

THE GREEK MILITARY CAMP IN THE TEN THOUSAND'S ARMY

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Para mi familia.

ABSTRACT - RESUMEN

The first and main conclusion of this study of the Xenophon's works is that the Greek military camp should be the subject of research and should get more than ten pages at most in any handbook on Greek warfare. Once the castramental vocabulary problem is resolved, and we know the exact difference on meaning between words like τὸ στρατόπεδον, τὰ ὅπλα οὐ σκηνέω, it will be possible to attempt an approximation to Greek castramental theory of the 4th century as it would have been described in lost contemporary works, such as the one by Aeneas Tacticus. The Greek military camp seems to have had a high level of professional organisation, with a regular plan and internal structure, a very sophisticated watch guard system and a routine that shows the generals' concern for the order and discipline of their troops. Inside the camp it was the συσκηνία (the group of soldiers who shared the same tent) the basic logistical (and also probably, tactical) unit in the Greek armies on campaign.

La conclusión principal de este estudio de las obras de Jenofonte es que el campamento militar griego puede y debe ser investigado, pudiéndosele dedicar más de las diez páginas que como mucho se le han venido otorgando en los manuales de historia militar de la Grecia clásica. Una vez solventado el problema del vocabulario, y conociendo la diferencia exacta de significado entre términos como τὸ στρατόπεδον, τὰ ὅπλα οὐ σκηνέω, hemos podido aproximarnos a la teoría castramental griega del s. IV tal y como pudo aparecer en obras hoy perdidas como la de Eneas Táctico. La castramentación griega parece haber alcanzado un alto grado de profesionalidad, con campamentos que mostraban un plano y una estructura interna regular, con un sofisticado sistema de guardias, y un horario que demuestra la preocupación de los generales por el mantenimiento del orden y la disciplina entre la tropa. Dentro del campamento era la συσκηνία (el grupo de soldados que comparten una misma tienda) la unidad logística (y, probablemente también, táctica) básica en los ejércitos griegos en campaña.

KEY WORDS - PALABRAS CLAVE

Classical Greece. Military History. Castramentation.
Grecia Clásica. Historia militar. Castramentación.

1. INTRODUCTION

It is very surprising to discover how little attention has been given to the Greek military camp from the time it is first mentioned in J.Potters' work (Potters, 1776: 156-155) in the 18th century until the present day. Although in recent years some important authors such as W.K. Pritchett (Pritchett, 1974: 133-146) or J.K. Anderson (Anderson, 1970: 59-66) have devoted whole chapters to this issue in more general works on war in Classical Greece and there has even been a tentative attempt to introduce it as a new area in archeological research (*cf.*, McCredie, 1966), the necessary monographic treatment has never really been under-

taken. Any attempt to produce a bibliographical review of the Greek στρατόπεδον should have paid more attention to authors who have never investigated the subject —so we have important omissions such as F.E. Adcock, D.W. Engels, G.T. Griffith, R. Lonis, G.B. Nussbaum or A.M. Snodgrass—, than those who have. In some of the more important works of general history such as the *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* or the *Dictionnaire des Antiquités Grecques et Romaines* the headword *stratopedon* does not appear. The first offers only a few lines about it in the article under the headword «*Kriegskunst*». In the second work, we find a short description of the Greek στρατόπεδον in the introduction of the entry on the Roman *castra*.

The reasons for this absence of works on the Greek military camp are, primarily, in Polybius' Judgement about the Greek style of encampment compared with the Roman tradition and also in the traditional inertia that sometimes governs classical studies and causes authors to accept old ideas uncritically.

But the study of this question is important, because it seems impossible that such high calibre armies as the Greek, and particularly the Spartan army, would have failed to plan this very important aspect of military life. Furthermore, we know of the existence in the 4th century B.C. of a military handbook, at least in the form of a draft, dedicated to the στρατόπεδον, written by Aeneas Tacticus (*cf.*, *Aen.Tact.*, XXI, 2). The attention devoted by Xenophon to it in all his literary works, —particularly in his *Lacedemonian Republic* and *Cyropaedia*—, also invites a more careful reflection on the subject. The results of such a study of the Greek army issue is only one of the possibilities confronted by this research. It could be also of great interest for understanding the process of Greek urbanism and colonisation and gaining a better understanding of the continuity between Greece and Rome. This research covers classical society as a whole.

Our choice of Xenophon as the main source of our work is not a casual one. No other author has described military life in the 4th century B.C. as well as he has. Not only did he discuss the *ars military*, but also he considered the duty of a good commander to look after every aspect of daily life of the soldiers under his command (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, I, 6, 14; *Mem.*, III, 1). Everything is coordinated within the framework of the military camp. Before Polybius he was the Greek author who showed most interest in life on campaign.

The *Anabasis* has proved to be the most rewarding source for our study. It was written from the author's personal experience of the events that occurred during the March of the Ten Thousand. The account thus gives us a view of the daily life of Cyrus' mercenaries and his military camp. Indeed this work became the most suitable, worthwhile and accurate source for the subject of this research.

Due to the limitation of Xenophon's works, our conclusions cannot be generalised to apply to the 4th century as a whole. His moral and didactic interests led Xenophon to select the events he included in his works and oblige us to be cautious about general conclusions until we have studied more classical authors. In this work we have only used other classical writers when it was very necessary and in support of some inferences presented here. But we have not used other authors as the basis of our argument. We have taken the view that any conclusions must be supported by Xenophon's testimony; he was very subjective, but had extensive experience and knowledge of the subject. His account does not reach the depth or accuracy of Thucydides, but we must recognise that no-one has described the hoplites' *ethos* better than him.

This article is a necessarily very brief summary from our dissertation, a thesis project entitled: «*Military camps and history of war in classical Greece (490-336 b.C.)*» supervised by Mr. Víctor Alonso Troncoso (Professor and Head of Department of Classical Studies of the *Universidad de La Coruña*) and Ms. Alicia Canto y De Gregorio (Reader of Archaeology of the *Universidad Autónoma de Madrid*). The principal object of our study was to demonstrate

that the Greek military camp could get more than the paltry ten pages normally devoted to it in the classical military handbooks.

2. CASTRAMENTAL VOCABULARY USED IN XENOPHON'S WORKS

At the beginning of our work, we realised that it was necessary to make a philological study of Xenophon's castramental terminology. Every piece of research is faced with the obstacle of lack of agreement among the translators as to the interpretations of terms such as τὸ στρατόπεδον, τὰ ὄπλα or σκηνέω in the contexts of Greek castramentation. This has been solved by using generic forms, a very inadequate solution when undertaking a monographic study of the subject. Moreover, this situation has led to a misunderstanding of the texts, and hindered any advance in the research of Greek στρατόπεδον. In this second section, we have tried to resolve this problem of vocabulary.

Xenophon uses five terms when he refers to military camps or the action of setting up camp: τὸ στρατόπεδον, σκηνέω (as a verb, and as a plural noun, σκῆναι), τὰ ὄπλα, ἀυλίζομαι and στρατεύμα. All of them are treated in the dictionaries as equivalents and translated as «military camp» or «encampment».

Τὸ στρατόπεδον is the main object of our study and standard term used in Xenophon's works to refer to a military camp. In Liddell-Scott's *Greek-English Lexicon* this noun is defined as «camp», «army», «fleet» and, in Roman times, «legion». We can find all these different meanings in the various translations of Xenophon's works¹. D.Roques, in his research on Herodian's political vocabulary, says the substantive τὸ στρατόπεδον is a vague and polysemic term, which depends very much on the translator for its meaning (Roques, 1990: 65).

When we look at the way Xenophon uses this word, we can realise that the existence of a στρατόπεδον does not depend on having defensive construction (τάφρον καὶ σταύρωμα)². If this is the case, Xenophon speaks about a camp surrounded by an entrenchment³. It is not necessary to have tents to talk about the στρατόπεδον (*cf.*, *HG.*, VII, 5, 22; *An.*, IV, 4, 8-22). Even the physical dispersion of troops on account of the distribution of the various army groups to different villages does not imply a multiplication of military camps (στρατόπεδα) and in this case one camp only (στρατόπεδον) is referred to because it pertains to only one army (*cf.*, *An.*, IV, 4, 9; IV, 4, 22; IV, 6, 1). Naturally, if there are buildings for the soldiers, these would be referred to —through a logical process of assimilation— as a camp, so Xenophon says that Eteonicus sent his troops to Metimna and set fire the στρατόπεδον (*cf.*, *HG.*, I, 6, 38).

In our opinion, the problem of translation rests on our definition of military camp. It tends to emphasise the territorial or physical aspect (tents, barracks, fortifications, etc.) of the encampment, while for Xenophon, at least, στρατόπεδον means first and foremost the troops or soldiers, and, by extension, the ground used by them or the buildings in which they

¹ *Cfr.*, e.g., *HG.*, I, 1, 3 (translated by Brownson as «fleet»); I, 1, 21 (as «Athenian forces»); I, 2, 7 (as «division» of an army). We find the same problem in other authors: F.G. Sturz (Sturz, 1964) presents *stratopedon* in Xenophon as «*castra, locus castrorum, exercitus, classis*». The more accurate translation in *Eq.Mag.*, VII, 9-10 seems to present a more complex picture: «φιλοῦσι δὲ πως στρατιώται, ὅσῳ ἂν πλείους ὦσι, τοσοῦτῳ πλείω ἀμαρτάνειν. ἢ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐπιμελεῖκεδάννυνται ἢ πορευομένων ἀταξίῃ μὲν προέρχονται, οἱ δ' ὑπολείπονται πλέον τοῦ καιροῦ. τὰ οὖν τοιαῦτα ἀμαρτήματα οὐ χρῆ παρίεναι ἀκόλαστα (εἰ δὲ μή, ὅλη ἡ χώρα στρατόπεδον ἔσται)».

² «When the historians refer to a camp (*stratopedon*), they habitually mean an expanse of ground occupied by an entire army on campaign, regardless of whether or not it was fortified» (Lawrence, 1979: 159).

³ *Cfr.*, *HG.*, VI, 2, 23 («τὸ στρατόπεδον σὺν τῷ χαρακώματι»); *HG.*, III, 2, 2-5 («στρατοπεδευσάμενοι καὶ περισταυρωσάμενοι»); *An.*, VI, 4, 1-6; 5, 1: the men took up quarters in a very easy natural place to defend, which is endowed with ditch and stockade; *Cyr.*, III, 3, 26-28: description of an Assyrian camp surrounded with ditch (τάφρον περιβάλλονται).

lived. When this aspect is understood, τὸ στρατόπεδον is no longer an ambiguous or polysemic term and becomes a very accurate concept in the Greek language, although we have no direct translation for it. In fact, it is not a term peculiar to the Athenian: Homer also refers to the Greek camp in Troy as στρατός (=army) (*cf.*, Chantraine, 1968: *s.v. stratos*).

Neither does Xenophon refer to any military contingent as στρατόπεδον. On one hand, we should distinguish it from a permanent troop settlement used for lookout, siege or harrying operations functions in enemy territory, like the φρούριον or τεῖχος⁴; on the other hand, an establishment taken out of the main army group during a march does not have the level of a military camp⁵. Actually, the στρατόπεδον refers only to the troops settled on land around his command⁶ and has no time limit defined by the the fulfilment of a duty.

The verb στρατοπεδεύω is closer in meaning to our verb «encamp», although a more accurated definition would be «occupation or settlement in a territory by an army». So, Xenophon does not describe the Cyrus' camp in *Cyr.*, VIII, 5, 2, but describes how Cyrus organised the settlement of his troops; in the same way, Lycurgus (*cf.*, *Lac.*, XII) does not describe the Lacedemonian encampment, but gives some rules about how to encamp, or more in keeping with the Greek mentality, how the Spartan army should settle when on campaign (*Lac.*, XII, 1: «Ἐρῶ δὲ καὶ ἢ στρατοπεδεύεσθαι ἐνόμισε χρῆναι Λυκοῦργος»).

Closely connected with the last verb is ἀναξενυγνύω, to refer to the action of «the camp moving off», or striking camp. Its original meaning was the action of «harnessing the horses or the oxen again», and from this idea comes «the camp moving off» and «getting the army ready to go on» (Adrados, 1986).

The second noun, usually translated as «encamping» is σκηνέω, though it has a more exact meaning in relation to the common life of the soldiers who share the same tent⁷ and, in general any form of quartering troops⁸. This term is given a broader meaning with the institution of συσκηνία (*cf.*, *Lac.*, V, 2; VII, 4; IX, 4; XIII, 1; XV, 5), the communal tent for meals on campaign, the civilian equivalent of which was the συσσίτιον (*Cfr.*, Rebenich, 1998: n. 60). Σκηνέω means principally the common life of the soldiers on campaign and the comradeship among those who shared the same tent, the smallest logistic (and probably tactical) unit in the Greek armies.

