysander’s troops fled towards the hill, which we can interpret as being where they had their camp, and their pursuers were held back by very rough terrain. Pausanias (9.33.4) also mentions a river, the Lophis, that flows into the Lake near Haliartos and Strabo (9.3.3,5) says that Haliartos is close to a marsh that produces flute reeds.57

To the south of Haliartos is the valley of the river Kephalari, which runs deep between two spurs of Mt. Helikon cf. infra Fig. 7 Mt. Likophios rises to the west of the valley, with its double peak, the southern one being the higher at 538 metres. Between Mt. Likophios’ two peaks is a narrow gully known as the Mazi Gorge. The modern town of Mazi is in this part of the valley, on the slope of a peaked hill (Leake.2.205). Mazi is where the routes from Koutoumiali/Zagara and Erimokastro/Thespiai meet, and another goes on to Haliartos. In the eastern part of the valley is Mt. Malaki, 294 metres high. Not only the summit of Mt. Malaki but the whole of the area in general is much lower than Mt. Likophios.

The river Kephalari runs through the valley of the same name and, before it was drained in the modern era, flowed into the Lake approximately a kilometre to the east of Haliartos. It is possible that Pausanias gives the name of the more important river, so the Kephalari is probably the ancient Lophis, but this does not mean it was the only river in the area or that we should identify the Lophis mentioned by Pausanias with the Hoplites in Plutarch. In fact, Leake (2.207) and Frazer (5.165) say that there were two rivers close to Haliartos, one of

57 On the reeds used to make flutes, see Pliny.NH.16.66 and Theophrastos.4.11.8, 9.
which flowed into the Lake to the west of Haliartos from the foot of the Mazi hill, while the other, called the Kephalarí, was to the east. A small stream flows from the Mazi Gorge, also called Mazi, which splits in two as it leaves the Gorge: a torrent joins the river Kephalarí just to the north of Mazi and is shown on Frazer’s map (5.111), while the other flow to the western part of Haliartos and Lake Kopais.

Between the mouth of the Kephalarí Valley and Haliartos there was a plain some five hundred metres N-S and one thousand five hundred W-E, sufficient to accommodate the two contending armies. According to Frazer (5.165), the northern side of the Haliartos hill is very steep with the crypts of several tombs built into it, and a copious spring flowing into the marshy area. To the west of the city was another necropolis containing a tumulus, where several springs rise. It is possible then that the whole area to the north and west of the city was marshy land in Antiquity.

To sum up, the western part of the Kephalarí valley and the space between this area and the city of Haliartos match the description of the battlefield given in the sources. Lysander could have camped in Mazi, where the Koutoumoulia and Thespiai routes converge. Modern Kephalarí must be the ancient Lophis and the Hoplites could be the Mazi torrent, which is a tributary of the Kephalarí. The road from Mazi to Haliartos would be the one referred to by Plutarch (Lys.28.3) along which Lysander advanced. The battlefield would extend between the left bank of the river Lophis/Kephalarí, across the plain to the south of Haliartos, which lies between the city itself and the Kephalarí Valley, and extends to the marshy area to the west where the Kissousa spring rises, site of the tombs of Rhadamanthos and Alea. The Mazi Gorge could be the ravine where the Theban pursuit ended.

In the case of the Thebans, Lysander appears to have been unaware of the Theban presence. Xenophon (HG.3.5.18) mentions a small Theban contingent inside Haliartos, but does not explain their presence, and says Lysander did not know they were there for he tried to incite the Haliartians to defect from the Thebans. Pausanias (3.5.3) also says that they entered the city unseen and Plutarch (Lys.28.3) informs us that they entered before Lysander arrived and were in battle formation, together with the Haliartians, behind the wall, (Plut.Lys.28.5: οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει Θηβαίοι μετὰ τῶν Ἀλιαρτίων συντεταγμένοι τῶν, obviously not to defend the walls but preparing to come out and fight when the bulk of the army joined battle. In fact, Plutarch says they did not move until that very instant.