A derivatived form often used is διασκήνηω, defined as «scattered encampment», normally for battalions billeted in different villages, Xenophon's expression: «διασκηνήσας τὰς τάξεις» (*cf.*, *e.g.*, *An.*, IV, 4, 8; IV, 5, 23) being typical.

The third most interesting and problematic term, is «τὰ ὄπλα». Its etymology as «military camp» was explained by J. Classen as «Folge des τίθεσθαι τὰ ὄπλα» (Classen, 1963:

⁴ Φρούριον would be the stronghold, because it holds a garrison (φρουρά). Over the φρούριον is τεῖχος, literally «wall», but it could be said also to a stronghold that politically is not a city: Oenoe on 431 is a φρούριον and on 411 is appointed as τεῖχος (*cf.*, Th., II, 18, 2; VIII, 98, 2) (Lawrence, 1979: 159, 172-173). Siege fortifications: τεῖχος (*HG.*, I, 3, 14; *HG.*, IV, 4, 16); Watch establishments or garrisons: φρούριον (*HG.*, III, 2, 11; IV, 7, 7); stronghold: τεῖχος (*HG.*, IV, 8, 25); establishments within enemy territory to serve as a base of operations against the enemy: ἐπιτειχισμός (*HG.*, V, 1, 2).

⁵ For example, *An.*, I, 2, 21-22 (is not a military camp, but only the garrison tents for guarding the Cilician Gates; in *HG.*, IV, 5, 3, Agesilaus encamps (ἐστρατοπεδεύετο) at the hot springs of Piraeum at Corinth, while he sends a company to spend the night on the nearby high places to watch over (ἐνυκτέρευσεν) the camp.

⁶ It is the physical proximity to the commander that defines the dependence on this general and the camp: *cf.*, *An.*, I, 3, 7; *Cyr.*, IV, 2, 26.

⁷ *Cfr.* F.G. Sturz (Sturz, 1964) *s.v.* σκηνέω: «castra locare et ibi commorari; tentoria habere; militare; convivari»; Liddell-Scott, *s.v.* σκηνέω: «to be or dwell in a tent, encamp, also, generally, to be quartered or billeted»; σκηνή, «tent; pl. camp». Strack gives the same meaning (Strack, 1971), *s.v.* σκηνέω: «(sich) lagern; übh. sich aufhalten oder Quartier haben (v. Truppen)», adding the other sense of «feasting (schmausen)». In the same way σκηνή is translated as «Zelt; Pl. zuw.= das Lager». Sturz offers a third form: σκηνώμα (=«Zelt; Behausung»).

⁸ The use of σκήναι is not necessary (*cf.*, *e.g.* *HG.*, V, 1, 20).

289). We can find this same idea directly expounded by Xenophon (*cf.*, *HG.*, VII, 5, 22; *Th.*, IV, 44, 1).

Once the weapons were set down, there was a camp. Moreover, the modern authors have defined this general term in a variety of ways: «weapons stack», «place of arms», «military camp» and «quarters of soldiers». But, as in the case of the noun στρατόπεδον, it is difficult to find the correct translation in each case. For instance, and amongst many other cases, we can extract the following text from the *Anabasis*, II, 4, 15: «μετὰ δὲ τὸ δεῖπνον ἔτυχον ἐν περιπάτῳ ὄντες πρὸ τῶν ὀπλῶν Πρόξενος καὶ Ξενοφῶν· καὶ προσελθὼν ἄνθρωπος...».

In the opinion of P. Masqueray we should understand «πρὸ τῶν ὀπλῶν» as the «weapons stack». And Brownson translates it in this way: «*Proxenus and Xenophon chanced to be walking in front of the place where the arms were stacked, when a man came up...*». We encounter some differences in Bach Pellicer's translation: «*Después de la cena se hallaban paseando frente al campamento Próximo y Jenofonte. Se acercó un hombre...*».

So, there is considerable disparity and we do not know where Proxenus and Xenophon were walking: whether they were outside or inside the camp, or somewhere near the camp of the Ten Thousand, maybe in a place that was easy for a Greek reader to recognise.

Among the various possible translations adopted by the modern authors, the identification of τὰ ὀπλά with «stacked arms» supposed to exist in Greek camps, is the most interesting one for our research. If it is correct, it would be important for studying the internal structure of Greek military camps. The first modern author to make use of this translation was H. Droysen in the description of the Lacedemonian camp (Droysen, 1889: 89). F. Ollier shares this opinion in his annotated edition of the same work. He claims that the Greeks had the custom of stacking all the weapons together in one or more places in the camp (Ollier, 1934: 62). This idea appears repeatedly in the translations of Xenophon's works by the publishers *Belles Lettres*, where, in a note to the *Anabasis* volume, we can read: «*Dans la langue de l'Anabase l'expression τα ὀπλα (II, 2, 20; III, 1, 40) désigne souvent, comme ici, une partie spéciale du camp où les soldats réunissaient leurs armes avant d'aller se reposer*» (Masqueray, 1988: 170).

If we reshift to the Xenophon's work which this claim is based (*cf.*, *Lac.*, XII, 2), we can see that at no point are stacked weapons mentioned, only weapons. However, the most of the translators believe that Xenophon referred to places where the soldiers' arms were collected. In our opinion, this interpretation was adopted because of the need to explain the existence of an internal guard stationed «ἀπὸ τῶν ὀπλῶν» (*cf.*, *Lac.*, XII, 2) to avoid weapons being taken by servants and used against their masters (*cf.*, *Lac.*, XII, 4) and to offer a logical interpretation of *Lac.*, XII, 7, normally translated as «rest by the arms»⁹.

But this translation has other problems too. The first arises because hoplites had their own servants (σκευοφόροι), who had to take care of, guard and carry their masters' weapons, amongst other duties. It is hardly likely or very logical that, when they were encamped, the servants would be careless with these special, important and valuable items of private property. Besides, in forces of this kind the tent companions seem to have acted as a logistic unit and there was no need to think they broke this habit and all the soldiers stacked their weapons together¹⁰.

The second objection arises when we look at the text of *Lac.*, XII, 7. The translation of «ἐπὶ τῶν ὀπλῶν» as «rest by the arms» is a less usual translation of ἐπὶ than «on» or

⁹ «μετὰ γὰρ μὴν ταῦτα δεῖπνοποιεῖσθαι κηρύττεται, καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἕσωσιν εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς οἷς ἂν κεκαλλιεργηκότες ὦσιν, ἐπὶ τῶν ὀπλῶν ἀναπαύεσθαι».

¹⁰ In roman camps there were no arms depots either. Hyginus, 1, says that each Roman had a place at the front, the same width and half length of the rest of the tent, for the weapons.

«over» and not very logical if we accept that in each *mora* there were common places to gather the weapons, because in this case the soldiers had rested in a very small place.

To clarify the correct interpretation of Xenophon's text we should quote some lines from the *Iliad*: «Βὰν δ' ἐπὶ Τυδεΐδην Διομήδεα • τὸν δ' ἐκίχανον ἐκτὸς ἀπὸ κλισίης σὺν τεύχεσιν • ἀμφὶ δ' ἐταῖροι εὐδον, ὑπὸ κρασὶν δ' ἔχον ἀσπίδας • ἔγχεα δέ σφιν ὄρθ' ἐπὶ σαυρωτήρος ἐλήλατο, τήλε δὲ χαλκὸς λάμφ' ὥς τε στεροπὴ πατρὸς Δός •...» (Hom., *Il.*, X, 150-154).

As we have just seen, at Diomedes' camp there was nowhere to stack the weapons, but each soldier kept his weapons near him and —as Xenophon does— we could claim that each man slept over his arms, using the shield as pillow for his head.

Another example of what we are saying appears in the *Anabasis* on the occasion of the alliance between the Ten Thousand and the Mossynoecians. Xenophon describes how the day after they had taken the oaths, the Mossynoecians came with ships to the place where they were encamped. The Greeks were outside the camp waiting to begin the march: «*After they had formed their lines one of them led off, and the rest after him, every man of them, fell into a rhythmic march and song, and passing through the battalions and through the quarters of the Greeks they went straight on against the enemy*» (translation by C.L. Brownson)¹¹.

In this case, we must understand by *τάξεις* the soldiers formation outside the camp, waiting to start the march, as standard practice and as we could also read in *HG.*, IV, 1, 23. So, after the Mossynoecians had gone through the Greek formation, they would have crossed the camp of the Ten Thousand. It does not make much sense to assume that *τῶν ὀπλων* would refer to the place where the arms were stacked, when the Greeks were ready to march out of the camp, as Masqueray's translation suggest: «*puis, après avoir traversé les rangs des Grecs et leur dépôt d'armes...*».

We think that, at least in Xenophon, *τὰ ὄπλα* means «military camp», and, specifically the idea of proper place or post for each soldier or group of soldiers in the camp corresponding to the site where their weapons are. Some passages of the *Anabasis* will help us to confirm this hypothesis.

In *An.*, III, 1, 3, Xenophon describes the spirit of the soldiers after the death of the commanders in the following words: «*ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ὄπλα πολλοὶ οὐκ ἦλθον ταύτην τὴν νύκτα, ἀνεπαύοντο δὲ ὅπου ἐτύγγανον ἕκαστος...*».

Masqueray translates the text as follows: «*et beaucoup n'allèrent pas déposer en commun leurs armes cette nuit-là. Ils se couchèrent, chacun où il se trouvait...*». And Bach Pelliger interprets it as follows: «*Sólo unos pocos al atardecer probaron la comida, y algunos encendieron fuego, y la mayoría no acudieron al campamento aquella noche. Cada cual se acostaba donde buenamente le cogía la noche*». But, in our opinion, Brownson's translation makes more sense: «*few kindled a fire, and many did not come that night to their quarters, but lay down wherever they each chanced to be...*».

When we think about the setting of this scene, we can exclude Masqueray's interpretation that the soldiers would have slept wherever they happened to be at nightfall. Just before the assassination of the commanders the situation of the mercenary troops in the middle of enemy territory would have made it very dangerous to leave or to sleep outside military establishment. Also, after the day's events and with the sense of defeat in the camp, it would have been impossible for them to spend the night outside of the military settlement and without seeking their comrades' protection. In our opinion, Xenophon is trying to express something different. He wants to convey the discouragement and neglect in the Greek camp that night by clearly contrasting this situation —when none of the soldiers took up this post in the military settlement, sleeping wherever he happened to be at sunset, but always within the

¹¹ *An.*, V, 4, 14: «καὶ διελθόντες διὰ τῶν τάξεων καὶ διὰ τῶν ὀπλων τῶν Ἑλλήνων...».

space occupied by the troops (ἀνεπαύοντο δὲ ὅπου ἐτύγγανον ἕκαστος)— and a more common situation when calm and discipline reign and everyone sleeps in his proper place beside his arms (ἐπὶ τῶν ὀπλῶν ἀναπαύεσθαι).

Then, Xenophon describes the same situation again, but in other words (*An.*, III, 1, 40): «νῦν γὰρ ἴσως καὶ ὑμεῖς αἰσθάνεσθε ὡς ἀθύμως μὲν ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὰ ὅπλα, ἀθύμως δὲ πρὸς τὰς φυλακάς».

Once again we find different translations:

- Masqueray: «*Actuellement, sans doute, vous comprenez aussi bien que moi en quel abattement ils sont allés déposer leurs armes, en quel abattement...*».
- Bach Pellicer: «*Porque ahora, posiblemente, os dais cuenta también vosotros de que han acudido a las armas con desaliento y sin ánimo hacen también las guardias*».
- Brownson: «*in what dejection they came to their quarters and in what dejection they proceeded to their picket duty*».

Brownson's interpretation again seems to be the translation that most accurately expresses events in the camp and Xenophon's intentions, trying to give the reader a clear impression of the state of mind among the Ten Thousands.

But it is not only in the *Anabasis* that Xenophon, using the τὰ ὅπλα term, discusses discipline problems in the στρατόπεδον: «καὶ οἱ μὲν Θηβαῖοι, ὅπου στρατοπεδεύοντο, εὐθύς ὧν ἔκοπτον δένδρων κατέβαλλον πρὸ τῶν τάξεων ὡς ἐδύναντο πλεῖστα, καὶ οὕτως ἐφυλάττοντο. οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες τούτων τε οὐδὲν ἐποίουν, καταλείποντες δὲ τὰ ὅπλα εἰς ἀρπαγὴν ἐπὶ τὰς οἰκίας ἐτρέποντο» (*HG.*, VI, 5, 30).

It does not make sense that the Arcadians would go off to plunder carelessly leaving their weapons behind or that they would consider it unnecessary to carry them during the raid. However, that is the translation by Strasburger or Guntiñas Tuñón¹². On the other hand, Brownson gives us a more logical version: «*The Arcadians, however, did nothing of this sort, but left their camp behind them and turning their attention to plundering the houses*» (translation by C.L. Brownson).

Xenophon was contrasting the discipline and prudence of the Thebans —when every soldier stayed at his proper position, taking all the possible precautions to defend himself in the camp— and the lack of discipline and meanness of the Arcadian soldiers, who were solely concerned with plundering and robbing the land (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, VII, 2, 5). We must not forget the importance that Xenophon attaches to maintaining discipline among the troops during the plundering actions and how he considers this activity as more appropriate to slaves than to soldiers (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, IV, 2, 25).

From this perspective, we can see also another intention of the references to τὰ ὅπλα in the *Lacedemonian Republic* text: the sentries in the Spartan camp would be posted at the border of the encampment, along the place of the soldiers (*cf.*, *Lac.*, XII, 2: «ἀπὸ τῶν ὀπλῶν»); at night, the lacedemonian patrols would have been responsible for keeping the servants out of the encampment to avoid any insurrection against their masters (*cf.*, *Lac.*, XII, 4: καὶ τοὺς δούλους εἴργουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀπλῶν»), while they were asleep in their positions by or on their arms (*cf.*, *Lac.*, XII, 7). It would also, *Lac.*, XII, 5 be an attempt to describe the high level of discipline and order in the Spartan armies during the campaigns. They were not permitted to spend the night away from their positions¹³. The strict character

¹² This idea is also accepted by V.D.Hanson. He considers that one of the main reasons why the groups of soldiers spread out over a territory plundering could so easily be attacked by the cavalry was that they had left their weapons in the military camp (Hanson, 1983: 106).

¹³ *Amm.Marc.*, XXII, 4, 6 records an ancient Lacedemonian law: the Spartan soldiers on campaign were not allowed to spend the night under roof («*sub tecto*»), which can be understood as the duty to not leave the military camp at night.

of this rule would contrast with the lack of discipline in the Athenian army at Catana (*cf.*, Th., VI, 64, 3).

Summing up, τὰ ὄπλα seems to mean the place occupied by each soldier in the camp, restricted to the area of the tent or each military unit into which the camp is divided. Because of this, it is sometimes translated as «camp», but with a more physical and restricted meaning than στρατόπεδον. The origin of this expression would be found in the ancient form of encampment, where every soldier would sleep at his post, almost literally, on his weapons. When proper campaign tents were used and there was greater organisational complexity in the armies, the term would keep its sense as a concept, but not as real form of encampment, with the meaning of proper place or post for each soldier or group of soldiers in the camp. Which of the two possibilities (singular or plural) is the most correct, it is difficult to say because τὰ ὄπλα appears only in its plural form. In any case, it seems unlikely that τὰ ὄπλα would be identified with any place in the camps to stack or gather the soldiers' weapons.

Finally, we should mention the other two words Xenophon used in connection with military camps: ἀυλίζομαι (principally, to bivouac or to sleep in the open air, although it is used in a more general way to mean sleeping in any kind of conditions) and στρατεύμα (the army as an encampment, compared with the personal character of στρατόπεδον).

After a detailed study of the castramental vocabulary used in Xenophon's works, we were able to discern more clearly the distinctions between the different terms used for military settlements in the Greek language and reject possible wrong interpretations, which have sometimes caused difficulties for understanding and translating some of his texts. On this basis, we were able to approach the study of στρατόπεδον in Xenophon's works.

3. SITTING THE CAMP

First of all, we should ask about the considerations taken into account by the Greeks when choosing a site for the camp. There is no proper treatment of this subject among the Greek classical writers as there is in some of the Roman authors such as Vegetius (I, 22 y III, 8) or Hyginus (56-57) when they discuss the Roman *castra*. On the sole basis of the statements in Polybius (VI, 42) and Xenophon (*Lac.*, XII, 1), a large number of modern authors have considered the defensive elements—to protect the camp and avoid the construction of stockades—as crucial in the choice of the place for encampment during a military campaign¹⁴. However, none of Xenophon's works seems to confirm this idea. In the *Cyropaedia* the criteria included other aspects, such as the healthiness of the settlement (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, I, 6, 15; VI, 1, 23) or the fulfilling the main logistical requirements of an army on campaign: water supply, abundance of fodder for the beasts of burden and the cavalry, and the necessary wheat to feed the soldiers (*cf.*, *e.g.*, *Cyr.*, V, 4, 40). If we combine all these logistics and defensive requirements, we would have the ideal site for settling an army on campaign¹⁵.

The importance of the logistic criterion is easy to recognize from the logic procedure of armies living from what they can find from the land. All these aspects are clearly reflected in our sources. The Greeks were well aware of the damage done by a στρατόπεδον settled in a

¹⁴ According to McCredie, after considering two Greek 3rd century B.C. military camps, the Greek military forces sacrificed all other considerations to obtain good natural protection for their camps (McCredie, 1966: 99-100). In the case of the military establishment at Koroni, identified by McCredie, there was no water source for the troops. H. Lauter considers that Koroni is not a military camp, but a fortified shelter for the Athenian citizens, due to the reinstatement of the Greek democracy in Athens on 287 B.C. (Lauter, 1992: 78-79).

¹⁵ *Cfr.* Veg., I, 22, 1: «(“In qualibus locis constituenda sint castra”) Castra autem, praesertim hoste uicino, tuto semper facienda sunt loco, ut lignorum et pabuli et aquae suppetat copia et, si diutius commorandum sit, loci salubritas eligatur».

territory. We can remember here the account of Polyaeus (II, 1, 21) about how Agesilaus kept changing the encampment sites as a mean of devastating the countryside of his enemies. This same process is explained by Xenophon in his *Lacedemonians Republic*: «The camp is frequently shifted (by the Lacedemonians) with the double object of annoying their enemies and of helping their friends»¹⁶. V.D. Hanson considers also the settlement of fortified military camps as a typical form of devastating fields in classical time (Hanson, 1983: 25-28). In many cases, the forces only began their destructive efforts once the camp had been constructed and could offer them the necessary security. However, unlike the Romans, the Greeks did not carry with them the stakes for building the palisade to defend the camp, so trees and vegetation become the first targets for the troops who used them for fortifying the στρατόπεδον.

In Anderson's opinion, this continuous movement of the camp's position should be related with health measures, which were taken to avoid the accumulation of excess dirt and garbage in the settlement (Anderson, 1970: 161). The sanitary criteria —also mentioned in the *Cyropaedia*— are, in Breitenbach's opinion, a response to a medical work, for instance, the *Corpus Hippocraticum* (Breitenbach, 1950: 73 and n. 10). These principles were not new among the Greek generals and would be considered by each commander. They would use them for their own benefit and to take advantage of the enemy. Polyaeus (II, 30, 3) gives us a very clear example of this last possibility. It is what Anderson considers the first example of bacteriological warfare in History (Anderson, 1970: 61). A wrong choice of camp position, for instance, would be the Athenian settlement in Sicily, sited on marshy land in the middle of the summer, which caused the illness and death of some soldiers, so the army had to find a better site (*cfr.*, Th., VII, 47)¹⁷. These principles were also usually remembered in the foundation of colonies and cities (*cfr.*, Str., VI, 2, 4; Arist., *Pol.*, 1327a; 1330a).

The other main goal when choosing a site for the troops to make camp was defence: the proper use of topographic peculiarities. Topographical features should be used by the generals as much as possible: the advantage of a secure hill, or wall or a river, afforded protection at the rear of the camp (*cfr.*, *Lac.*, XII, 1)¹⁸.

The most common practice seems to have been the settlement of the soldiers on a slope or on the top of a mountain. The advantages of this choice are easy to understand: a higher position would be very useful against possible enemies who came from the valley or the plain, where the traditional hoplite combat took place. But there were also disadvantages and dangers: if the troops were settled on the top of a hill, the soldiers could be encircled and besieged, and, could therefore have great difficulty getting food and water (*Cfr.*, *An.*, VI, 3, 6-9); If the camp was on the slope of the hill, the enemy forces could take higher positions and the settlement would either be exposed to attack by enemy hoplite formation, or could become an easy target for the peltast and enemy bowmen placed in that higher position. But this seems to have been the normal practice and the drawbacks were overlooked (*cfr.*, *HG.*, IV, 6, 7; VI, 4, 4 and 14; VII, 5, 22; *An.*, VII, 4, 11-12; VII, 4, 13).

Either a fight against lightly armed troops was probably not expected to happen or, as we shall see, the generals did not consider the possibility of a direct attack against the camp with the intention to taking it. In their tactical expectations, traditional combat was more probable: in open field and between hoplite formations. The capture of the troops' camp would be the

¹⁶ *Lac.*, XII, 5: «Μεταστρατοπεδεύονται γε μὴν πυκνὰ καὶ τοῦ σίνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους ἔνεκα καὶ τοῦ ὠφελεῖν τοὺς φίλους». *Cfr.*, *Cyr.*, III, 3, 23.

¹⁷ Alexander the Great seems to have been farsighted in this aspect when —according to Arrian's account (*An.*, VI, 25, 6)— he always places his camp 20 stadia far away from water supply to avoid illnesses among the troops due to drinking water too quickly. For the Roman practice, *cfr.*, *Veg.*, III, 8.

¹⁸ «Διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τὰς γωνίας τοῦ τετραγώνου ἀχρήστους εἶναι κύκλον ἐστρατοπεδεύσατο, εἰ μὴ ὄρος ἀσφαλὲς εἶη ἢ τείχος ἢ ποταμὸν ὀπισθεν ἔχοιεν».

outcome of defeat in the battle field. Following this type of war, the settlements of troops on the hillsides was the best tactical option. In the event of fighting against another phalanx, they could count on the site having the advantage of a slope to bring more power and push its formation¹⁹. Bearing in mind the dangers of this situation, Xenophon's recommendation to find a secure hill (ὄρος ἀσφαλές) for the military camp in this *Lacedemonians Republic* is not purely rhetorical.

Another way of protecting the camp was to use walls or rivers to defend the rearguard (*cf.*, *Lac.*, XII, 1). Those elements allowed the army to focus its defensive efforts on the other sides of the encampment (*cf.*, *Hdt.*, VII, 208). Reference is probably being made here to the custom of employing the temple's τέμενος or when the army is grounded at *gymnasia* (*cf.*, *HG.*, I, 3, 7; II, 2, 8; IV, 1, 41; V, 2, 5; VI, 5, 27). Furthermore, Xenophon always argued in favour of seeking the element of surprise and concealed places to encamp, considering them to be a feature of great value (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, III, 3, 28).

The proximity of the military establishment to villages and cities was other quite important factor when choosing a place to encamp. In the *Anabasis*, the stages of the Greeks' progress is described in terms of the forces halting at different villages. They offered an excellent opportunity to satisfy the logistic requirements of wheat, forage, water, wine and other goods taken as booty. In the case of cities, the army could stay for longer and take the opportunity for other important activities such as reviewing the troops (*Cfr.*, *An.*, I, 2, 4; I, 2, 6; I, 2, 7; I, 2, 14), celebrations and the purification of the army (*An.*, I, 2, 10; IV, 8, 25; V, 5, 5; V, 7, 35), selling the booty (*An.*, V, 3, 2; VI, 6, 38), or sharing out the profits (*An.*, V, 3, 4; V, 7, 34).

But one question remains: Whether the soldiers were quartered near the urban settlement or actually in the houses. Many writers claimed that the Greek troops were generally billeted in houses, particularly in the case of the Army of the Ten Thousand. The soldiers would have resorted to a bivouac or a tent only when there was no other solution²⁰. But we have some difficulties in accepting this opinion:

- Quartering soldiers in houses would have made it necessary to use more than one village to ensure the billeting of an army of many thousand men, apart from their servants, baggage and beasts of burden, as was usual among Greek forces. Only in cases of quartering in big cities or if there were several villages near to each other, could we accept this possibility.
- From the legal point of view, it could be taken as an belligerent act, resulting in hostile relations between the community and the the military forces. Incidents of abuse or pillage could break out when troops were quartered in villages or houses, and result in the enmity of the population (*cf.*, *e.g.*, *An.*, IV, 1, 8-9; 4, 8-14). Foreign forces are always compelled to stay outside the walls surrounding cities (*cf.*, *e.g.*, *An.*, VII, 1, 39, 2, 21).
- Obtaining supplies always followed the hospitality and commercial custom: the host allowed the foreign force to settle in this countryside, demonstrating acceptance through hospitality presents and opening a market-place where the soldiers could obtain provisions at good prices controlled by both parties (*cf.*, *An.*, I, 5, 12). The host was also obliged to allow sick soldiers to rest in city houses, but only for the time necessary to recover from illness (*An.*, IV, 8, 22-V, 2, 32). In positive situations, the city would open its gates during the day to the troops camped on its territory²¹. The ab-

¹⁹ *Cfr.*, Liers, 1895: 148; D.S., XV, 32, 3; 34, 1. The greater the use of peltast and light armed forces, the more dangerous the choice of hills for striking camp. We find the final step of this development in Vegetius, I, 22, 2: «*Cavendum etiam, ne mons sit vicinus aut altior locus, qui ab adversariis captus posit officere*».