Xenophon (HG.3.5.18) tells us that a more numerous Theban corps, comprising hoplites and horsemen, attacked swiftly outside Haliartos and, in his opinion, it was this corps that decided the battle. He obviously misinterprets their presence because they could not have been coming from Thebes because all the action took place on a single day and in the same sequence (Cook, 1981: 285), so they must have been waiting nearby. Of the two possible explanations he suggests for Lysander’s action (X.HG.3.5.19): that he did not know they were nearby or that he thought he could defeat them, the first, that he was caught unawares, is the most plausible. Otherwise it would seem that Lysander made a tactical error in advancing to the wall, exposing the army’s left flank and rearguard to the bulk of the Theban army. According to Plutarch (Plut.Lys.28.4-5, 29.3-4), the Thebans who had remained outside the city attacked Lysander with the walls of Haliartos on their left, that is, from the west, from behind and just as their enemies were crossing the river Hoplites. Thus the Thebans must have been to the left of Lysander’s position where he could not see them, somewhere on the mountainside between Mt. Likophios and the Vigla Pass.

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58 Frazer (5.165) identifies the stream on the hill with the Kissousa spring and the tumulus with the tomb of Rhadamanthos or Alea.
Fig. 6. The Battlefield from Ancient Haliartos.
6. CONCLUSIONS: RECONSTRUCTING THE BATTLE OF HALIARTOS

On the basis of all that has been said so far, we can now try to reconstruct the entire battle. Lysander, with at least one Lakedaimonian mora and perhaps a small Peloponnese levy, starting out from Sikyon rather than Korinth, disembarked in Phokis, possibly in the bay of Antikyra. From Antikyra, he would have gone to Elateia, where he joined forces with the Phokians and various allies from central Greece, including Herakleots, Ainians, Malians, Oitaians and perhaps also the Doriens and Athamanians. Probably knowing that the Orchomenians intended to defect, he took the most direct route to Orchomenos via Elateia, Hympholis and Abai. When they saw him coming, the Orchomenians opened the gates, and thus defected from the Boiotian Confederacy. Orchomenos accepted the Lakedaimonian garrison, the pro-Spartan oligarchs were confirmed in power and the Orchomenians joined Lysander’s army. With the Orchomenians, Lysander would have had some six thousand soldiers, counting hoplites and horsemen, plus light infantry. From Orchomenos, following the shore of Lake Kopais, Lysander crossed and plundered Lebadeian territory; consequently the city remained on the side of the Confederacy. In Lebadeia, he sent a letter to Pausanias who, if he had followed the Spartan plans, should already have been in Plataiai, with instructions to meet him the following day in Haliartos. In order to reach Haliartian territory, Lysander crossed Koroneia, which did not desert the Confederacy either, and, taking the Koutoumoulia route inland, at dawn encamped on the spur at the end of the Kephalari valley, to the south of Haliartos, probably in Mazi. The hill was well protected by the rivers Hoplites/Mazi to the north and Lophis/Kephalari to the east and overlooked the route from Thespiai and the plain that lay between the river Hoplites and the city of Haliartos. He set camp there and waited for Pausanias who, coming from Thespiai, should have appeared a few hours later.

However, the Thebans intercepted and deciphered the Lysander’s message and decided to engage Lysander’s army before he could join forces with Pausanias. So they left the Athenians protecting Thebes, either within the city itself or stationed to the south of it to prevent Pausanias attacking and, marching by night, covered the twenty kilometres between Thebes and Haliartos by the Steni Pass and the shore of Lake Kopais. They arrived before dawn and before Lysander, stationed part of the army in the city but the larger contingent outside it, lying in wait, probably around Mt. Likophios, out of sight from the south and southeast.

Lysander, unaware that his message had been intercepted and that the Theban army was close by, planned to incite Haliartos to defect from the Confederacy. The sources say he was impatient, but this is probably a misinterpretation: Lysander must have thought that his forces were vastly superior to those of the Haliartians and that the defection of Haliartos would be a severe blow to Thebes. The city would lose control of western Boiotia, and he could chalk up another victory before the arrival of Pausanias, who outranked him, making the conquest his alone. So he advanced by the route from Thespiai to Haliartos and, crossing the river Hoplites, perhaps the torrent that comes down from Mt. Likophios, approached the city walls.