²⁰ *Cfr.*, Berve, 1926: 174; Liers, 1895: 152-154; Droysen, 1889: 88; Tänzner, 1912: 59-63, although during the period before the Peloponnesian War, this procedure would not have been common amongst the Greek troops (32-33).

²¹ *Cfr.*, *An.*, V, 1, 13; VII, 2, 11; IV, 8, 22, in comparison with *An.*, V, 5, 3; VII, 1, 7, 32.

sence of conflict was guaranteed by a balance of fear between the population —afraid of incidents when there were a great number of soldiers at its gates— and the foreign army —which needed to obtain the supplies without fighting for them—²². The whole of *Anabasis* confirms this thesis.

Moreover a custom of quartering the στρατόπεδον in houses would have been a very dangerous situation for an hoplite army, whose chances of success in combat depends on maintaining its formation. Fragmentation of the army (διασκηνέω) would have represented enormous danger and have undermined its capability for combat. The operations described in the *Anabasis* —as in the other Xenophon's works— also demonstrate this logic (*cf.*, *e.g.*, *An.*, IV, 4, 18).

The few cases where we are sure troops were quartered under a roof were the result of exceptional situations due to difficult weather conditions or urgent defense requirements. The generals distributed the troops and allowed their soldiers to stay in houses, in villages or cities, but the practice resulted in the enmity of the citizens (*cf.*, IV, 4, 6-22). In any other situation we must assume that these settlements always consisted of a camp near the villages, but the troops were not billeted in houses.

Another element to bear in mind in connection with mutual distrust between the population and the army, was the longer or shorter distance between the urban center and the στρατόπεδον, balancing the advantages of easy access to the market-place and the security of the population²³. The distance between two military camps provides us with information about the kind of relationship between armies and also the confidence on their relations. Xenophon formulates this principle in *An.*, III, 1, 28 as barometer to measure the good will between two armies (*cf.*, Th., IV, 125).

4. THE LAYOUT OF THE MILITARY CAMP

Στρατόπεδον refers principally to the troops that comprise a camp, but here we shall try to answer the following question: Whether the layout of the camp normally adopted a standard form or forms that can be considered typical of the Greeks.

Few modern historians have examined this matter, and their silence can be interpreted as recognition of the impossibility of saying anything about it or even the non-existence of an accepted form for the στρατόπεδον. In the opinion of some authors, however, the Lacedaemonians' camps were round in view of their professional approach to military matters (*cf.*, *Lac.*, XII, 1).

The available sources that might clarify this question are very limited. First of all there is Polybius, VI, 42, 3-4, with a text taken by many modern authors as the definitive evidence for rejecting any regularity in Greek camps. However, the evidence of Polybius is not reliable at all, even when we talk about the Roman *castra*. It is true that the outline of the two-legion consular military camps could be described as square or almost quadrilateral, but in Augustus' time most of them were completely irregular or had a regular and irregular layout at the same time²⁴. This premise is important to evaluate the evidence in Polybius about the Greek form of camps accurately. But it is also true that Polybius' major concern in this text,

²² *Cfr.*, *An.*, IV, 8, 8; V, 5, 18; V, 1, 13; VI, 2, 46; *HG.*, II, 1, 1; *An.*, IV, 8, 22-V, 2, 32; We find the opposite example in the relations between the Ten Thousand and the city of Cotyora: *cf.*, *An.*, V, 5, 6-25. For the legal implications *cf.*, Fernández Nieto, 1975: 188-195 and 231-233. For the different legal procedures to securing provisions for the Ten Thousand, *cf.*, Descat, 1995: 99-108. For the relationship between military forces and cities, *cf.* Alonso Troncoso, 1987: 97-101.

²³ It is a very important tactical element as we can see in *HG.*, II, 1, 22-26.

²⁴ Petrikovits, 1975: 139; Lenoir, 1986: 329-330.

was the regularity and distribution system of the different elements and groups of a land force within the camp, with the aim of maintaining order and discipline among the troops. He did not discuss the shape of the camp, but the arrangement of military settlements²⁵.

The other statement about this problem comes from Xenophon, who in *Lac.*, XII, 1 asks which is the best shape for a camp, circular or quadrilateral, resolving the problem in favour to the circular due to its defensive advantages. This was the form adopted by the Lyncurgen Sparta, showing once again its superior intelligence in military matters. Naturally, it was the form assumed by Cyrus to settle his army in the *Cyropaedia* (VIII, 5, 1-16).

Actually, neither Polybius nor Xenophon dealt with the question of whether military camps should have regular outline or not. Both authors seem to have assumed that the camp should have a regular shape. Polybius' text does not look at this problem, but at the internal arrangement of the various elements of the army in the plan of camp, while Xenophon in his *Lacedemonian Republic* tries to solve the problem of the best shape for the στρατόπεδον, circular or quadrilateral, and coming down in favour of the first. We should remember that among the castramental traditions that may have had most influence on Greek culture (Persian, Assyrian or Egyptian) we can see both circular and quadrilateral layouts (the latter also included the square and the rectangle).

Another reference to the shape of Greek στρατόπεδον is found in Thucydides, during the Athenian campaign at Syracuse, when he mentions a circular camp in the Epipolae²⁶. If we take the reference to τὸν κύκλον for the Athenian camp, used as base for building the walls to lay siege to Syracuse and not the walls themselves, it is a question solved by E. Odermann. Besides, it seems clear that we are dealing here with a fortified military camp, and not with a φρούριον or some other kind of fortification, thanks to the statement of Plutarch, who referred to this construction as στρατόπεδον (*cf.*, *Nic.*, XXIV, 1). Odermann compared this Athenian form of camp with the reference to the circular Spartan military camp quoted by Xenophon (*cf.*, *Lac.*, XII, 1) and considers this kind of layout to be a typical Lacedemonian form, occasionally used by the Athenians, who would have copied it on this occasion (Odermann, 1927: 42-47).

Indeed, we have no reason to think that this was an exceptional form among the Athenian troops. Quite the opposite: since Thucydides only mentions the shape of the military camp, and Plutarch did not say anything about it being a particular Athenian military tradition, it seems possible that a circular camp, if not usual, was not particularly odd in the Athenian tradition. But the lack of more references to the typical layout of an Athenian camp means we are unable to reach a more definite conclusion.

In relation with the elements that defined the space of a camp and its shape, we must mention as possibilities the existence of palisades (though it was not a necessary element for the Greek camp), the lines of guards in the camp (at night with fires on the perimeter of the camp), or a low protective wall that did not become a palisade, as mentioned by Philo Byzantius (IV, 6, 10).

Considering the few sources on the subject, it would seem sufficient to accept that the Greeks normally adopted a regular layout when they camped and the site permitted, the main problem of the military theory at this time being the best shape for the camp, circular or quadrilateral. Xenophon always favoured the first.

²⁵ «Διὸ καὶ κατὰ τε τὴν τῆς ὅλης παρεμβολῆς θέσιν πᾶν ἀναγκάζονται σχῆμα μεταλαμβάνειν, ἐπόμενοι τοῖς τόποις...».

²⁶ *Cfr.*, Th., VI, 98, 2; VI, 99, 1 and 3; 101, 1; 102, 1; VII, 2, 3; and maybe, also, VII, 2, 4.

5. PALISADES AND CAMP DEFENCES

The question of whether palisades and defensive constructions existed has been the most discussed aspect of the Greek military camp, but there is as yet no generally accepted answer to it²⁷. We do not pretend to offer a definitive answer here, but only to look at Xenophon's view of this matter. First of all, it is necessary to remember once again that the concept of στρατόπεδον does not in itself imply the existence of defensive constructions. Xenophon always speaks about a στρατόπεδον that is endowed with defences, palisades, walls or ditches (*cfr.*, *e.g.*, *HG.*, VI, 2, 23). In the same way, the walls fortifying a Greek city were not the first element of the *polis*, but were developed from the inside to the outside, with the citizens as its fundamental element. The Greeks did not give to the walls either the essential military value they had in the Roman *castra* or the religious significance of the cities in Orient or in the Etruscan world (Garland, 1974: 87).

Xenophon does not defend the construction of walls or ditches to guard the camp. In his description of the Spartan στρατόπεδον there is no kind of fortification. The only protective elements would have been those existing in the field (a secure hill, wall or a river; *cfr.*, *Lac.*, XII, 1) and, more importantly, the use of guards and lookout systems. Neither do we find defensive structures to protect Cyrus' troops in the *Cyropaedia*. Defence was achieved by distributing the different elements of the army according to their capacity to respond to an unexpected attack from the enemy: a line of hoplites should be established outside the camp, making a defensive wall with their shields; behind them, the peltasts and bowmen; and in the centre of the camp, the cavalry, which was the group of soldiers that needed most time to prepare, for which reason they were the most vulnerable when they were encamped (*cfr.*, *Cyr.*, VIII, 5, 8-14). The security system should always be completed with guards, lookout posts and the choice of concealed places for the army to camp.

But Xenophon advocated a defence system without palisades and walls not through ignorance of these entrenchment systems. In fact, the Asian Minor campaigns and leading the Ten Thousands brought Xenophon briefly into contact with the typical Persian defence of walls and ditches. We can confirm his familiarity with this type of defence in his works. This experience led him to support the active defence of an army camped in the field, avoiding the passive protection of walls and ditches.

In the *Anabasis* we find only one example of fortifying a Greek camp, and there is no reason to think that the Greeks normally made an entrenchment when they encamped, due to the conditions in which they would have been marching (*cfr.*, Pritchett, 1974: 141). This singular event happens during his stay at Calpe and was motivated by the need to find a site for the impedimenta that was easy to defend, when part of the army had to take on Farnabazo's forces, which were in the vicinity (*cfr.*, *An.*, VI, 5, 1-4). It played no part in the military action. Its isolated mention in the whole narration seems to confirm its extraordinary character.

But we can find examples in the *Anabasis* in which the Greek forces were confronted with defensive walls and ditches, *e.g.*, the attack against the Drilae's fortified metropoli (χωρίον) (*cfr.*, *An.*, V, 2, 3-27). This is a good example of the dangers faced by the hoplites when they were confined in a fortification and could not present their phalanx. Xenophon had to find a solution to avoid the danger for his soldiers of being caught in the city's stockade as if it were a jail. He resolves the problem by setting the Drillas' houses on fire and drawing out the palisade, allowing the hoplites to manoeuvre in open ground (other example: *An.*, VII, 4, 12-19). In the *Anabasis*, the use of ditches and entrenchments by Xenophon's forces was reduced to situations of great necessity, due to the perils of their use. Any wall, ditch or entrenchment is seen as a limitation for the movements and deployment of the hop-

²⁷ *Cfr.*, Liers, 1895: 151-154; Pritchett, 1974: 146; Anderson, 1970: 61-63; Bauer, 1893: 318-319, 439 and 457-458; Berve, 1926: 174.

lite soldiers, who needed an open field to maintain their formation and the mobility that would ensure their efficacy and strenght.

For the same reasons, the tactical evaluation of the entrenchments in the *Hellenicas* was not high. We can mention, because of its dramatic character, the assault on the Odrysians' fortified camp. A great number of the Athenian hoplites died under the fire of the lightly armed Bithynians while they were guarding the camp, trapped by the defensive walls as if they were in a jail (*cf.*, *HG.*, III, 2, 3-4).

All these experiences were remembered by Xenophon when he wrote his *Cyropaedia* to demonstrate the best tactics to adopt in each type of situation²⁸. But this work never refers to the construction of a fortification for Cyrus' troops, which was the most usual form of defence among the barbarians. According to Xenophon's account, the barbarians had three reasons for building entrenchments in their camps:

- Their forces consisted basically of cavalry, the military unit least suited to responding to surprise attacks against the camp (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, III, 3, 26-27). This problem was resolved by Cyrus by putting them in the centre of the camp and defending them with hoplites (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, VIII, 5, 8-12).
- The existence of a large number of servants in their armies to built the entrenchment (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, III, 3, 26), although Xenophon does not appear to be consistent, if we remember that he claims the Ten Thousand needed only one day to build the whole entrenchment at Calpe (*cf.*, *An.*, VI, 5, 1).
- The Assyrians assumed that having a position in an entrenchment enabled them to choose the best moment to attack (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, III, 3, 27). But Cyrus saw the situation very differently: since the Assyrians were confined in the fortification, he could decide when to attack and how many enemy troops to take on, because the troops inside a fortification need longer to go out and get into formation than an army in open field (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, III, 3, 46-47; IV, 1, 18).

As we have seen, in Xenophon's opinion, the use of entrenchments made no sense because he always argued in favour of traditional warfare between two hoplite forces in open field. The fortification was only an emergency shelter, which could also be used to the enemy's advantage in the event of combat between two hoplite formations²⁹.

With all these precedents, and knowing the Athenian's didactic intention, it is not surprise that he does not mention palisade constructions in his description of Iphicrates' camp (*cf.*, *HG.*, VI, 2, 27-31; 33-34), as would seem to be the Athenian general's usual practice³⁰. On the contrary, Xenophon pays more attention to the lookout systems used by Iphicrates as an active method of defence.

To sum up, Xenophon rejects the use of entrenchments to protect the camp as useless or even something that could be dangerous for his own army. Despite this, we are not claiming that Greeks camps were unfortified in the 4th century. On the contrary, all the evidence seems to suggest that at this time some Greek generals systematically employed this kind of defence. But in this discussion, Xenophon questioned those practices on account of his ex-

²⁸ Cyrus built and organised the $\phi\rho\upsilon\rho\rho\tau\omicron\nu$ (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, III, 2, 11; III, 3, 1); assault of the Assyrian fortified camp (*Cyr.*, III, 3, 26-28; III, 3, 60-70); taking an unfortified military camp (*Cyr.*, IV, 2, 32-33).

²⁹ «The early hoplite army did not, in battle, rely upon the moral and material support of a fortified camp which is so prominent in Roman warfare. We are not well informed for the fourth century» (Adcock, 1957: 8).

³⁰ *Cfr.*, Polyæn., III, 9, 17; Plu., *Moralia*, 187a; in the fourth century the Theban Epaminondas seems to have used fortification systematically for his encampments (*cf.*, *HG.*, IV, 5, 30). In the third century it is usually accepted that fortifications were habitually employed in Greek camps, in contradiction with the Polybius statement in VI, 42 (*cf.*, Pritchett, 1974: 135; Liers, 1895: 151-154).

perience during his Asia Minor campaigns against Persian armies that always adopted this method of defence. The controversy could be considered part of the more general debate about the best way of defending Attic territory, between those who supported actively defending the land and those who favoured a passive guard within the walls of the city (*cf.*, *Oec.*, 6, 6-7; *Mag. Eq.*, 7, 3-13; *Vect.*, 4, 43-48). Xenophon would probably have accepted Plato's saying: «καλῶς μὲν καὶ ὁ ποιητικὸς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν λόγος ὑμνεῖται, τὸ χαλκᾶ καὶ σιδηρᾶ δεῖν εἶναι τὰ τείχη μᾶλλον ἢ γήϊνα» (*Lg.*, 778d)³¹.

6. SENTINELS AND LOOKOUTS SYSTEMS AROUND THE CAMP

The only author who has dealt with the guard and lookout systems systematically is Aeneas Tacticus, though he did so in reference to the protection of cities. Xenophon also devotes considerable attention to this question, without intending to treat it systematically, but filling his works with examples of their use. In both authors, this subject is very closely connected with the study of στρατόπεδον (*cf.* *Cyr.*, I, 6, 43; *Aen.Tact.*, XXI, 2), although in the fourth century it was probably not considered an essential element in the installation of a military camp³².

Xenophon's texts give us a description of a security system for military camps, arranged with guard posts (φύλακες) and lookout posts or scouts (σκοποί), and divided into day and night watches. Guard duty was seen as being active in character and designed to prevent strangers entering the camp, while the duties of the lookout posts (σκοποί) was passive, restricted to reporting any sign of enemies approaching the camp.

First of all, we must distinguish between two types of guard posts: φύλακες and προφύλακες (guard and advanced guard posts). The first type was located just on the limit of where the troops were settled to control the access of strangers to the camp and was helped at night by the light of fires³³. The second type, the προφύλακες, were posted at some distance from the line of soldiers' tents, giving the στρατόπεδον more space for defence. If anybody came near the camp one soldier at the post would report it into the camp, while the other soldiers would prevent the intruder advancing further (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, VI, 3, 9; *An.*, II, 1, 7-8; II, 3, 1-3). Their form of action was somewhere in between the φύλακες and the σκοποί. We must notice that these advance guards never became a second defence around the camp, φύλακες and προφύλακες never being mentioned at the same time. Otherwise a great many men would have been employed for the same function. The choice between this or the other type of sentinel was taken by the generals depending on the particular circumstances and interests of the time, although the posting of advance guards seems to be more common during the day, while φύλακες were used mainly at night³⁴. If we compare *Anabasis*, III, 1, 40 with III,

³¹ The poet referred to here is not known to us. He is similar to Alcaeus, fr., 112 (10LP), Aeschylus, *Persae*, 349, Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates*, 47, or Plutarch, *Lyk*, 19, 12; on the other hand, Arist., *Pol.*, 1330b. About this controversy in the 4th century, *cf.*, Munn, 1993: 14-15.

³² *Cfr.*, *Oec.*, XX, 8; *An.*, V, 1, 9 (there are no guards around the camp until a couple of days after the troops had settled); *Aen.Tact.*, XXII, 1 (on the other hand, it was not seen as something necessary). Only Iphicrates seems to have methodically used guard and lookout posts systems in his mercenary camps (*cf.*, Polyæn., III, 9, 17; *HG.*, VI, 2, 29).

³³ *Cfr.*, *Cyr.*, III, 3, 33; IV, 5, 14; *An.*, VII, 2, 17-18; *HG.*, VI, 2, 29; use of fires during the night guard: Polyæn., III, 11, 15; *An.*, VII, 2, 17-18 and again in *Cyr.*, III, 3, 25.

³⁴ We know of only one use of the expression ἡμεροφύλακας (*cf.*, *HG.*, VII, 2, 6), unrelated to a camp, but to the daytime guard of Phlius. The existence of advance guard posts (προφύλακες) during the night is only attested in *Cyr.*, III, 3, 25 and III, 3, 28 —both referring to the same stratagem— and in the description of the sentinel system at the Lacedaemonian camp (*cf.*, *Lac.*, XII, 1-4), but with some particularities in this latter case that we will explain later. The way on which nights attacks on some camps occurred confirms that during the night there were no advance guard posts (*cf.*,

basis, III, 1, 40 with III, 2, 1, we can see how the changeover from a night defence system with φύλακες to a day defence system with προφύλακες took place.

The static function, as simple advanced lookout of the military camp, made a distinction between the lookout post (σκοπός) and the προφύλακες. The only duty of the σκοποί was to report to the camp when someone tried to approach. On the contrary, the προφύλακες should, first intercept any strangers and prevent them approaching the space occupied by the army, and then inform the generals³⁵. We find no reference of both kinds of post guards at the same time because of their similar type of action. It is more reasonable when we sometimes find the complementary use of φύλακες and σκοποί during the day guards services (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, IV, 1, 1; *Eq. Mag.*, IV, 10).

In Xenophon's works we have only two complete descriptions of the guards post system in a military camp: the Iphicrates' camp on the *Hellenicas* (VI, 2, 27-31) and the example of the Spartan in *Lac.*, XII, 1-6. Both examples follow the principles just explained. Only the text from the *Lacedemonian Republic* need some explanations to let a better comprehension³⁶.

If we follow the interpretations given in the second section about the castramental vocabulary in Xenophon's works, we will find a simple solution to the possible difficulties. The text makes a clear distinction between daytime guard duties (*Lac.*, XII, 1-2 and 6) and night duties (*Lac.*, XII, 3-4). The first would consist of a line of soldiers posted on the boundary of the encampment («ἀπὸ τῶν ὀπλῶν»: *Lac.*, XII, 2) whose particular duty was not to look outwards from the lines, controlling the access to the camp, but inwards, in order to prevent the possible insurrection of the servants. The external protection was entrusted to advance horsemen posted on high places and called προσκοποὶ (*Lac.*, XII, 6). Their duty was to inform the camp of every approach or enemy movements as fast as possible. Naturally they were cavalry troops stationed on high ground places, where they had a panoramic view of the surrounding land.

Night security in the camp was the responsibility of soldier patrols, armed with spears and stationed on the perimeter to prevent servants or allies entering the space of the Spartan soldiers³⁷. Servants and non-Spartan forces would have been forbidden from staying at the military camp during the night.

Allied troops had also their role in the camp security. Compelled to stay at some distance from the Lacedemonian soldiers, they were used like night προφύλακες for the military establishment, because of the place where they were posted. If an enemy intended to come into the vicinity, these troops were the first line of defence to challenge their advance. They would act as the day advance guard posts³⁸.

As we have just seen, this organisation follows the main general ideas. The peculiarities are due to the particular character of the Spartan society with its permanent fear to servants' insurrection. These peculiarities could be summed up as the need to establish two rings of security around the camp: the first one just on the perimeter of the establishment —to watch over the servants during the day, and not allow them into the camp at night—, and the second one —composed with the advance guard post, day and night— to look out for enemies.

e.g., *HG.*, II, 4, 5, where Trasibulus' men were posted at three or four *stadia* from the Lacedemonian camp, remaining there until daylight).

³⁵ *Cfr.*, *Cyr.*, VI, 1, 46, in contrast to the action of the προφύλακες in the *An.*, II, 1, 7-8; II, 3, 1-3.

³⁶ Ollier, in his annotated edition of this work, states that Xenophon gives us a chaotic view of the guard posts system, with unacceptable errors and does not demonstrate the necessary perspective for understanding the sentinel system he describes (Ollier, 1934: 62-63).

³⁷ *Cfr.*, *Lac.*, XII, 4: «καὶ τοὺς δούλους εἴργουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀπλῶν».

³⁸ That is the function doing by the Hyrcanian in the Assyrian army of the *Cyropaedia* (IV, 2, 1-27), which displays many similarities with the Sciritae troops of the real Lacedemonian army.

We have little information about the number of sentinel posts and the way they operated. The little we do know comes from the Aeneas Tacticus' book and assumes that there were many organisational similarities between military camps and walled cities (*cfr.*, Aen.Tact., XXI, 2; XXII, 1).

Between the night and day duties there seems to have no more dissimilarity than a different watch word (σύνθημα) (*cfr.* Aen.Tact., IV, 5-6; *An.*, VII, 3, 34). It is more difficult to know the number of shifts that made up the night watch. Many modern authors have considered three the most usual number, as we read, *e.g.*, on Polyaeus, IV, 8, 4. Although, Arrian (*An.*, V, 24, 2) talks about four, what has commonly been considered a transposition of a Roman custom to the Alexander's time. On the contrary A.B.Bosworth claims the night was divided into four shifts in the 4th century B.C., one for each three hours of the equinoctial time (Bosworth, 1995: 333). In *HG.*, VII, 2, 5-6, Xenophon also says there were four shifts, but referred to picket duty in a city, not in a camp, which is also confirmed in Aeneas Tacticus (XVIII, 21).

Neither can we be sure if the number of shifts was fixed or variable. At least in the *Cyropaedia* there is a recommendation that the number should be adjusted to the duration of the night, particularly if a night march was planned. In this case there would have been more and shorter shifts to avoid exhausting the soldier with a long time spent on watch (*cfr.*, *Cyr.*, V, 3, 44; Aen.Tact., I, 8; XXII, 4-5; XXII, 24-25).

An essential element for watch duties was designating passwords to distinguish between members of their own army from spies or enemies trying to enter the camp³⁹. The question is not directly mentioned in any of Xenophon's works, but we can find many stratagems concerning it on Polyaeus' work (*cfr.*, *e.g.*, I, 11; I, 40, 3; III, 13, 1; V, 15, 5). Aeneas Tacticus also devoted some paragraphs to this question and recommends using passwords that are easy to remember, and connected with the enterprises or circumstances concerned⁴⁰: at the battle of Cunaxa, *e.g.*, the Greek watchword was «Zeus Saviour and Victory» and at Thymbrara «Zeus Saviour and Guide» (*cfr.*, *An.*, I, 8, 16; *Cyr.*, VII, 1, 10; Aen. Tact., XXIV, 16).

The advance guard post duties seems to have been carried out by groups of soldiers (*cfr.*, *An.*, II, 3, 1-2). If intruders were intercepted, one of the soldiers ran to the base, while the others remained at the post watching over the enemies. Their type of action would have been very similar to the watchmen or σκοποὶ, which Xenophon says numbered ten (*cfr.*, *Cyr.*, VI, 3, 12: μίᾱ δεκάδς). Aeneas Tacticus advises putting at least three very experienced men at each guard post. They had to be able to distinguish between incidents that were important and those that were not, to avoid any unnecessary alarm among the population (*cfr.*, Aen.Tact., VI, 1). The more experienced man should command the post, and he is named by Xenophon as σκόπαρχος, although he is only referred to in the *Cyropaedia* (VI, 3, 5-6 and 12).

The natural complement of the watches were the patrols (περιοδεῖα). It is the subject of chapter XXVI in Aeneas' work. In Xenophon we only have one reference to this activity on *Lac.*, XII, 4. We assume that this duties were similar to those of the guards, because Aeneas Tacticus deals with the watch and patrol duties as one and both belonging to the military camp study⁴¹. Maybe there are not mentioned by Xenophon because they played little part in the events and would have been taken for granted by the reader. But —not having any other information— we can say no more.

³⁹ Xenophon gives great importance to the use of spies for obtaining information about the situation and movements of the enemy army. In his *Cyropaedia* he describes a great number of possible methods of spying: the use of observers-spys (III, 1, 2), double agents (as Araspas, VI, 1, 31), ambassadors sent to the camp (VI, 2, 2) or slaves (VI, 2, 11).