From then on the confrontation could be called an ambush, and seems to follow a premeditated plan by the Thebans. The major part of the army, with the walls of Haliartos to its left, attacked Lysander’s rearguard and left flank from the west and immediately afterwards, the Haliartians and Thebans waiting inside the city attacked from the front once Lysander’s battle formation had been weakened. Lysander and some others died in this coordinated attack and the army broke ranks and fled. Thebans and Haliartians then pursued Lysander’s troops up the hill where they had encamped and the slopes of Mt. Likophios, from whose heights Lysander’s soldiers fought off their pursuers. A thousand of Lysander’s troops were lost and between two and three hundred of their enemies died, most of them Thebans.
The news of Lysander’s defeat took Pausanias by surprise when he was still between Plataiai and Thespiai and, it would seem, far from making haste, he arrived at Haliartos the day after the battle. Once in Haliartos, Pausanias possibly camped in the same place as Lysander had done the previous day and initially intended to join battle with the Thebans and Haliartians but he immediately recognised that he faced a difficult situation. On one hand, the bodies were close to the city walls, and if he tried to recover them by force, the other side would harry them from the walls and they would suffer serious casualties. Pausanias’ six thousand men must have represented a contingent approximately equal to the Thebans but he had fewer horsemen. In addition the allies had little enthusiasm for battle (X.HG.3.5.23); it was ebbing away as they saw the conditions in which the fighting would take place. Pausanias remained indecisive all that day, thus losing precious time if his troops were to engage the enemy. The next day, the second after the battle, when the Athenians arrived under the command of Thrasyboulos, who must have come by the same route as the Thebans and joined forces with them, Pausanias no longer had any choice. So, despite the opposition of his Spartan advisers, and no doubt against the advice of the polemarchs and penteconters, Pausanias decided not to fight and asked the Thebans for a truce to take up the dead, which meant explicitly acknowledging defeat. In exchange for allowing them to take their dead, the

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59 X.HG.3.5.22 and ff, Lys.14.5, 14; 16.13-14; Plut.Lys.29.1; Paus.3.5.4.
Thebans demanded the withdrawal of Pausanias’ army. Once they had collected the bodies, the Lakedaimonians withdrew by a pre-determined route and were not permitted to set foot on Boiotian land. According to Plutarch, Lysander’s body was buried in Panopeian territory, on the Sacred Way from Chaironeia to Delphi. This means that the Thebans did not allow Pausanias to return to the Peloponnese via Mt. Kithairon, but made him go back across Phokis and cross by sea, thus making his retreat even more ignominious.

The battle of Haliartos, the defeat and the humiliating withdrawal of the Lakedaimonians had two immediate consequences, both in internal Lakedaimonian politics and in the general course of the war. In Sparta it led to a regrouping of political factions with the disappearance of the old leaders that had dominated Spartan politics since the end of the Peloponnesian War. King Agis had died in 400. Lysander perished at Haliartos and King Pausanias was brought to trial for his conduct at Haliartos, condemned to death in his absence and lived out the rest of his life in exile in Tegea. Their demise explains a key feature of Sparta’s evolution until the middle of the fourth century: the predominance of Agesilaos, who became the central figure in Spartan politics until his death in 359 and, of all the Spartan kings, perhaps the most powerful.

For the other side, the victory at Haliartos led to the Korinthians and Argives joining the coalition and the allies momentarily recovering the initiative in the war, which they exploited to wage a campaign in central Greece and Thessaly in 394. It is true that Sparta regained the initiative later the same year, but the alliance with Korinth and Argos meant that the centre of conflict moved to Korinth and, as a result, both Boiotia and Attica escaped Spartan incursions for the rest of the war. But perhaps the most important consequence of the battle was that the Spartans were obliged to recall Agesilaos, thus abandoning their empire in Asia, which would be lost after the naval battle of Knidos in 394. Despite Agesilaos’ promise that he would return, like a McArthur of the Ancient World, he never again set foot on Asian soil.

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60 X.HG.3.5.24; Fernández Nieto.I:109-110, 231-233. Cf. the same terms in Delion: Th.4.98.7-8; Munn, 1997: 71.
61 X.HG.3.5.21-25; Plut.Lys.29.1-3, 30.1; Paus.3.5.4-6; Parke, 1945: 109.


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