⁴⁰ *Cfr.*, chapter IV (about visual signals or σημεῖα), XXIV (σύνθημα or verbal signals) and XXV (physical signals or sounds to answer, called as παρὰσύνθημα, and used to prevent panic situations and recognise allies). *Cfr.*, Aen.Tact., XXIV, 1; Aen.Tact., XXIV, 14-15.

⁴¹ *Cfr.*, Aen.Tact., XXI, 2; Iphicrates used to employ it at night: *cfr.*, Aen.Tact., XXIV, 16.

The weaknesses of the camp security system were also evident to Xenophon. In *Eq. Mag.*, VII, 12-14 the fundamental tactical principles to be borne in mind when preparing an attack against encamped forces are explained. They could act as a bridge for entering the camp territory, remembering the existence of advance guard posts that should be taken first, and then attacking the settled taking advantage of times when the soldiers were unarmed. These recommendations are strictly followed in the examples of assaults on military camps in Xenophon's works (*cfr.*, *HG.*, II, 1, 22-30; II, 4, 4-6; IV, 1, 20-24; VII, 1, 15-16). Xenophon's reference to speed in setting up lookout posts early in the morning in his description of the Lacedaemonian establishment (*cfr.*, *Lac.*, XII, 6) to reduce this particularly dangerous time for an encamped army, is not a facile statement of the author.

Even when the attacks on camps had great chances of success, the problem was actually the balance between risks and results, which was not always very good. The attack would cause the soldiers to flee, abandoning the camp and the possessions, but it never meant a definitive victory over the enemy army. They could regroup somewhere else and strike back at the troops who were plundering the camp⁴². Xenophon's theory for solving this problem is explained in the *Cyropaedia*: the στρατόπεδον should be surrounded at great speed to prevent the enemy fleeing and the plundering should be with strict order (*cfr.*, *Cyr.*, IV, 2, 32-35; III, 1, 6; VII, 5, 34)⁴³. The secret of the success was summed up by Xenophon in one fundamental tactical principle, told by Cambyses:

«Contrive, then —said he— as far as is in your power, with your own men in good order to catch the enemy in disorder, with your own men armed to come upon them unarmed, and with your own men awake to surprise them sleeping, and then you will catch them in an unfavorable position while you yourself are in a strong position, when they are in sight to you and while you yourself are unseen» (*Cyr.*, I, 6, 35).

7. INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE CAMP

The modern authors have not dealt with this subject or have claimed that nothing can be said about it, firstly, due to the absence of direct statements in the sources, and secondly, on account of Polybius, VI, 42, 3-4⁴⁴. However, to judge Polybius' statement properly we should remember the words of Petrikovits (*cfr.*, Petrikovits, 1975: 139), quoted some paragraphs before, and how Polybius actually talked about a παρεμβολή, word which also means «military camp», but which was never used by Xenophon. Moreover, Polybius described only the internal arrangement in the Greek camps, saying that the Greeks did not always use the same layout for a camp, as the Romans did. They changed it continuously, to suit the terrain. But this does not necessarily mean there was no internal structure to the Greek στρατόπεδον, which is the topos we are discussing here.

The first indication of a possible internal structure of the Greek camps is the incident between Menon's and Clearchus' armies mentioned in *An.*, I, 5, 10-14. Here we read that there was enough space between the two encamped contingents to allow each hoplite formation to assemble and Clearchus' Thracian cavalry to move forward against the Menon's troops (*cfr.*,

⁴² *Cfr.*, *HG.*, IV, 1, 20-24; VII, 2, 5-6; *An.*, IV, 4, 20; particular examples are Aegospotami, where only some soldiers were able to flee to the small nearby fortifications (*cfr.*, *HG.*, II, 1, 22-30), and the assault against the Laconian guard at Phyle, where more than 120 hoplites died in the following pursuit, but not during the attack itself (*cfr.*, *HG.*, II, 4, 4-6).

⁴³ *Cfr.*, Pritchett, 1991: 157-160, about the camp as a target for booty. Contrary to Polybius, who describes Greek disorder during the raid, Xenophon shows great interest in the *Cyropaedia* in laying down rules and order for this activity (*cfr.*, *Cyr.*, IV, 2, 38-47; VII, 2, 5-7). In Xenophon the camp as booty was distributed *per* tents (*cfr.*, *Cyr.*, IV, 5, 39) as it would be a city or village, where it is also done *per* houses (*cfr.*, *Cyr.*, VII, 5, 35). Xenophon considers this activity to be the province of slaves (*cfr.*, *Cyr.*, IV, 2, 25; VII, 2, 11).

⁴⁴ *E.g.*, Pritchett, 1974: 133; Lawrence, 1979: 160-167; Droysen, 1889: 88-90; McCredie, 1966: 96-99.

An., I, 5, 13). There was even enough space to let Proxenus stop the combat, interposing himself with one hoplite battalion between the two sides (*cf.*, *An.*, I, 5, 14).

Furthermore, it can be seen in the *Anabasis* how the generals set up their quarters at different places within the camp, with their soldiers around them⁴⁵. The commanders did not live in shared quarters, but when a camp was composed of more than one army, the soldiers under each commander were kept separate. Each army had to organise itself as distinct element within the camp.

But this principle of order does not seem to stop here. On Xenophon's description of the Lacedemonian camp, he says that the Spartan soldiers were not permitted to leave the space of their *μόρα*, were not allowed to be far from their place in the camp (*cf.*, *Lac.*, XII, 5). Therefore in the Lacedemonian camp the soldiers had to encamp in military units, each of which had a limited space which the soldiers could not leave. So, we find here just the same principle of internal structural divisions, but now at a lower hierarchical level. The question is, whether it was normal practice in the Lacedemonian armies and, if so, whether this was the common practice among other Greeks forces too. But in Xenophon's works there is no further indications that would answer this questions. Now Polyaeus, II, 3, 11, is the author who can help us:

«Ἐπαμινώνδας Λακεδαιμονίοις παρετάσσετο. Τῆς δὲ μάχης καρτερᾶς γενομένης, πολλῶν ἀμφοτέρωθεν πεσόντων, νυκτὸς ἀφελομένης τὸ τέλος τῆς νίκης ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἕκαστοι. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν δὴ κατὰ λόχους καὶ μόρας [καὶ] ἐνομοτίας καὶ συσσίτια στρατοπεδεύοντες ἔμαθον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀπολωλότων καὶ αὐτῶς ἀθυμήσαντες ἐς ὕπνον ἐτρέποντο. Θηβαίοις δὲ παρήγγειλεν Ἐπαμινώνδας καταστρατοπεδεύειν, ὡς ἔτυχον ἕκαστοι, καὶ μὴ ζητεῖν τοὺς λόχους μηδὲ τὰς τάξεις, ἀλλὰ ὡς τάχιστα δειπνούντας ἀναπαύεσθαι, ἄνδρα ἀνδρὶ ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ἐπιτεδείων ἐπαρκέσαντα».

This text not only confirms what Xenophon said in his *Lacedemonian Republic*, but it also help us to complet the picture. Contrary to Polybius' view —supposedly chaotic—, the Lacedemonian camp had an internal organisation, following the hierarchical order of the army. The internal structure of the Lacedemonian military camp was built up on the internal subdivision of the army.

But the peculiarity of the Spartan *nomos* justifies the doubt that this was the practice amongst the other Greeks. In our opinion, the answer to this question is positive —at least in the 4th century—, although we recognise that the evidence is very scarce. The interpretation of the last text quoted suggests that both combatants used the same system to organise the soldiers when they encamped; but, in this particular case, Epaminondas seems to be clever and gives the order to his troops to not follow the usual practice —finding their normal place in the camp and into the proper military unit—, but to rest where each of them was at the end of the day.

This is also confirmed on the next stratagem concerning Chares' army:

«Χάρης ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ κατασκόπους ὑπονοήσας εἶναι φυλακῆν ἔξωθεν τοῦ χάρακος περιστήσας, προσέταξεν ἕκαστον ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ πλησίον καὶ μὴ πρότερον ἀφιέναι, πρὶν εἰπεῖν, ὅς τις εἶη καὶ τίνος τάξεως. οὕτω δὴ συνέβη τοὺς κατασκόπους ἀλῶναι μὴ δυναμένους εἰπεῖν μήτε τάγμα μήτε λόχον μήτε συσσίτιον μήτε σύνθημα» (Polyaen., III, 13, 1).

This text does not say if Chares' Athenian army adopted this kind of arrangement when they encamped, but it is important to recognise that both texts refer to hierarchical military units in the same context and it seems logical to assume that the latter principle was also employed here.

⁴⁵ *Cfr.*, *An.*, IV, 3, 10-14; *Cyr.*, III, 3, 40; *Hom.*, II, X, 152-153.

At the beginning of this section we saw how the different Greek armies in the *Anabasis* were separated when they organised the camp. We should now mention another text which suggest that this rule of hierarchical subdivision for setting up the camp could be applied in the case of the Army of the Ten Thousand, too (*An.*, III, 1, 32):

«οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὰς τάξεις ἰόντες, ὅπου μὲν στρατηγὸς σῶος εἶη, τὸν στρατηγὸν παρεκάλουν, ὅπου δὲ οἴχοιτο, τὸν ὑποστράτηγον, ὅπου δ' αὖ λοχαγὸς σῶος εἶη, τὸν λοχαγόν»⁴⁶.

Does this mean that Polybius' claim was unfounded, or even untrue, and the Greeks, like the Romans, always encamped using the same structure? We think not, and we find an answer to this question in Xenophon himself. The only Greek text in which the internal organisation of an encamped army and how the different military units were arranged into one settlement is described directly is the *Cyropaedia*, VIII, 5, 2-16. Here we find not only Xenophon's military experience, but also different proposals—more or less practicable—intended to improve the conditions and the art of war of Greek armies. We should read Xenophon's work with this idea always in mind. Although we know that throughout the whole work the Persian element on Cyrus' army was only the frame of a Greek, even Lacedaemonian, picture, the question of whether the paragraph refers to a Persian camp or not is of secondary importance to us. What is really important is to distinguish the true picture from recommendations in Xenophon's work.

The paragraph in *Cyropaedia* only considers the arrangement of the way various units were encamped. The goals were to obtain greater protection and order in the camp and to improve discipline and efficiency among the troops. Xenophon recommends giving each kind of military unit a fixed space and place according to its peculiar characteristics within the military establishment (*cfr.*, *Cyr.*, VIII, 5, 6).

These recommendations did not conflict with the distribution according to army, battalion, company, section and tent. Actually, he talks here about the place that should always be occupied by each different army unit (cavalry, hoplites, peltasts, bowmen) in the camp. No other classical Greek source considers this problem, probably because there was no custom for organising it. But Xenophon recognised the need to improve this situation and made proposals for doing so.

In the absence of any other evidence, the *Cyropaedia* perhaps describes only Xenophon's proposals, not a real system followed by the Greek armies. Furthermore, as Polybius himself says, the Greek system which aims to take advantage of the characteristics of the terrain to protect the camp and implied adapting the layout of the camp to each specific situation is not compatible with a fixed camp plan. The Greeks sacrificed the advantages of a fixed plan for the benefits offered by adapting the layout to each individual situation. However, Xenophon's idea was quite the opposite: a fixed layout giving priority to order, discipline and efficiency when they encamped. Indeed, Xenophon himself agreed with Polybius.

The solution adopted by Cyrus in the *Cyropaedia* assumes the creation of a regular form of castramentation on which every unit knows where to pitch camp and how much space it should occupy. This layout would fulfil the order desired by Polybius and every Roman, and would have given the Greeks a practical, single, familiar and unvarying solution (*cfr.*, *Plb.*, VI, 42, 5). The *Cyropaedia*'s proposal is far removed from the later Roman answer to the problem. It has the same spirit and form, but lacked the methodical implementation it would have in Rome. Some small features were also precursors of the later Roman custom, such as

⁴⁶ «but the others proceeded to visit the various divisions of the army. Wherever a general was left alive, they would invite him to join them; where the general was gone, they invited the lieutenant-general; or, again, where only a captain was left, the captain» (translation by Brownson).

the use of identification banners on each commander's tent (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, VIII, 5, 13). But Cyrus was still a Greek despite his advanced ideas, and Xenophon himself says the plan was used much of the time but not always (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, VIII, 5, 16).

We can accept that within the Greek camps each military unit encamped within a well defined space and the soldiers of different units did not mix, though this does not mean that there was a fixed layout for the camp. There was a plan, but this changed every time. The distribution would have created an internal network of streets with a regularity that we can not know. Perhaps we should remember here that Homer says the fortified Greek camp in the *Iliad* was crossed by many streets⁴⁷.

Our information about other internal elements in a Greek camp are very scarce. It can be assumed that the commander's tent was in the middle of the camp, as in the case of Cyrus's tent in the *Cyropaedia* (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, VIII, 5, 8)⁴⁸. Also the ground between the Cyrus' tent and the *δορυφόροι* was well established. There was a custom in Greek armies to reserve an empty space in front of the general's tent for use as a meeting place and to set the commander apart from the troops⁴⁹.

There is no direct information about such a place during the march of the Ten Thousand, although, a wide space in the middle of the camp is sometimes mentioned. This is where the soldiers met, and is on one occasion called as *to meson* (=centre). It had to be a place large enough to hold all the soldiers in the army sitting down (*cf.*, *An.*, III, 2, 1; III, 1, 33; III, 1, 46)⁵⁰.

At least in the case of the Ten Thousand, there must have been more than one of these places in the camp and each commander would have been able to gather his troops alone. In *An.*, I, 4, 13 Menon summoned only his men, trying to convince them to continue the march with Cyrus. But neither in these case nor in other similar instances, does it say where it happened. In *An.*, I, 4, 13, secrecy was necessary to gain Cyrus' favour and therefore a principal place among the commanders and the control of the mercenary army. So it is reasonable to assume that this meeting would not have taken place in the middle of the camp, but somewhere else, probably in the space occupied by the Menon's soldiers at the camp. The most suitable place for it would have been the free ground in front of Menon's tent, while the middle of the camp would have been used only for general meetings. But this is a very difficult question to resolve, because we do not know if this central empty space was common to all Greek military camps or was peculiar to that of the Ten Thousand, due to its particular configuration as a union of different armies.

The choice of when and where to make the encampment was a prerogative of the Spartan king among the Spartans or the army commander (*cf.*, *Lac.*, XIII, 10), and was announced with a horn call, just as it was to strike camp or to start marching again⁵¹. Establishing the camp needed some preparatory works on the ground, *e.g.*, felling trees where the camp would be set up (*cf.*, *Polyaen.*, II, 1, 21). We know, at least in the Spartan army, there was

⁴⁷ *Cfr.*, *Hom.*, *Il.*, X, 66: «πολλὰ γὰρ ἀνὰ στρατόν εἰσι κέλευθοι». In *An.*, I, 5, 12 Clearchus decides to cross the encamped army of Menon as the quickest way to reach his army. That suggest that the internal distribution of the camp of the Ten Thousand was sufficiently regular to create a network of streets.

⁴⁸ *Cfr.*, *Polyaen.*, IV, 8, 2, places Alexander's tent in the middle of his camp; *Aen.Tact.*, XXII, 2-3.

⁴⁹ *Cfr.*, *HG.*, I, 1, 30. A general military regulation in the Macedonian army from the end of the Third century, found at Amphipolis, has a paragraph entitled «περὶ στεγνοποιίας» (col., II, 5-8) concerning the installation of the king's tent. This place should be well established and with guard quarters located on its boundaries («Ὅταν δὲ τὸν φραγμὸν συντελέσωσιν τ' {1} βασιλεῖ |⁶ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σκηνοποιίαν καὶ γένηται διάστασις, | εὐθὺ τοῖς ὑπασπισταῖς ποιήτωσαν ἔκκοιτιον») (*Cfr.* *Roussel*, 1934: 44-45; *Fernández Nieto*, 1995: 240-242).

⁵⁰ When Nussbaum talks about the soldiers meetings, he simply says that they took place with all soldiers sitting down unarmed at some appropriate place (Nussbaum, 1967: 55).

⁵¹ The use of the horn and not the trumpet for these orders alone is a precursor of the later Roman custom of giving each instrument a different meaning. Among the Greek armies, as in Rom, the order to set down the troops or to strike camp was made with three calls (Anderson, 1965: 1-4).

an official responsible for the baggage section (*Lac.*, XIII, 4: στρατοῦ σκευοφορικοῦ ἄρχοντες)⁵², but we do not know what his duties would have been while the camp was being set up. Bauer thinks this official was responsible for establishing the camp, on the basis of *HG.*, III, 4, 22 (Bauer, 1893: 318). However, the subject of this sentence seems to be the Persian and not the Greeks⁵³. We have to wait for Hellenistic times—and after Alexander the Great—to find a definite reference to one official in charge of the camp or allotting the soldiers' quarters (*cf.*, *Plu.*, *Demetr.*, XXIII, 4: «σταθμοδότης»).

8. THE GREEK MILITARY TENT

We have just said it is not necessary to have campaign tents for there to be a στρατόπεδον, but they are its most representative element and provide the typical quarters for soldiers on campaign. From the word σκηνή comes the most usual verb to refer to the quartering of an army on campaign (σκηνέω), in houses, ships, tents or any other kind of shelter.

We know the measurements and characteristics of the campaign tents used by the Roman soldiers⁵⁴, but our knowledge of them in the Greek world is very limited. In Xenophon we should interpret σκηνή to be a shelter made with posts and covered with leather—which served as canvas⁵⁵—, put up at every stage by the army and taken down again when the order to march was given. They must have been very heavy and difficult to carry⁵⁶. In Alexander's time they had metal spikes, very similar to the ones we have today (*Cfr.*, *Arr.*, *An.*, IV, 19, 1).

There are some pictures of Greek tents on glasses and pottery (*cf.* Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* «*Tentorium*»), normally related to a character in the *Iliad*⁵⁷ and displaying a great Persian influence. They consisted of vertical posts, covered with material and were very oriental in appearance, which were greatly admired, and influenced the Greek world. The tents of the Hellenistic monarchs were simply copies of the Persian musters and became symbols of royal power. Here the lord held court and welcomed ambassadors⁵⁸.

In the 4th century B.C. the commanders seem to have had individual tents, bigger than the common tents and large enough to hold meetings and banquets with other officers (*cf.*, *HG.*, I, 1, 30; *Cyr.*, IV, 5, 2). There are no reference to the tents of the common soldiers. Only in the *Cyropaedia* does Xenophon describe what he considers to be the necessary elements for living comfortably on campaign (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, IV, 5, 39).

The Greeks could always set aside the tents and sleep in the open air, covered only with their blankets (στρωμναί: *cf.*, *An.*, IV, 4, 11), probably made of wool (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, V, 2, 15). These were kept on sail covers (*cf.*, *An.*, V, 4, 13) and took up a lot of space in each sol-

⁵² *Cfr.*, *Cyr.*, V, 3, 40 which talks about οἱ ἄρχοντες σκευοφόροι.

⁵³ This opinion was shared by Krentz: «*This addition (their commander) from the Agesilaos makes the sentence's subject be the Persian commander rather than Agesilaos. The sentence then runs more smoothly and the sense fits the location of the Persian camp in III, 4, 24*» (Krentz, 1989: 190).

⁵⁴ *Cfr.* Richmond, 1934: 62 for the classical description of a Roman military tent.

⁵⁵ *Cfr.*, *An.*, I, 5, 10: the tents were used as improvised raft to cross the river; *cf.*, *Arr.*, *An.*, I, 3, 6; III, 29, 4; *Curt.*, VII, 5, 17-18 for the same method among Alexander's troops. They are called «*keleks*», very common on this region till the 19th century (*cf.*, Lendle, 1995: 49, 121; Barnett, 1958: 220-221; Lehmann-Haupt [vol.1], 1910: 340-341).

⁵⁶ *Cfr.*, *An.*, III, 2, 7; III, 3, 1: the generals set the tents and carts on fire to make it easier to march. In *An.*, III, 5, 7 the tents are mentioned again, which must be a *lapsus* by Xenophon.

⁵⁷ In the Greek camp at Troy, the soldiers lived in barracks or shelters (κλισίαι: *cf.*, *Eust.*, *Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem pertinentes*, I, 185). The ones used by commanders were really palaces; the Poet names as οἶκος or δόμος what we call «*Aquiles' tent*» (*cf.*, *Hom.*, *Il.*, XIV, 471, 673). It was a place with a stockade, wide enough to keep horses, carts and cattle.

⁵⁸ Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* «*Tentorium*». Polyæn., IV, 8, 2 gives a description of Alexanders' tent. It measured 100x100 feet, what we could calculate as 100 κλιναί (*cf.*, *Ath.*, XII, 539d; *Ael.*, *VH.*, IX, 3; *Plu.*, *Eum.*, 13); *cf.*, *An.*, IV, 4, 21 for Tiribazus' tent.

dier's baggage (*cfr.*, *Cyr.*, VI, 2, 30). Straw could be used as a mattress (στιβάς; *cfr.*, *Cyr.*, V, 2, 15).

More interesting than the physical construction of the tents was the development of the σκηνή as a community of soldiers and their roll in the castramental Greek life. This group of soldiers who live in the same tent and eat together is called συσκηνία. Therefore the expression σύσσιτοι⁵⁹ was sometimes a synonym for them⁶⁰.

Xenophon pays great attention to this communal life shared by the soldiers. It is in the idealistic, moral and didactic framework of his *Cyropaedia* that we find the importance of this institution for the Greek military life clearly expressed. From the point of view of military morale, the close life of the soldiers encouraged them to share knowledge, a spirit of conquest and a strong internal solidarity in the army (*cfr.*, *Cyr.*, II, 1, 25; II, 1, 28)⁶¹.

The tent was also important for diplomacy. To share the tent was an expression of good relations and hospitality that should exist between military men. A clear example is given in *Hellenicas* VII, 1, 38, when Timagoras was put to death *on the complaint of Leon that he had refused to share quarters* (συσκηνοῦν) *with him and taken counsel in all matters with Pelopidas*⁶².

The συσκηνία as military unit was also important for logistics in Greek camps. Xenophon also refers to this cooperative action amongst tent companions on logistic and administrative matters during the *Anabasis*: For example, in *An.*, V, 8, 5-7 mentions a muledriver whose duty was to carry and take care of his companions' tools. It seems natural, since they shared the same tent, that they would not have dispersed their baggage, but kept all their belongings together during the march creating so that the process of setting up and striking the camp would be easier and faster⁶³. On account of the special circumstances of the Ten Thousand, one of the tent companions was in charge of the baggage of all those sharing the tent, thought it was normally carried by slaves or servants. Actually, the tent companions also worked together as a military unit in intendency matters in the camp. Like a συσσίτιον, the tent companions shared their provisions, for which one of them was responsible (*cfr.*, *Cyr.*, IV, 2, 34-37)⁶⁴.

Some modern authors have spoken about the possibility that the συσκηνία also played a role in the militar organisation, as a basic tactical unit in the army⁶⁵. However, we have no direct example of its tactical use in the fourth century, or of its introduction into the hierarchical Greek military order as a special unit⁶⁶.

The most similar use in a tactical context was in Polyaeus' texts referred to above when we discussed the internal organisation of the camp. In II, 3, 11, the Lacedemonian troops

⁵⁹ Poland 1932: 1833-1834; Kahrstedt 1932: 1832-1833. This institution was called φιδίτια in Sparta and ἀνδρεία in Creta. Belonging to one συσσίτιον was a necessary condition of holding civil rights. Each member should contribute some of his fields to the communal property.

⁶⁰ Poland, 1932: 1829-1831. The identification between συσσίτιον and ἀνδρεία was made by Str., X, 4, 18. Hesiquio (*s.v.*) treated συσκηνία and συσσίτιον as equivalent.

⁶¹ An example of difficult life together: *cfr.*, Arr., *An.*, I, 21, 1. About the συσκηνία in civil society *cfr.*, Launey, 1950: 1001-1036; *SEG*, II, 60; *IG*, XII, 2, 640.

⁶² *Cfr.*, Polyaeus., IV, 8, 2; more normal situation was *HG.*, III, 2, 8. An example of the necessary hospitality in the tent is *Cyr.*, II, 1, 30; As a Spartan institution: *HG.*, V, 3, 20.

⁶³ The same happened among the crew on board ships, *cfr.*, *Oec.*, VIII, 12.

⁶⁴ Though it is outside the scope of this study, we should remember how in Alexander the Great's army, the δεκάς—the most basic element of his military organization—also seems to be used as the basic unit of intendency, as the συσκηνία was among the Ten Thousand. Frontinus (IV, 1, 6) says Philipus allowed only one servant for each ten infantry men, which seems quite similar to the *Anabasis*. This suggests that in Philipus' reform, the δεκάς was the elementary logistic unit, too. *Cfr.*, Arr., *An.*, IV, 21, 10, where the sharing of provisions in the camp was made κατὰ σκηνήν.

⁶⁵ *Cfr.*, Berve, 1926: 175, as supposition following Arr., *An.*, IV, 21, 10; Toynbee (Toynbee, 1969: 369) suggests that each ἐνωμοσία would consist of a pair of συσσίτια due to the military character of this institution and the need to keep the ἐνωμοσία as the basic element of its structure. Lazenby (Lazenby, 1985: 13) rejected it, because it was not consistent with Spartan military organization. Although he accepts the ancient military character of the συσσίτιον. Launey (Launey, 1950: 1003) also claims that the συσκηνία was very probably a military unit, following *SEG.*, I, 378 and Berve's opinion.

⁶⁶ In *SEG*, I, 378 there is a reference to one σκηναρχός (II-I century B.C.).

encamped after λόχοι, μοραί, ἐνομοτιαὶ and συσσίτια; and in III, 13, 1, Chares' army was organised into τάξις, τάγμα, λόχος and συσσίτια. Out of this castramental context, we find only one reference to the tent companions as military unit in Herodotus, I, 65, 5, when he lists the military subdivisions as ἐνομοτιαὶ, τριηκαδαὶ and συσσίτια.

The absence of other references to the συσκηνία as a military unit is not difficult to understand on account of the few opportunities for such a small group to undertake any major action during the great battles. We should also remember that the basic group of the infantry among the Greek armies was the δεκάς (ten men unit)⁶⁷, although it is never mentioned in the description of an army's structure, or during any military events. There is no mention of anything smaller than the ἐνομοτιαὶ in the Greek military ordinance of our classical sources.

If we accept that the συσκηνία had a tactical character, the δεκάς and συσκηνία would have been two terms for the same military unit. This is possible if we accept the texts of Polyaeus and Herodotus just mentioned, and if we remember that συσσίτιον and συσκηνία were also synonyms. Actually, it seems very reasonable that the συσκηνία would have had a role in tactics, as it did in logistic and castration activities. There would have been no sense in attaching importance to creating solidarity and comradeship among tent companions if it had no use during the combat and in the hoplite phalanx. Therefore, the phalanx would have based its strength on the solidarity and unity of the tent companions.

The great difficulty in accepting this argument is that δεκάς, συσσίτιον and συσκηνία should each have consisted of the same number of soldiers: ten men. We know that the Roman military tent was formed by eight soldiers, but we have no sources on this matter for the Greeks. In the *Lacedemonian Republic* the members of the Lacedemonian king's tent on campaign are listed and there were ten of them⁶⁸. Xenophon's idealised view of the uniformity and austerity of the Spartan army leads us to assume that he would want to describe it without many differences between the common soldiers' tents and so it too would consist of ten men⁶⁹.

But the greatest difficulty appears when we consider the number of members in each συσσίτιον. Most of the modern authors, following Plutarch (*Lyc.*, XII, 2), think that there were 15 men at each communal Spartan table. Although, as Lazenby has said, we know from Plutarchus that this number changed in the course of Antiquity. We must also remember that his works were written four centuries after Xenophon's times (*cf.*, *Plu.*, *Agis*, VIII, 1-2; Lazenby, 1985: 13). Therefore, the evidence of this author alone can not be used to determine with any degree of certainty the number of members of the συσκηνία in the 4th century⁷⁰.

Finally we should explain why there might be two terms for the same thing. The answer may lie in the way they are used: δεκάς would be related to the tent companions as a tactical fighting division, while συσκηνία would refer to a basic logistic unit on campaign.

⁶⁷ Droysen, 1901: 2422; *cf.*, Robert, 1938: 118-126, about an inscription found at Chios from the end of the 5th century, with list of slaves, grouped by *dekadas* for a military mobilisation. Some examples of possible uses of this unit: *Cyr.*, II, 3, 21; IV, 2, 27; VI, 3, 12; VIII, 1, 14.

⁶⁸ *Cfr.*, *Lac.*, XIII, 1: the king, one polemarch for each of the six μόρα and three ὄμοιοι in charge of the tent's necessities. This three ὄμοιοι might be three young Spartans, chosen from among the 300 ἵππεις. It seems probable that they were divided into three companies of 100 men, following the opinion of Lazenby (Lazenby, 1985: 53). In *Lac.*, XV, 5, two men more are appointed to the royal tent, called «Pythii». But they did not go with the king on campaign (Rebenich, 1998: 131-132). On *Cyr.*, II, 1, 26-27, Xenophon speaks about the possibility of grouping one τάξις of 100 men on each tent to assure the control and order over his men.

⁶⁹ On *Arr.*, *An.*, IV, 21, 10 the food was distributed by tents, which we can assume held ten men («καὶ ταῦτα δοῦς οὐκ ἔφασκεν ἀναλώσει τῶν παρεσκευασμένων ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν οὐδὲ τὴν δεκάτην μοῖραν»).

⁷⁰ In *Oec.*, VIII, 13 («πάντα οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ τινι μείζονι χώρῳ ἔκειτο ἢ ἐν δεκακλίῳ στέγῃ συμμετρῶ») there is a reference to space for ten couches for communal meals on ships. Once again ten is the basic logistic unit. Some authors correct the text as «ἐν <ἐν>δεκακλίῳ...», assuming an error by the transcriber on the grounds that the capacity of a normal dining room was 11 couches (Pomeroy, 1994: 288-289). However, Pollux (I, 80) also quotes this text of Xenophon writing «ἐν δεκακλίῳ». Some authors consider the *dekakline* as a common unit of measurement in the ancient world, corresponding to 25 m² (*cf.*, McCartney, 1934: 30-35).

Συσσίτιον and συσκηνία are probably equivalent terms, but used in different contexts (civil and military). Accordingly —and though the arguments are not decisive— we think that the identification of δεκάς with συσκηνία can be accepted as very probable and logical: a ten-men unit that was the basic tactical and logistic unit in Greek camps and armies in the 4th. century.

To close this section, we should mentioned one very singular person: the πρεσβύτατον ἄπὸ σκηνῆς. He acted as visible head of his tent companions in very different contexts, having special dignity and duties in relation to the commander of the army (*cfr.*, *Cyr.*, IV, 2, 34-37)⁷¹. The respect and dignity accorded the longest-serving soldier was a common feature in Greek armies, and, for instance he had the right to speak first at any military meeting⁷².

To sum up we can say that Greek life on campaign seems to have been founded in many aspects on the male unity of tent companions (συσκηνία). In relation to the meals, servants, provisions and general logistic aspects, the tents seems to have had a great deal of autonomy. They probably played a role in the tactical military organisation of the army, too. The solidarity amongst the tent companions is a common place on the commentaries on discipline and courage in Xenophon's works. Even in the case of the *Lacedemonian Republic*, this unity of soldiers is compared with the table companions (συσσίτιον) in Sparta, when it discusses comradeship, joint action in battle and the discipline required of them as a group. Among them there was an hierarchical organisation in wich the oldest man in the tent represented the others.

9. ROUTINE AT THE CAMP

The daily life at the camp was governed by a routine described by Xenophon in his ideal arrangement in the *Lacedemonian Republic* (*Lac.*, XII, 5-7):

- The firsts activities in the morning were physical exercises, followed by the military review carried out by the first polemarch and called by the herald.
- It was followed by breakfast and the dispatch of advance lookouts.
- Most of the time of each day was free for recreation and rest before the afternoon exercises.
- At the end of the journey, the heralds announced dinner and after that, there were songs to the gods honoured in the sacrifices. Then the day ended, and everyone slept at his post and beside his arms.

That is the basic plan of an encamped army, which must be adapted in many aspects to take into account the needs and activities of every military establishment and due to the particular circumstances of each campaign. However a study of the *Hellenicas* and *Anabasis* has confirmed this general plan. Even the Persian army in the *Cyropaedia* seems to have followed the daily routine, in form and spirit, too⁷³.

⁷¹ Perhaps he was the *skenarchós* that appears on *SEG*, I, 378.

⁷² *Cfr.*, *An.*, II, 1, 10; III, 1, 34; VI, 5, 13; That is the πρεσβύτατος τῶν περὶ δαμοσίαν in the Spartan royal tent (*cfr.*, *Lac.*, XIII, 7), too. Maybe he was the first polemarch (Rebenich, 1998: 134).

⁷³ Sacrificies before breakfast: *Cyr.*, III, 3, 34; IV, 5, 13-18; VI, 4, 1; end of the day: *Cyr.*, II, 3, 1; III, 3, 28; III, 3, 33; IV, 1, 17; V, 3, 51; VI, 3, 37; sport exercises: *Cyr.*, II, 1, 29; I, 6, 17; tactical lessons in Cyrus' tent: *Cyr.*, II, 1, 20-24; II, 2, 6-10; different games *Cyr.*, II, 3, 17-20; II, 3, 21 (*cfr.* *Plu.*, *Alex.*, XXXI, 1-2); tactical exercises before dinner: *Cyr.*, II, 3, 22-24; among the fleets, are naval exercises: *HG.*, I, 1, 16; *Plu.*, *Alc.*, XXIX, 2; among Iphicrates' troops: *HG.*, VI, 2, 27-31; Chabrias: *Polyaen.*, III, 11, 7.

The first activity of the polemarches, even before breakfast, was the sacrifices to the gods. Until that had been done, no decisions were taken or orders given to the soldiers. When the sacrifices proved favourable, the commander transmitted the orders for the day to the soldiers (*cf.*, *HG.*, VI, 5, 17; *An.*, IV, 3, 9; V, 4, 22).

Then, the commander and captains passed the order to have breakfast to the heralds. This was really the beginning of the day. Now the στρατόπεδον was opened and people allowed to enter and leave the camp. This was also when the night guards finished their watch (*cf.*, *HG.*, VII, 1, 16; *An.*, III, 2, 1; *Lac.*, XII, 6). If the march was to continue that day, the camp had to be struck after breakfast, before starting off⁷⁴.

There are no references to any troop reviews in Xenophon sources, except in the *Lacedemonian Republic*. It could be a daily practice or perhaps only took place in special circumstances⁷⁵.

When the army stayed in the same place for a long time, the most important activities of the soldiers was to purchase provisions, plundering, or finding food.

The meals took place in each tent, but the officers gathered for dinner in the commander's tent. This was when orders were given and the necessary decisions taken for the next day. It finished with libations to the gods, and then each official went back to his tent, night watches were posted, the watch-word was given and the time to rest in the military camp began. The beginning or the end of these periods was normally announced with horn calls to the whole camp⁷⁶.

Indeed, all the Greek armies followed this general routine. It was something that was commonly accepted as being for the general good and had to be borne in mind when undertaking operations against the enemy. That meant not sending the soldiers out from the battle camp to fight before they had their first meal but trying to surprise the enemy before they had eaten; attacking the camp when there the watches were less vigilant, while they were preparing the meal, when many soldiers were out of the camp looking for booty in the free time, or early in the morning, or when the evening activities were just beginning (*cf.*, *Cyr.*, I, 6, 36)⁷⁷.

10. CONCLUSIONS

The first and main conclusion of our study is that the Greek military camp should be the subject of research and should get more than ten pages at most in any handbook on Greek warfare. Once the castramental vocabulary problem is resolved, and we know the exact difference on meaning between words like τὸ στρατόπεδον, τὰ ὄπλα or σκηνέω, it will be possible to attempt an approximation to Greek castramental theory of the 4th century as it would have been described in lost contemporary works, such as the one by Aeneas Tacticus.

⁷⁴ *Cfr.*, *An.*, IV, 1, 12-14; III, 3, 1 (with a logic inversion of order due to the special circumstances). On naval forces: *HG.*, II, 1, 22. Anderson thinks that the Greek armies usually started the march without having a regular cooked breakfast («cooked meal»), having their first meal at the end of the march at midday (Anderson, 1974: 90). But the sources and common sense say that the soldiers should have breakfast before the march.

⁷⁵ *Cfr.*, *An.*, II, 3, 1-3 (therefore Clearchus was in fact the first polemarch in Cyrus' army). Liers said, following this text, that there was a daily review, intended to check that there was no one missing in the στρατόπεδον (Liers, 1895: 154).

⁷⁶ In the case of naval forces, it was made by a signalling system between the ships: *HG.*, II, 1, 22; Polyæn., III, 9, 63; V, 32, 2. In Aeneas Tacticus we also find a signal system to announce to the troops in the territory the time for re-shifting to the camp in the afternoon (VII, 2), the moment for preparing the dinner and starting the watch-posts (VII, 3; XVIII, 1) and the close of the city and start of the night time (X, 14).

⁷⁷ Going out to look for booty: *HG.*, I, 2, 5; III, 2, 2-5; at lunch time: *HG.*, I, 6, 21; Polyæn., I, 48, 4; VI, 27, 1; when the soldiers were out of the camp looking for provisions: *HG.*, II, 1, 27-28; in the early morning: *HG.*, II, 4, 4-6; IV, 1, 24; VII, 1, 16; Polyæn., IV, 6, 8.

The Greek military camp seems to have had a high level of professional organisation, with a regular plan and internal structure, a very sophisticated watch guard system and a routine that shows the generals' concern for the order and discipline of their troops. Inside the camp, as well as in each military force, it was the group of soldiers who shared the same tent (tent companions or *συσκηνία*) that was the basic element around which the whole of life on campaign was organised.

Although we have limited our sources to Xenophon's works and our final view must be reached with caution due to the special nature and concern of Xenophon's writings, the results are very positive. However it is clear, too, that we must wait for more and wider research of the classical sources to reach a more general understanding of castramental theory in the classical Greek period. This is only the beginning.

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